> On 19 Dec 2018, at 01:10, Russell Standish <[email protected]> wrote: > > On Mon, Dec 17, 2018 at 01:57:43PM -0800, [email protected] wrote: >> >> >> On Monday, December 17, 2018 at 8:43:32 PM UTC, Brent wrote: >> >> >> I don't necessarily accept those, but I'm willing to consider them as a >> theory of everything and see what they predict. One thing you often >> repeat is that you can derive QM from them. So what is that derivation? >> >> >> I've requested that (approximate) derivation several times for motivational >> purposes, but to no avail. >> I am doubtful he can do it. He just keeps saying to read his papers. AG >> > > The answer has been stated a number of times - various modal logics > appear by applying the Theatetus "trick" from the definition of > knowledge □p & p to the modal logic of provable and consistent > statements □p & ◇p, and then restricted to computable statements Σ₁ > gives rise to a modal logic Z₁ which satisfies the basic axioms of > quantum logic. > > The best explanation of it (not so technical) is put forward in > Marchal's "le secret de l'amibe", translated as "The Amoeba's Secret" > in English. > > Interesting, but a little underwhelming IMHO. Basically, he enumerates > a number of different model logic structures related to knowledge, > provability, consistency and belief, as well as restricting things to > the computable domain, and ends up with something resembling the > abstract skeleton of quantum mechanics extracted by von Neumann and > Birkhoff. I never quite understood why that particular modal logic was > the one that was supposed to describe matter.
Take step 3 with the “new” protocol, where you are offered a cup of coffee in Washington and Moscow. We want that P(coffee) = 1. But we cannot prove our own consistency, so the Gödel’s [] cannot work. We might belong to a cul-de-sac world where [](coffee) is always trivially true ([]coffee = ~<>~coffee, which is true as <>~coffee is false!). Cul de sac worlds satisfy []f. So to get a probability on consistent extension, we need to force consistency (the default hypothesis of probability theory) in the definition of the probability predicate, and that is why we need []p & <>t. In the case, P(coffee) = 1, and P(“seeing only once city”) = 1 to, and we get the first person indeterminacy. (And the quantum logic, when p is sigma_1, which means p is UD-accessible). Note that []p & p is stronger, in general than []p & <>t. (And UDA has already motivate that physics = measure on the consistent computational extensions). Incompleteness does not leave any choice. G * prove the equivalence between all modes, but G does not, so by Solovay theorems, the machine introspecting itself cannot avoid those nuances, and can study their logics and, like us, verify them. Cheers! Bruno > > > > -- > > ---------------------------------------------------------------------------- > Dr Russell Standish Phone 0425 253119 (mobile) > Principal, High Performance Coders > Visiting Senior Research Fellow [email protected] > Economics, Kingston University http://www.hpcoders.com.au > ---------------------------------------------------------------------------- > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an > email to [email protected]. > To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. > Visit this group at https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. > For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to [email protected]. To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. Visit this group at https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
