On Thursday, December 20, 2018 at 5:41:07 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal wrote: > > > On 19 Dec 2018, at 19:36, Philip Thrift <[email protected] <javascript:>> > wrote: > > > > On Wednesday, December 19, 2018 at 9:19:50 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal wrote: >> >> >> On 18 Dec 2018, at 16:40, Philip Thrift <[email protected]> wrote: >> >> >> snip >> >> > >> >> I should add: Why is fictionalism compelling? >> >> When you get down to the bottom of it, *numbers are spiritual entities*. >> >> >> I have no problem with that. I have some evidence for spiritual entities, >> indeed all the mathematical notions are spiritual or immaterial, then >> consciousness mind, etc. >> >> >> >> Many are compelled to want to eliminate spiritual entities. >> >> >> >> Like you apparently. If you put the spiritual entities, like numbers and >> math in fictionalism, it will look you consider them as fiction, it seems >> to me. >> >> I am problem driven. And my favorite problem is the mind-body problem. I >> reduce the mind-body problem into the justification why universal spiritual >> entities get the (admittedly persistent) impression of a primitively >> material world. I found it. All universal “spiritual” entities go through >> this. >> >> Bruno >> >> >> > > A: There is arithmetical reality where there are "simulated" entities that > surmise a material reality (but matter itself does not actually exist). > > M. There is material reality where arithmetic is a language (or language > group) created by material entities. > > > But the arithmetical reality is not a language. > > > > > But to have A producing matter in reality, or matter "emerging from" A > (A→M), is a kind of dualism. And what would be the need for A→M if A is > enough? > > > Because []p & <>t (prediction) is not the same as []p, from the point of > view of the machine. It feels different. It obeys different laws. That > difference of perception is explained in virtue of the arithmetical > reality.. > > > > > In M, "mind" comes from the psychical states of matter (Strawson, et al., > who say of course that the "mechanistic", "physicalistic", whatever > materialists are misguided). > > > > Which psychical states of matter? > > Should we give the right to vote to Milk and coffee? > > To have thinking, usually we bet on some form of dialog, and that is why a > brain or a computer has so many connexions/relations. Why would we need a > brain if there is some primary matter with the ability to think? Do you > think a brain is not Turing emulable, or do you think a brain can be Turing > emulated but that this would only make a p-zombie (someone acting like it > was conscious, but isn’t?). > > Bruno > > > > That arithmetic is a language (or technically, a language group) leads to it (from a language theory perspective) includes both syntax & semantics.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Programming_language_theory Formal semantics Main article: Formal semantics of programming languages <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Formal_semantics_of_programming_languages> Formal semantics is the formal specification of the behavior of computer programs and programming languages. Three common approaches to describe the semantics or "meaning" of a computer program are denotational semantics <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Denotational_semantics>, operational semantics <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Operational_semantics> and axiomatic semantics <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Axiomatic_semantics>. (From a fictionalist view, the objects of arithmetic are fictional objects: a fictional semantics.) The psychical (experiential) states of matter (brain) are the real constituents (psychicals) of consciousness. The brain-as-computer operates with psychicals as a Turing-machine operates with symbols. - pt -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to [email protected]. To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. Visit this group at https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
