> On 20 Dec 2018, at 14:49, Philip Thrift <[email protected]> wrote: > > > > On Thursday, December 20, 2018 at 5:41:07 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal wrote: > >> On 19 Dec 2018, at 19:36, Philip Thrift <[email protected] <javascript:>> >> wrote: >> >> >> >> On Wednesday, December 19, 2018 at 9:19:50 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal wrote: >> >>> On 18 Dec 2018, at 16:40, Philip Thrift <[email protected] <>> wrote: >>> >>> >>> snip > >>> >>> >>> I should add: Why is fictionalism compelling? >>> >>> When you get down to the bottom of it, numbers are spiritual entities. >> >> I have no problem with that. I have some evidence for spiritual entities, >> indeed all the mathematical notions are spiritual or immaterial, then >> consciousness mind, etc. >> >> >> >>> Many are compelled to want to eliminate spiritual entities. >> >> >> Like you apparently. If you put the spiritual entities, like numbers and >> math in fictionalism, it will look you consider them as fiction, it seems to >> me. >> >> I am problem driven. And my favorite problem is the mind-body problem. I >> reduce the mind-body problem into the justification why universal spiritual >> entities get the (admittedly persistent) impression of a primitively >> material world. I found it. All universal “spiritual” entities go through >> this. >> >> Bruno >> >> >> >> >> A: There is arithmetical reality where there are "simulated" entities that >> surmise a material reality (but matter itself does not actually exist). >> >> M. There is material reality where arithmetic is a language (or language >> group) created by material entities. > > But the arithmetical reality is not a language. > > > >> >> But to have A producing matter in reality, or matter "emerging from" A >> (A→M), is a kind of dualism. And what would be the need for A→M if A is >> enough? > > Because []p & <>t (prediction) is not the same as []p, from the point of view > of the machine. It feels different. It obeys different laws. That difference > of perception is explained in virtue of the arithmetical reality.. > > > >> >> In M, "mind" comes from the psychical states of matter (Strawson, et al., >> who say of course that the "mechanistic", "physicalistic", whatever >> materialists are misguided). > > > Which psychical states of matter? > > Should we give the right to vote to Milk and coffee? > > To have thinking, usually we bet on some form of dialog, and that is why a > brain or a computer has so many connexions/relations. Why would we need a > brain if there is some primary matter with the ability to think? Do you think > a brain is not Turing emulable, or do you think a brain can be Turing > emulated but that this would only make a p-zombie (someone acting like it was > conscious, but isn’t?). > > Bruno > > > > > That arithmetic is a language (or technically, a language group) leads to it > (from a language theory perspective) includes both syntax & semantics. > > https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Programming_language_theory > Formal semantics > > Main article: Formal semantics of programming languages > <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Formal_semantics_of_programming_languages> > Formal semantics is the formal specification of the behavior of computer > programs and programming languages. Three common approaches to describe the > semantics or "meaning" of a computer program are denotational semantics > <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Denotational_semantics>, operational semantics > <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Operational_semantics> and axiomatic semantics > <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Axiomatic_semantics>. > >
Wiki is not quite accurate on those matters. Better to separate the language, the semantics, and the theories. I use the notion of theory, to avoid the “semantics” used in programming language (to avoid possible confusion). > (From a fictionalist view, the objects of arithmetic are fictional objects: a > fictional semantics.) The point is that with Mechanism, primary physics is inconsistent. So we are out of my working hypothesis. > > > The psychical (experiential) states of matter (brain) Why a brain? If matter can be conscious, what is the role of the (non-digital) brain? > are the real constituents (psychicals) of consciousness. The > brain-as-computer operates with psychicals as a Turing-machine operates with > symbols. I don’t understand. To be sure, I have no idea at all of this could work. Please try to explain like you would explain this to a kid. Up to now, I see only a magical use of word. For a logician, a theory works when you can substitute any words by any words. Maybe use the axiomatic presentation, with f_i for the functional symbols, and R_i for the relation symbols. If not, it is hard to see if there is a theory, or just idea-associations. Bruno > > > - pt > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an > email to [email protected] > <mailto:[email protected]>. > To post to this group, send email to [email protected] > <mailto:[email protected]>. > Visit this group at https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list > <https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list>. > For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout > <https://groups.google.com/d/optout>. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to [email protected]. To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. Visit this group at https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
