On Friday, December 21, 2018 at 3:18:26 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal wrote:
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> On 20 Dec 2018, at 14:49, Philip Thrift <cloud...@gmail.com <javascript:>> 
> wrote:
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> The psychical (experiential) states of matter (brain) 
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> Why a brain? If matter can be conscious, what is the role of the 
> (non-digital) brain?
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> are the real constituents (psychicals) of consciousness. The 
> brain-as-computer operates with psychicals as a Turing-machine operates 
> with symbols. 
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> I don’t understand. To be sure, I have no idea at all of this could work. 
> Please try to explain like you would explain this to a kid. Up to now, I 
> see only a magical use of word.
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> For a logician, a theory works when you can substitute any words by any 
> words. Maybe use the axiomatic presentation, with f_i for the functional 
> symbols, and R_i for the relation symbols. If not, it is hard to see if 
> there is a theory, or just idea-associations.
>
> Bruno 
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Whether psychicals (*experiential states*) go down to, say insects, that's 
one thing scientists are studying:

    
https://www.smithsonianmag.com/science-nature/do-insects-have-consciousness-180959484/

Whether they go down to cells, molecules, particles, ... ,that's another 
thing (the next chapter):

  
  https://www.penguin.co.uk/books/111/1117019/galileo-s-error/9781846046018.html

     

On experiential semantics (for brain-as-computer): The toy example as I've 
given before is to think of a Turing-type computer, but instead of 
operating with symbols, it is operating with emojis - but the emojis have 
actual (material!) realization as experience.

- pt

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