On Monday, December 24, 2018 at 6:55:46 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal wrote: > > > On 23 Dec 2018, at 13:39, Philip Thrift <[email protected] <javascript:>> > wrote: > > > > On Sunday, December 23, 2018 at 5:20:57 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal wrote: >> >> >> On 21 Dec 2018, at 11:06, Philip Thrift <[email protected]> wrote: >> >> >> >> On Friday, December 21, 2018 at 3:18:26 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal wrote: >>> >>> >>> On 20 Dec 2018, at 14:49, Philip Thrift <[email protected]> wrote: >>> >>> >>> The psychical (experiential) states of matter (brain) >>> >>> >>> Why a brain? If matter can be conscious, what is the role of the >>> (non-digital) brain? >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> are the real constituents (psychicals) of consciousness. The >>> brain-as-computer operates with psychicals as a Turing-machine operates >>> with symbols. >>> >>> >>> I don’t understand. To be sure, I have no idea at all of this could >>> work. Please try to explain like you would explain this to a kid. Up to >>> now, I see only a magical use of word. >>> >>> For a logician, a theory works when you can substitute any words by any >>> words. Maybe use the axiomatic presentation, with f_i for the functional >>> symbols, and R_i for the relation symbols. If not, it is hard to see if >>> there is a theory, or just idea-associations. >>> >>> Bruno >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> >> >> >> Whether psychicals (*experiential states*) go down to, say insects, >> that's one thing scientists are studying: >> >> >> https://www.smithsonianmag.com/science-nature/do-insects-have-consciousness-180959484/ >> >> Whether they go down to cells, molecules, particles, ... ,that's another >> thing (the next chapter): >> >> >> https://www.penguin.co.uk/books/111/1117019/galileo-s-error/9781846046018.html >> >> >> >> On experiential semantics (for brain-as-computer): The toy example as >> I've given before is to think of a Turing-type computer, but instead of >> operating with symbols, it is operating with emojis - but the emojis have >> actual (material!) realization as experience. >> >> >> >> You lost me. One of my goal is to explain “matter”, and with mechanism, >> we cannot assume it at the start. Mechanism makes any role for some primary >> matter being quite magical. >> >> Bruno >> >> >> >> > > But the point is: Matter is not *Mechanistic*. > Matter is *Experientialistic*. > > That's the whole thing! > > > But Mechanism implies exactly this: matter is experientialistic (first > person, phenomenological) and indeed not emulable by any Turing machine, > and so Mechanism explains the existence of a non mechanistic > phenomenological matter. For example, to copy any piece of matter, we would > need to run the entire universal dovetailing in a finite time, this entails > a “non-cloning” theorem for matter, confirmed by QM. > In arithmetic, the universal machines are confronted with many non > computable things, including first person and consciousness, and matter. > Most arithmetical truth are not computable, and the matter indeterminacy > inherit it by the First Person Indeterminacy on all computations. > > Bruno > > >
Engineers might be happy with imperfect cloning of matter. - pt -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to [email protected]. To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. Visit this group at https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
