> On 23 Dec 2018, at 13:39, Philip Thrift <cloudver...@gmail.com> wrote:
> 
> 
> 
> On Sunday, December 23, 2018 at 5:20:57 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal wrote:
> 
>> On 21 Dec 2018, at 11:06, Philip Thrift <cloud...@gmail.com <javascript:>> 
>> wrote:
>> 
>> 
>> 
>> On Friday, December 21, 2018 at 3:18:26 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>> 
>>> On 20 Dec 2018, at 14:49, Philip Thrift <cloud...@gmail.com <>> wrote:
>>> 
>>> The psychical (experiential) states of matter (brain)
>> 
>> Why a brain? If matter can be conscious, what is the role of the 
>> (non-digital) brain?
>> 
>> 
>> 
>> 
>> 
>> 
>>> are the real constituents (psychicals) of consciousness. The 
>>> brain-as-computer operates with psychicals as a Turing-machine operates 
>>> with symbols. 
>> 
>> I don’t understand. To be sure, I have no idea at all of this could work. 
>> Please try to explain like you would explain this to a kid. Up to now, I see 
>> only a magical use of word.
>> 
>> For a logician, a theory works when you can substitute any words by any 
>> words. Maybe use the axiomatic presentation, with f_i for the functional 
>> symbols, and R_i for the relation symbols. If not, it is hard to see if 
>> there is a theory, or just idea-associations.
>> 
>> Bruno 
>> 
>> 
>> 
>> 
>> 
>> 
>> 
>> Whether psychicals (experiential states) go down to, say insects, that's one 
>> thing scientists are studying:
>> 
>>     
>> https://www.smithsonianmag.com/science-nature/do-insects-have-consciousness-180959484/
>>  
>> <https://www.smithsonianmag.com/science-nature/do-insects-have-consciousness-180959484/>
>> 
>> Whether they go down to cells, molecules, particles, ... ,that's another 
>> thing (the next chapter):
>> 
>>     
>> https://www.penguin.co.uk/books/111/1117019/galileo-s-error/9781846046018.html
>>  
>> <https://www.penguin.co.uk/books/111/1117019/galileo-s-error/9781846046018.html>
>> 
>>      
>> 
>> On experiential semantics (for brain-as-computer): The toy example as I've 
>> given before is to think of a Turing-type computer, but instead of operating 
>> with symbols, it is operating with emojis - but the emojis have actual 
>> (material!) realization as experience.
> 
> 
> You lost me. One of my goal is to explain “matter”, and with mechanism, we 
> cannot assume it at the start. Mechanism makes any role for some primary 
> matter being quite magical.
> 
> Bruno
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> But the point is: Matter is not Mechanistic.
> Matter is Experientialistic.
> 
> That's the whole thing!

But Mechanism implies exactly this: matter is experientialistic (first person, 
phenomenological) and indeed not emulable by any Turing machine, and so 
Mechanism explains the existence of a non mechanistic phenomenological matter. 
For example, to copy any piece of matter, we would need to run the entire 
universal dovetailing in a finite time, this entails a “non-cloning” theorem 
for matter, confirmed by QM.
In arithmetic, the universal machines are confronted with many non computable 
things, including first person and consciousness, and matter. Most arithmetical 
truth are not computable, and the matter indeterminacy inherit it by the First 
Person Indeterminacy on all computations.

Bruno



> 
> - pt
> 
>  
> 
> -- 
> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
> "Everything List" group.
> To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an 
> email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com 
> <mailto:everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com>.
> To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com 
> <mailto:everything-list@googlegroups.com>.
> Visit this group at https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list 
> <https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list>.
> For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout 
> <https://groups.google.com/d/optout>.

-- 
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
"Everything List" group.
To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email 
to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com.
Visit this group at https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list.
For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.

Reply via email to