> On 29 Dec 2018, at 21:28, Brent Meeker <[email protected]> wrote: > > > > On 12/29/2018 3:54 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: >> >>> On 24 Dec 2018, at 20:45, Brent Meeker <[email protected] >>> <mailto:[email protected]>> wrote: >>> >>> >>> >>> On 12/24/2018 5:18 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: >>>> >>>>> On 24 Dec 2018, at 00:23, Brent Meeker <[email protected] >>>>> <mailto:[email protected]>> wrote: >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> On 12/23/2018 10:21 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: >>>>>> >>>>>>> On 22 Dec 2018, at 23:08, Brent Meeker <[email protected] >>>>>>> <mailto:[email protected]>> wrote: >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> On 12/21/2018 10:43 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> ... >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> With Mechanism, physics has to be the same for all “observers” aka >>>>>>>> universal machines, and indeed physics has to be independent of the >>>>>>>> initial theory (phi_independent, or “machine independent” in the sense >>>>>>>> of theoretical computer scientist (recursion theory does not depend on >>>>>>>> which universal machinery we talk about). >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> Indeed, physics becomes simply the “measure one expectation” of the >>>>>>>> universal machine on all computations going through (any) of its >>>>>>>> states. All the rest will be contingent and can be called geographical >>>>>>>> and/or historical. Our mundane consciousness requires long and deep >>>>>>>> histories. >>>>>>> >>>>>>> So what expectation has measure 1.0? Can you show that it includes >>>>>>> conservation of energy-momentum for example? >>>>>> >>>>>> You should revise the basics. The answer is no of course. There is not >>>>>> yet energy, physical time, … It is not even on the horizon. >>>>>> >>>>>> Soling the mind body is not simple. But physics as metaphysics is simply >>>>>> wrong with mechanism, so to solve the mind body problem, there is no >>>>>> other choice, unless you know a better theory, of course. >>>>> >>>>> Of course there are other choices: (1) Mechanism is wrong >>>> >>>> Sure. That is what we can test. It fits well the fact until now, unlike >>>> the materialist metaphysics. >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>>> (2) Your argument is wrong >>>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> Of course, that remains always a possibility, but you cannot assume this, >>>> you have to find the mistake. >>> >>> One mistake is in inferring from the possibility of "accidental" >>> implementations of computations instantiating conscious thoughts that no >>> physical implementation is required at all. >> >> That is equivalent with the creationist critic of the theory of evolution. >> They could say that the mistake is in inferring from the possibility of >> “accidental” implementations of computations in a physical reality >> instantiating conscious thoughts that no God intervention if required at all. >> >> The mistake done here by the creationist or the materialist is in invoking >> an ontological commitment to avoid testing a simpler (shorter) theory which >> avoids that ontological commitment.. > > It's not a commitment. It's an empirical observation.
I don’t think so. Physicist measure numbers, and correlate them in extrapolated mathematical relation; with diverse possible interpretations (as QM illustrates well). An ontology always ask for some faith. > >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> Another is supposing that an "ideal machine" that knows/believes/proves >>> every theorem of arithmetic is a reasonable model of conscious thought. >> >> >> It is not a model/theory of conscious thought. It is just that any sound >> digital machine looking inward discovers immediate indubitable (and thus >> knowable) truth which are non sharable, > > If they are knowable, why aren't they sharable? You seem to be trapped by > identifying know=provable. ? On the contrary I distinguish very precisely know and provable, given that know has become “provable-and-true”, which is equivalent in G*, but quite distinct from the machine points of view. Personal consciousness is knowable, for example, but is not sharable per se. You need to be a good poet to approximate the sharing, and even this presupposes enough common experiences. > >> non provable and non rationally justifiable, which explains pretty well the >> “conscious” experience, without any supplementary ontological commitment. > > It's a bug not a feature when your minimalist ontology prevents your theory > from predicting anything (or less than everything). Up to now, it works, where physicalism needs to invoke actual infinities, non computable phenomenon in exploitable by nature. It predicts better than physics, strictly speaking. Indeed, mechanism predicts physics itself, and explain why the numbers cannot avoid it, and this in a precise enough manner so that we can make the test. Note also that the arithmetical self-referential does explain the quanta, and the qualia, and why they look so different and obey different mathematics. Materialism or physicalism still needs a “god” in the Aristotelian sense, for which we don’t have any evidence at all. It simplifies the research in natural science, but leads to the idea that consciousness, free-will, meanings do not exist (which is nonsense). You can decide that physics = metaphysics, but that is the Aristotelian act of faith, and its predication fails in metaphysics, where mechanism is well verified up to now. Bruno > > Brent > > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an > email to [email protected] > <mailto:[email protected]>. > To post to this group, send email to [email protected] > <mailto:[email protected]>. > Visit this group at https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list > <https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list>. > For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout > <https://groups.google.com/d/optout>. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to [email protected]. To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. Visit this group at https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
