> On 24 Dec 2018, at 00:23, Brent Meeker <[email protected]> wrote: > > > > On 12/23/2018 10:21 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: >> >>> On 22 Dec 2018, at 23:08, Brent Meeker <[email protected] >>> <mailto:[email protected]>> wrote: >>> >>> >>> >>> On 12/21/2018 10:43 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: >>>> >>>> ... >>>> >>>> With Mechanism, physics has to be the same for all “observers” aka >>>> universal machines, and indeed physics has to be independent of the >>>> initial theory (phi_independent, or “machine independent” in the sense of >>>> theoretical computer scientist (recursion theory does not depend on which >>>> universal machinery we talk about). >>>> >>>> Indeed, physics becomes simply the “measure one expectation” of the >>>> universal machine on all computations going through (any) of its states. >>>> All the rest will be contingent and can be called geographical and/or >>>> historical. Our mundane consciousness requires long and deep histories. >>> >>> So what expectation has measure 1.0? Can you show that it includes >>> conservation of energy-momentum for example? >> >> You should revise the basics. The answer is no of course. There is not yet >> energy, physical time, … It is not even on the horizon. >> >> Soling the mind body is not simple. But physics as metaphysics is simply >> wrong with mechanism, so to solve the mind body problem, there is no other >> choice, unless you know a better theory, of course. > > Of course there are other choices: (1) Mechanism is wrong
Sure. That is what we can test. It fits well the fact until now, unlike the materialist metaphysics. > (2) Your argument is wrong > Of course, that remains always a possibility, but you cannot assume this, you have to find the mistake. Bruno > Brent > >> >> >> >> >>> >>>> >>>> It could have been possible that the logic of physics would have collapsed >>>> into classical logic, >>> >>> No. It could have been possible that your theory incorrectly predicted the >>> logic of physics collapsed. Which would have been bad for your theory, >>> but would have had no effect on physics. >> >> If the theory incorrectly predict something, it has to be abandoned. Your >> way of phrasing things seems strange to me. The notion of incorrect >> prediction is fuzzy. If mechanism incorrectly predict that an electron >> weight is one kilogram, then, we correct the prediction, and if we find it >> is 2 kilos, we still abandon the theory (unless get some further >> explanation, like the presence of hyper bosons with negative masses happing >> to keep up the appearances … > > But you don't predict anything like that. You assume that elements > implementing computations could be substituted for parts of the human brain > with noticeable effect. So that's one thing that could be wrong. It might > be that you have to use atoms and molecules. The rest of your agrument, that > cosmic rays could intervene to repair brain damage also seems doubtful. And > your reliance on quantum mechanics may well be undermined by the quantum > theory of gravity. Your theory doesn't predict anything and it only > retrodicts a few aspects of QM. > > Brent > >> >> I have no theory. Digital Mechanism is already implicit in Darwin theory of >> evolution, and molecular biology has confirmed the (relative) digital aspect >> of it. >> >> All hamiltonian use in physics are computable, and QM preserves >> computability, so non mechanism is speculating on appeal to magical >> thinking, without evidences. >> >> >> >> >>> >>>> for example if incompleteness was false and arithmetic complete, in that >>>> case there would be a infinite “landscape” of geographies/histories >>>> possible, and the laws of physics would be trivial somehow, that is empty. >>>> Thanks to incompleteness the logic of physics (that is, the logic of the >>>> measure one on the sigma_1 sentences (the logic of []p & <>t); obeys a non >>>> trivial logic quantum, and orthomodular logic suggesting the probabilities >>>> are not trivial, and suggesting also that the logico-physical bottom (the >>>> leaves of the UD, the sigma_1 true sentences) is symmetrical from that >>>> “observable” view point. >>> >>> But the probabilities you've derived are either zero or one...which I'd say >>> are trivial. >> >> Not at all, that gives a quantum logic for the yes-no experiences, and if it >> is the right type, you will get a Gleason theorem (as it should be with >> Mechanism), and derives the other probabilities from this. >> >> Anyway, no other theories works today, I think. Physics works, because it >> makes a listing assumption which is just non sensical with digital >> mechanism. You need infinite amount of energy/information to localise a soul >> in a body when you assume mechanism. >> >> >> >> >>> >>>> >>>> The core physical laws are invariant for all universal (Löbian) machine >>>> (in the Classical Digital Frame of course). It is first person plural >>>> indeterminacy on all relative computations. >>>> >>>> That is why we can detect experimentally if mechanism is false (assuming >>>> that we are not in a malevolent second order emulation, where we are just >>>> lied) by comparing the physics “sum on all computations” >>> >>> But what does it mean to "sum on all computations”? >> >> UDA gives the intuitive meaning, with the UD pictures for the true sigma_1 >> sentences. >> >> AUDA gives the mathematics of the measure one, and how to proceed from that, >> if you are interested in metaphysics (nothing to do with physics a priori: >> to use metaphysics for doing physics, is like is like using the LARC to >> taste a pizza). >> >> >> >>> >>>> with the physics of the “actually” observable predictions. >>> >>> What is an observation in these computations? >> >> It receive an input, like seeing Washington, instead of Moscow, or reading 4 >> instead of 5. It is a local measurement, usually kept in some memory for >> further comparisons. >> >> >> >> >>> >>>> If there is a discrepancy, mechanism is refuted, or we are in the normal >>>> (gaussian) world, but “captured in some simulation trying to prevent we >>>> got the right laws of physics (something rather absurde, and which >>>> requires an infinite work on the par of the liar). >>>> >>>> If Planck constant is derivable from mathematical constant coming from the >>>> semantics of the “material hypostases” (the S4Grz1, Z1*, X1* logics), then >>>> it is part of the laws. If the Planck constant is shown to be not >>>> derivable from them, then it is “geographical”, and some region of the >>>> “multi-multi-verse” might have a different one. >>> >>> That's just saying either my theory applies to X, or X is an exception. >> >> >> It is saying either Mechanism is true and this observable feature is not an >> invariant, or Mechanism is false. >> >> >> >>> >>>> >>>> The quantum seems to be the digital seen from inside. Mechanism saves the >>>> quantum and symmetries from being contingent geographies. The laws of >>>> physics are laws, indeed, mathematical laws derivable from the mathematics >>>> of the universal (Gödel-Löbian) machines. >>>> >>>> Number theory might suggest shortcut toward physics, and explain why group >>>> theory plays a so big role in physics, and why it seems the unitary group >>>> imposes itself and how this is related to a measure one on a universal >>>> Turing structure. The particles are group invariants, so that light help >>>> to get the bosons and the fermions. >>> >>> The particles are (local) Lorentz invariants. But how do Lorentz >>> transformations show up in the computations (of the Ud?)? >> >> This is explained in Vic Stenger’s book, in a way which shows that physics >> is already in a large part derivable from simple invariance principles. >> >> But Mechanism is at weight years away from explaining space. Number theorist >> will get it before the theologians! >> >> Normally, space comes from a knotty structure, a projection algebra, or a >> Temperley Lieb Algebra related to the fact that the Z and X logic are graded >> on their extensions, and obeys relation involving []^n<>^n+1[]^n and >> <>^n[]^n+1<>^n. But the math is hard. (That was expected of course, the >> whole subject is difficult, and all error in philosophies and theologies can >> be sees as a confusion between two self-referential modes. Here G/G* >> clarifies a lot. >> >> Bruno >> >> >> >>> >>> Brent >>> >>>> >>>> We can dig from all sides. The advantage of looking “in the head of the >>>> universal machine” is that we benefit from the Gödel-Löb-Solovay G/G* >>>> separation between proof and truth, and its inheritance in the “material” >>>> hypostases, which explains a lot, I think, about the relation between the >>>> qualia and the quanta, the sensible privately knowable and the first >>>> person plural sharable. >>>> >>>> Bruno >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>>> >>>>> Jason >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> -- >>>>> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups >>>>> "Everything List" group. >>>>> To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an >>>>> email to [email protected] >>>>> <mailto:[email protected]>. >>>>> To post to this group, send email to [email protected] >>>>> <mailto:[email protected]>. >>>>> Visit this group at https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list >>>>> <https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list>. >>>>> For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout >>>>> <https://groups.google.com/d/optout>. >>>> >>>> -- >>>> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups >>>> "Everything List" group. >>>> To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an >>>> email to [email protected] >>>> <mailto:[email protected]>. >>>> To post to this group, send email to [email protected] >>>> <mailto:[email protected]>. >>>> Visit this group at https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list >>>> <https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list>. >>>> For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout >>>> <https://groups.google.com/d/optout>. >>> >>> >>> -- >>> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups >>> "Everything List" group. >>> To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an >>> email to [email protected] >>> <mailto:[email protected]>. >>> To post to this group, send email to [email protected] >>> <mailto:[email protected]>. >>> Visit this group at https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list >>> <https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list>. >>> For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout >>> <https://groups.google.com/d/optout>. >> >> -- >> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups >> "Everything List" group. >> To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an >> email to [email protected] >> <mailto:[email protected]>. >> To post to this group, send email to [email protected] >> <mailto:[email protected]>. >> Visit this group at https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list >> <https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list>. >> For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout >> <https://groups.google.com/d/optout>. > > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an > email to [email protected] > <mailto:[email protected]>. > To post to this group, send email to [email protected] > <mailto:[email protected]>. > Visit this group at https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list > <https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list>. > For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout > <https://groups.google.com/d/optout>. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. 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