On Saturday, January 5, 2019, Philip Thrift <cloudver...@gmail.com> wrote:
> > > On Saturday, January 5, 2019 at 12:02:53 PM UTC-6, Jason wrote: >> >> >> >> On Sat, Jan 5, 2019 at 6:13 AM Philip Thrift <cloud...@gmail.com> wrote: >> >>> >>> On Saturday, January 5, 2019 at 4:26:11 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal wrote: >>>> >>>> >>>> On 4 Jan 2019, at 17:25, Philip Thrift <cloud...@gmail.com> wrote: >>>> >>>> >>>> Physicists today (as I've observed) are not (for the most part) real >>>> materialists. >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> That is true, and physicists have rarely problem with the consequence >>>> of Mechanism. Now, some physicist can be immaterialist, but still >>>> physicalist (like Tegmark was at some moment at least). The physical >>>> reality would be a mathematical reality among others, but with >>>> computationalism, the physical reality comes from a more global >>>> mathematical phenomenon based on the behaviour/semantics of the material >>>> mode of self-rereyence (involving probabilities, i.e., for those who have >>>> studied the self-referential modes available, the p & X modes, with X >>>> being either p, or <>t, or p & <>t). >>>> >>>> This makes mechanism testable, and if quantum mechanics did not exist, >>>> I would have thought that Mechanism is already refuted. >>>> >>>> Bruno >>>> >>>> >>> >>> >>> "Physicalism"/"Physical" are words that needs deprecating, as they can >>> mean (to some philosophers of science) "can be reduced to physics", and >>> physics is what is currently-accepted in the physics scientific community. >>> >>> (When I use "physical", I mean it in the sense of being "explainable" by >>> physics.) >>> >>> It gets worse: "In this entry, I will adopt the policy of using both >>> terms ['materialism' and 'physicalism'] interchangeably, though I will >>> typically refer to the thesis we will discuss as ‘physicalism’." >>> https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/physicalism/ >>> >>> Better to just use "materialism" and reject the use of "physicalism" >>> (unless it refers to a the particular meaning of "can be reduced to >>> physics"), though materialism has a "weak" and "strong" definition. >>> >>> Galen Strawson defines what "hard-nosed materialism" is: >>> >>> https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=HvHVo6TslV4 >>> >>> >> The important distinction, which may be lost in your definitions, is >> whether "primariness" is assumed or not. These diagrams I made highlight >> the difference: >> >> >> *Primary Physicalism (Physics is at the bottom, and cannot be explained >> or derived from anything else):* >> [image: primary-physicalism.png] >> >> *Non-Primary Physicalism (Physics is not at the bottom, and can be >> explained or derived from something more fundamental):* >> [image: non-primary-physicalism.png] >> >> You could also be agnostic on the question, let's call someone with that >> belief a "*Primary Physicalism Agnostic*". >> >> Currently, scientists have collected zero evidence in favor of Primary >> Physicalism. So if you strongly believe it, you might want to consider why >> it is you believe in something so strongly despite there being no evidence >> for it. >> >> >> >>> >>> >>> But what exactly would be a "test for Mechanism"? >>> >>> >> If you replace one or more of your neurons with a mechanical yet >> functionally equivalent replacement and experience no change in >> consciousness. >> >> The existence and utility of cochlear implants can be seen as a loose >> confirmation of digital mechanism. >> >> Jason >> > > > > A question remains though: Can chemistry (or biology for that matter) be > reduced to physics? By that it is typically meant "Can problems of > theoretical chemistry be reduced to The Standard Model?" > > See *List of unsolved problems in chemistry* > - https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_unsolved_problems_in_chemistry > > Except for a leap of faith ("The Standard Model can explain all of these > open problems in chemistry"), there could be chemical properties not > reducible to physical properties. > Doesn't that require chemical reactions that violate physical laws? > > If that is the case, what is physical (as I have defined physical) does > not cover what is chemical (much less biological). > > Matter includes all levels of "stuff": physical, chemical, biological, > psychical. So materialism is the agnostic position: It doesn't matter > whether everything can be reduced to the physical or not. > > > > In "replace one or more of your neurons with a mechanical yet functionally > equivalent replacement", mechanical could of course include biomechanical > (as defined in *synthetic biology*), as there was no restriction of > "mechanical". > > Mechanism is the belief that any mechanical replacement will do, regardless of what that mechanical component is made of, so long as that component is functionally equivalent to the part replaced. Mechanism is the belief held by 99% of scientists, who say they brain is a machine, and there is no magic in it. Jason > > - pt > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an > email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. > To post to this group, send email to firstname.lastname@example.org. > Visit this group at https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. > For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. > -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to email@example.com. Visit this group at https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.