On Sat, Jan 5, 2019 at 2:05 PM Philip Thrift <[email protected]> wrote:
> > > On Saturday, January 5, 2019 at 12:52:19 PM UTC-6, Jason wrote: >> >> >> >> On Saturday, January 5, 2019, Philip Thrift <[email protected]> wrote: >> >>> >>> >>> On Saturday, January 5, 2019 at 12:02:53 PM UTC-6, Jason wrote: >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> On Sat, Jan 5, 2019 at 6:13 AM Philip Thrift <[email protected]> >>>> wrote: >>>> >>>>> >>>>> On Saturday, January 5, 2019 at 4:26:11 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal wrote: >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> On 4 Jan 2019, at 17:25, Philip Thrift <[email protected]> wrote: >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> Physicists today (as I've observed) are not (for the most part) real >>>>>> materialists. >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> That is true, and physicists have rarely problem with the consequence >>>>>> of Mechanism. Now, some physicist can be immaterialist, but still >>>>>> physicalist (like Tegmark was at some moment at least). The physical >>>>>> reality would be a mathematical reality among others, but with >>>>>> computationalism, the physical reality comes from a more global >>>>>> mathematical phenomenon based on the behaviour/semantics of the material >>>>>> mode of self-rereyence (involving probabilities, i.e., for those who have >>>>>> studied the self-referential modes available, the []p & X modes, with X >>>>>> being either p, or <>t, or p & <>t). >>>>>> >>>>>> This makes mechanism testable, and if quantum mechanics did not >>>>>> exist, I would have thought that Mechanism is already refuted. >>>>>> >>>>>> Bruno >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> "Physicalism"/"Physical" are words that needs deprecating, as they can >>>>> mean (to some philosophers of science) "can be reduced to physics", and >>>>> physics is what is currently-accepted in the physics scientific community. >>>>> >>>>> (When I use "physical", I mean it in the sense of being "explainable" >>>>> by physics.) >>>>> >>>>> It gets worse: "In this entry, I will adopt the policy of using both >>>>> terms ['materialism' and 'physicalism'] interchangeably, though I will >>>>> typically refer to the thesis we will discuss as ‘physicalism’." >>>>> https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/physicalism/ >>>>> >>>>> Better to just use "materialism" and reject the use of "physicalism" >>>>> (unless it refers to a the particular meaning of "can be reduced to >>>>> physics"), though materialism has a "weak" and "strong" definition. >>>>> >>>>> Galen Strawson defines what "hard-nosed materialism" is: >>>>> >>>>> https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=HvHVo6TslV4 >>>>> >>>>> >>>> The important distinction, which may be lost in your definitions, is >>>> whether "primariness" is assumed or not. These diagrams I made highlight >>>> the difference: >>>> >>>> >>>> *Primary Physicalism (Physics is at the bottom, and cannot be explained >>>> or derived from anything else):* >>>> [image: primary-physicalism.png] >>>> >>>> *Non-Primary Physicalism (Physics is not at the bottom, and can be >>>> explained or derived from something more fundamental):* >>>> [image: non-primary-physicalism.png] >>>> >>>> You could also be agnostic on the question, let's call someone with >>>> that belief a "*Primary Physicalism Agnostic*". >>>> >>>> Currently, scientists have collected zero evidence in favor of Primary >>>> Physicalism. So if you strongly believe it, you might want to consider why >>>> it is you believe in something so strongly despite there being no evidence >>>> for it. >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> But what exactly would be a "test for Mechanism"? >>>>> >>>>> >>>> If you replace one or more of your neurons with a mechanical yet >>>> functionally equivalent replacement and experience no change in >>>> consciousness. >>>> >>>> The existence and utility of cochlear implants can be seen as a loose >>>> confirmation of digital mechanism. >>>> >>>> Jason >>>> >>> >>> >>> >>> A question remains though: Can chemistry (or biology for that matter) be >>> reduced to physics? By that it is typically meant "Can problems of >>> theoretical chemistry be reduced to The Standard Model?" >>> >>> See *List of unsolved problems in chemistry* >>> - https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_unsolved_problems_in_chemistry >>> >>> Except for a leap of faith ("The Standard Model can explain all of these >>> open problems in chemistry"), there could be chemical properties not >>> reducible to physical properties. >>> >> >> Doesn't that require chemical reactions that violate physical laws? >> >> >>> >>> If that is the case, what is physical (as I have defined physical) does >>> not cover what is chemical (much less biological). >>> >>> Matter includes all levels of "stuff": physical, chemical, biological, >>> psychical. So materialism is the agnostic position: It doesn't matter >>> whether everything can be reduced to the physical or not. >>> >>> >>> >>> In "replace one or more of your neurons with a mechanical yet >>> functionally equivalent replacement", mechanical could of course include >>> biomechanical (as defined in *synthetic biology*), as there was no >>> restriction of "mechanical". >>> >>> >> Mechanism is the belief that any mechanical replacement will do, >> regardless of what that mechanical component is made of, so long as that >> component is functionally equivalent to the part replaced. Mechanism is >> the belief held by 99% of scientists, who say they brain is a machine, and >> there is no magic in it. >> >> Jason >> >> >>> >>> >>> > The concept of some theoretical chemists (vs. some theoretical physicists) > is that there are laws of chemistry that cannot be reduced to laws of > physics. Not that they 'violate' laws of physics. What physics governs > still works. > Chemistry is nothing beyond the interactions of particle physics, just as biological interactions are ultimately chemical. > > If 'function' (in "functionally equivalent") includes experiential as well > as just informational functionality, then that something else. > > The brain is a machine: A biomachine. The human is a biocomputer: > https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Human_biocomputer > > But all computers are equivalent. Jason > No problem there. > > - pt > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an > email to [email protected]. > To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. > Visit this group at https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. > For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. > -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to [email protected]. To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. Visit this group at https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
