On 5/5/2019 10:30 PM, Jason Resch wrote:
On Sun, May 5, 2019 at 10:51 PM 'Brent Meeker' via Everything List <[email protected] <mailto:[email protected]>> wrote:On 5/5/2019 7:30 PM, Jason Resch wrote:On Sunday, May 5, 2019, 'Brent Meeker' via Everything List <[email protected] <mailto:[email protected]>> wrote: On 5/5/2019 5:57 PM, Jason Resch wrote:On Sunday, May 5, 2019, 'Brent Meeker' via Everything List <[email protected] <mailto:[email protected]>> wrote: On 5/5/2019 3:49 PM, Jason Resch wrote:How do we know other humans are conscious (we don't, we can only suspect it). Why do we suspect other humans are conscious (due to their outwardly visible behaviors). Due to the Church-Turing thesis, we know an appropriately programmed computer can replicate any finitely describable behavior. Therefore a person with an appropriately programmed computer, placed in someone's skill, and wired into the nervous system of a human could perfectly mimic the behaviors, speech patterns, thoughts, skills, of any person you have ever met. Do you dispute any of the above?It assumes you could violate Holevo's theorem to obtain the necessary program. You could find the program by chance or by iteration (for the purposes of the thought experiment).In those cases you could never know that you had been successful. The question wasn't whether or not we would succeed, but given that we know it is possible to succeed, given there ezists a program that could convince you it was your friend, why doubt it is consciousness?I don't think I would doubt it was conscious even if it just acted as intelligent as some stranger. But note that it would have to be interactive. So I think Wegner's point is that makes its computations not finitely describable. Who is Wegner in this context, and what was his point?I don't see how any computation could be not finitely describable, given that any programs can be expressed as a finite integer.
This guy, Peter Wegner, that pt referred to indirectly. http://www.cse.uconn.edu/~dgoldin/papers/strong-cct.pdf His point is that human consciousness is an interactive program that receives arbitrary and unknown inputs from the environment and is modified by those inputs. He calls this model a PTM, Persistent Turing Machine, because it keeps a memory and doesn't overwrite it. Of course you can say that whatever the environmental input is, it can be included in the TM code, but then it is potentially inifinite.
Brent
Jason BrentJason BrentJasonIf you encountered a close friend who had to get a computer replacement for his brain (e.g. due to an inoperable tumor), and this friend displayed perfect mimicry of the behavior prior to the surgery, would you continue to tell him he his not conscious, despite his protestations that he is every bit as conscious as before? On what basis would this your claim rest?Some of my friends I'd tell him it was amazing how much smarter he was. BrentJason On Sun, May 5, 2019 at 1:33 PM <[email protected] <mailto:[email protected]>> wrote: Re: "only certain kinds of matter can be conscious" and "all matter is conscious" I do think the first (human brains at least, and perhaps some non-human brains, from primates to down* the "food-chain"). Some think there was no fully or cognitively conscious (only a sensory conscious) human before language. There may be something to that. But not the second (where there is self and self-awareness). *Rocks are not conscious.* But the idea is that all matter does have some level of *elementary protoconsciousness* in various types, phases, and configurations of matter. When some matter is combined into certain configurations (like a human brain), these *protopsychical parts* are fused into something conscious. * Do Insects Have Consciousness and Ego? /The brains of insects are similar to a structure in human brains, which could show a rudimentary form of consciousness/ https://www.smithsonianmag.com/smart-news/do-insects-have-consciousness-ego-180958824/ I don't think that societies are conscious, the Earth is conscious, the universe is conscious. The Earth is aware of itself? I don't think so. @philipthrift On Sunday, May 5, 2019 at 8:25:26 AM UTC-5, Terren Suydam wrote: You keep trotting out the term "cybernetic delusion" as if it's a problem. But it's just an assumption I make, that consciousness is identified with cybernetic dynamics. I'm exploring the consequences of that idea, which are compelling IMO. You or anyone else can feel free to adopt or not adopt that assumption. But it's not a delusion. Calling it that suggests there's a more correct way to view consciousness. But you haven't been clear about what that is, vacillating between "only certain kinds of matter can be conscious" and "all matter is conscious". If you adopt panpsychism, you fall prey to the cybernetic delusion yourself. And when you don't, /you fail to explain what privileges certain kinds of matter over others/. It seems pretty clear to me that there's no principled way to do that... any explanation of why brains can be conscious but not computers starts to sound suspiciously like "spirit" and "soul", in the sense that you're invoking some property of matter that cannot be detected. Terren On Sun, May 5, 2019 at 4:57 AM <[email protected]> wrote: On Saturday, May 4, 2019 at 8:30:00 PM UTC-5, John Clark wrote: On Sat, May 4, 2019 at 9:15 PM 'Cosmin Visan' <[email protected]> wrote: /> What happens in cases of telepathy is [...]. For example, in cases of dream telepathy[...] This clearly is a case of dream telepathy./ OK, there was little doubt before but you just made it official, Cosmin Visanis a crackpot. John K Clark / / // Telepathy I doubt pretty bigly, but the cybernetic delusion is a really crackpot idea. @philipthrift-- You received this message because you aresubscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to [email protected]. To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. Visit this group at https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. 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