On Mon, Apr 29, 2019 at 7:57 AM Bruno Marchal <[email protected]> wrote:
> > On 26 Apr 2019, at 02:50, Jason Resch <[email protected]> wrote: > > > > On Tue, Apr 23, 2019 at 9:57 AM Bruno Marchal <[email protected]> wrote: > >> >> On 23 Apr 2019, at 03:32, Jason Resch <[email protected]> wrote: >> >> >> >> On Mon, Apr 22, 2019 at 7:51 PM 'Brent Meeker' via Everything List < >> [email protected]> wrote: >> >>> >>> >>> On 4/22/2019 4:24 PM, Jason Resch wrote: >>> >>> >>> >>> On Tue, Nov 6, 2018 at 3:16 AM Bruno Marchal <[email protected]> wrote: >>> >>>> >>>> On 5 Nov 2018, at 02:56, Martin Abramson <[email protected]> >>>> wrote: >>>> >>>> Consciousness is a program. >>>> >>>> >>>> Consciousness might be related to a program, but is not a program, that >>>> would identify a first person notion with a third person notion, like a >>>> glass of bear and its price. >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> It explores whatever entity it finds itself within and becomes that >>>> creature's awareness of the world. For humans it becomes the identity or >>>> soul which responds to anything that affects the organism. It can be >>>> uploaded into a data bank but otherwise it dissipates with death. >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> How? We can attach a soul to a machine, but a machine cannot attach its >>>> soul to any particular computations, only to the infinity of (relative) >>>> computations, and there is at least aleph_zero one, of not a continuum. >>>> >>>> Bruno >>>> >>>> >>>> >>> The above reminded me of this quote from Alan Turing: >>> >>> Personally I think that spirit is really eternally connected with matter >>> but certainly not always by the same kind of body. I did believe it >>> possible for a spirit at death to go to a universe entirely separate from >>> our own, but now I consider that matter and spirit are so connected that >>> this would be a contradiction in terms. It is possible however but unlikely >>> that such universes may exist. >>> Then as regards the actual connection between spirit and body I >>> consider that the body by reason of being a living body can ``attract´´ and >>> hold on to a ``spirit,´´ whilst the body is alive and awake the two are >>> firmly connected. When the body is asleep I cannot guess what happens but >>> when the body dies the ``mechanism´´ of the body, holding the spirit is >>> gone and the spirit finds a new body sooner or later perhaps immediately. >>> >>> >>> It seems otiose to postulate a separate spirit. A pitiful attempt to >>> grasp immortality. Isn't it plain that what is "immaterial" and >>> distinguishes a brain of a rock is that the brain instantiates processes >>> which incorporate memory, purpose, perception, and action. >>> >> >> >> Is it otiose to make a distinction between a "story" and a "book”, >> >> >> ? >> >> You might be too quick here. A book can instantiate a description of a >> story, but a story is a sequence of events (be them relative computation in >> arithmetic, or in some “universe”). >> >> > You might be misinterpreting my point. I was attempting to show that there > is an important distinction between "mind" and "brain", (as there is > between "story" and "book", and "program" and "computer”). > > > > I was a bit splitting the air, with respect to what you were trying to > convey. Sorry. > No worries, greater clarification is always appreciated. > > BTW, I forget to mention that Post Anticipation has really anticipated the > whole things, from Gödel up to immaterialism. In fact Post is the real > first person to discover both the Church-Turing thesis, the incompleteness > implied by it (something almost forgot since Gödel!, but clearly > re-explained by Kleene and Webb later). > > Emil Post was very sick all its life, and has been a math teacher in High > school almost all his life, but eventually, thanks to his paper of 1944 > (which led to Recursion theory) he will be recognised, and get a position > in a university, for a short time before death. > > I think that Emil Post was the deepest thinker here. > > Interesting I didn't know anything about Post's life or contributions before. I will look more into this. > > > In all cases, the brain, book, computer, are physical, and can have > specific physical incarnations. However, despite differing physically, > they can be used to implement the same (potentially identical) abstract > patterns (minds, stories, programs). > > Because the latter category refers to abstract, informational, duplicable, > patterns, they are in a sense immaterial. Many attributes you might > attribute to a "soul" you could apply to these abstract informational > patterns, such as: > > > - No physical location > - No mass or energy > - Indestructible (at least always recoverable, in theory - ability to > resurrect) > - Ability to cross between different physical embodiments (ability to > reincarnate) > - Ability to exist in different physical universes/realms/planes > (ability to transmigrate) > > > OK. > > It is just that this is verified by “mind”, but “mind” and informational > pattern, or number are immaterial, but still admit third person > description. The soul, or consciousness , or first person, is not only > immaterial, but is not identifiable to anything having a third person > description. The soul like god has no “name” (that is no third person > description at all). Yet, with mechanism, it admits meta-description, > quasi-axiomatic definition, and then it can be proved it has no third > person description, a bit like the notion of truth in Tarski theory of > truth (which I am using all the time, explicitly or implicitly). > Would a single observer-moment/experience admit a third-person description? Is it only the time-evolution of experience that is not definable? Jason > > > >> >> or a "program" and a "computer", or might there be value in that nuance? >> >> >> I guess you mean a universal program and a computer. But then you use >> “computer” in the sense of “universal digital machine/number”. In this >> list, I use more often “computer” for the physical implementation of a >> computer, >> > > (Here I meant a physical computer, I was trying to contrast the > software/hardware distinction) > > > OK. > > > > >> which is typically not a computer, nor even anything emubable on a >> computer, given that to emulate even a piece of the physical vacuum, we >> already needs the complete universal dovetailing (the full sigma_1 >> arithmetical truth). A physical computer is only an appearance in the >> number’s mind, and it is not emulable, if only because we cannot >> algorithmically decide which computations, in arithmetic, run through our >> state of mind, and which does not. >> >> The difference between software and hardware is only locally dispensable. >> Eventually, the apparent primitive matter is a sum on infinitely many >> computations, belonging to a non recursively enumerable domain. >> A part of the mystery is why physics, or the observable realm, looks so >> much computational, but it is not, and QM confirms this. >> >> >> >> >> Clearly a program stops executing locally when a computer executing that >> program is destroyed, but of course this says nothing about the >> destruction, existence, non-existence, continuation, quantity, or locations >> of other instances of that program. I think here Turing was making a >> similar point, in the nuanced distinction between a mind and a brain. >> >> >> I see it that way, except that Turing refers to bodies, which in his >> mind, meant material bodies, if not, he would have invoked the universal >> dovetailing (whose existence in arithmetic is obvious). But many texts by >> Turing seem to confirm that Turing was a naturalist (metaphysically). >> >> > Interesting. Thanks for your comments. > > > You are welcome, > > Bruno > > > > > Jason > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an > email to [email protected]. > To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. > Visit this group at https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. > For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. > > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an > email to [email protected]. > To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. > Visit this group at https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. > For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. > -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. 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