> On 10 May 2019, at 15:38, Jason Resch <[email protected]> wrote: > > > > On Fri, May 10, 2019 at 7:53 AM Bruno Marchal <[email protected] > <mailto:[email protected]>> wrote: > >> On 8 May 2019, at 17:44, Jason Resch <[email protected] >> <mailto:[email protected]>> wrote: >> >>
SNIP >> >> OK. >> >> It is just that this is verified by “mind”, but “mind” and informational >> pattern, or number are immaterial, but still admit third person description. >> The soul, or consciousness , or first person, is not only immaterial, but is >> not identifiable to anything having a third person description. The soul >> like god has no “name” (that is no third person description at all). Yet, >> with mechanism, it admits meta-description, quasi-axiomatic definition, and >> then it can be proved it has no third person description, a bit like the >> notion of truth in Tarski theory of truth (which I am using all the time, >> explicitly or implicitly). >> >> Would a single observer-moment/experience admit a third-person description? >> Is it only the time-evolution of experience that is not definable? > > The expression “observer-moment” is ambiguous. It is often used in a first > person sense, then confused with third person sense. > > In the third person sense, it is equivalent with the notion of instantaneous > state description. It is the state of a computer, at some moment of its > computation/running. > > A first person observer moment is just a conscious state, lived as > here-and-now, like when you open the box in Washington, and get the > experience “I am in Washington”. That cannot be formalised or predict in any > way, but is still amenable to a metamathematical treatments when we assume > mechanism. > > The []p & p definition, makes the first person notion non formalisable. We > can come back on this (it is not easy to understand, nor to explain). > > To be sure, to get the immediacy of the observer-moment, []p & <>t & p is > better (this suppress the transitivity). []p & p is the logic of > knowledgeable. []p & <>t & p is closer to the logic of known-here-and-now. > > > Interesting. Might one say "[]p & p" is analagous to the world-soul / Atman > from Hinduism Yes. > as "[]p & <>t & p" is to the observer/thought moment as in Buddhist's concept > of Anatta (no-self)? May be. (It is not entirely “no-self”, For Anatta, as far as I understand, you might need to useat least the dual diamond, which here will be <>p v []f v p). In my long text, that is the “actual/curren/immediate” dream state. I am glad you got the bible! I mean Davis’ “The undecidable”. It is the best beginning for the machine mathematical theology. Concerning mathematical logic and theology, an incredible book is: Cohen J. Daniel, 2007. Equations from God, Pure Mathematics and Victorian Faith, John Hopkins Press, Baltimore. That books shows that the whole field of mathematical logic is born from Victorian Faith. I suspected this from my reading of Lewis Carroll, but I did not suspect it to be so historically true. Then, it explains the way this has been hidden, for the professional benefits of the whole of Mathematics, but that did not help for the field of theology, alas. Bruno > > Jason > > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an > email to [email protected] > <mailto:[email protected]>. > To post to this group, send email to [email protected] > <mailto:[email protected]>. > Visit this group at https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list > <https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list>. > To view this discussion on the web visit > https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/CA%2BBCJUhUUddaRD0rS%3D2ZS%2By9hCTyfzqNA8Vy%3Dzqw76c8%2BL26WQ%40mail.gmail.com > > <https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/CA%2BBCJUhUUddaRD0rS%3D2ZS%2By9hCTyfzqNA8Vy%3Dzqw76c8%2BL26WQ%40mail.gmail.com?utm_medium=email&utm_source=footer>. > For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout > <https://groups.google.com/d/optout>. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to [email protected]. To view this discussion on the web visit https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/2B116352-480E-47A8-A40A-15FFB987DABA%40ulb.ac.be.
