On Fri, May 10, 2019 at 7:53 AM Bruno Marchal <[email protected]> wrote:
> > On 8 May 2019, at 17:44, Jason Resch <[email protected]> wrote: > > > > On Mon, Apr 29, 2019 at 7:57 AM Bruno Marchal <[email protected]> wrote: > >> >> On 26 Apr 2019, at 02:50, Jason Resch <[email protected]> wrote: >> >> >> >> On Tue, Apr 23, 2019 at 9:57 AM Bruno Marchal <[email protected]> wrote: >> >>> >>> On 23 Apr 2019, at 03:32, Jason Resch <[email protected]> wrote: >>> >>> >>> >>> On Mon, Apr 22, 2019 at 7:51 PM 'Brent Meeker' via Everything List < >>> [email protected]> wrote: >>> >>>> >>>> >>>> On 4/22/2019 4:24 PM, Jason Resch wrote: >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> On Tue, Nov 6, 2018 at 3:16 AM Bruno Marchal <[email protected]> wrote: >>>> >>>>> >>>>> On 5 Nov 2018, at 02:56, Martin Abramson <[email protected]> >>>>> wrote: >>>>> >>>>> Consciousness is a program. >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> Consciousness might be related to a program, but is not a program, >>>>> that would identify a first person notion with a third person notion, like >>>>> a glass of bear and its price. >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> It explores whatever entity it finds itself within and becomes that >>>>> creature's awareness of the world. For humans it becomes the identity or >>>>> soul which responds to anything that affects the organism. It can be >>>>> uploaded into a data bank but otherwise it dissipates with death. >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> How? We can attach a soul to a machine, but a machine cannot attach >>>>> its soul to any particular computations, only to the infinity of >>>>> (relative) >>>>> computations, and there is at least aleph_zero one, of not a continuum. >>>>> >>>>> Bruno >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>> The above reminded me of this quote from Alan Turing: >>>> >>>> Personally I think that spirit is really eternally connected with >>>> matter but certainly not always by the same kind of body. I did believe it >>>> possible for a spirit at death to go to a universe entirely separate from >>>> our own, but now I consider that matter and spirit are so connected that >>>> this would be a contradiction in terms. It is possible however but unlikely >>>> that such universes may exist. >>>> Then as regards the actual connection between spirit and body >>>> I consider that the body by reason of being a living body can ``attract´´ >>>> and hold on to a ``spirit,´´ whilst the body is alive and awake the two are >>>> firmly connected. When the body is asleep I cannot guess what happens but >>>> when the body dies the ``mechanism´´ of the body, holding the spirit is >>>> gone and the spirit finds a new body sooner or later perhaps immediately. >>>> >>>> >>>> It seems otiose to postulate a separate spirit. A pitiful attempt to >>>> grasp immortality. Isn't it plain that what is "immaterial" and >>>> distinguishes a brain of a rock is that the brain instantiates processes >>>> which incorporate memory, purpose, perception, and action. >>>> >>> >>> >>> Is it otiose to make a distinction between a "story" and a "book”, >>> >>> >>> ? >>> >>> You might be too quick here. A book can instantiate a description of a >>> story, but a story is a sequence of events (be them relative computation in >>> arithmetic, or in some “universe”). >>> >>> >> You might be misinterpreting my point. I was attempting to show that >> there is an important distinction between "mind" and "brain", (as there is >> between "story" and "book", and "program" and "computer”). >> >> >> >> I was a bit splitting the air, with respect to what you were trying to >> convey. Sorry. >> > > No worries, greater clarification is always appreciated. > > > I appreciate. > > > > > >> >> BTW, I forget to mention that Post Anticipation has really anticipated >> the whole things, from Gödel up to immaterialism. In fact Post is the real >> first person to discover both the Church-Turing thesis, the incompleteness >> implied by it (something almost forgot since Gödel!, but clearly >> re-explained by Kleene and Webb later). >> >> Emil Post was very sick all its life, and has been a math teacher in High >> school almost all his life, but eventually, thanks to his paper of 1944 >> (which led to Recursion theory) he will be recognised, and get a position >> in a university, for a short time before death. >> >> I think that Emil Post was the deepest thinker here. >> >> > Interesting I didn't know anything about Post's life or contributions > before. I will look more into this. > > > > He found everything, just a bit too much early for his time. He found > Gödel’s theorem, even the “simple” proof from “Church’s thesis”. He found > the argument of Lucas-Penrose using “Gödel” against Mechanism. He found the > deep error that such argument illustrates, he get the understanding that > materialism is at stake, and the difficulties, etc. > > He is at the origin of "Recursion Theory” (theoretical computer science, a > branch of mathematical logic). That is not in his anticipation, but in his > paper, which is also in Davis Anthology: > > POST E., 1944 , Recursively Enumerable Sets of Positive Integers and their > Decision Problems, Bull. Am. Math. Soc. 50, pp. 284-316. also in Davis > 1965, pp. 304-337. > > I was happy to see it included in Davis's "The Undecidable" which is now on my desk. I am particularly interested in what Post concluded regarding immaterialism. > > > >> >> >> In all cases, the brain, book, computer, are physical, and can have >> specific physical incarnations. However, despite differing physically, >> they can be used to implement the same (potentially identical) abstract >> patterns (minds, stories, programs). >> >> Because the latter category refers to abstract, informational, >> duplicable, patterns, they are in a sense immaterial. Many attributes you >> might attribute to a "soul" you could apply to these abstract informational >> patterns, such as: >> >> >> - No physical location >> - No mass or energy >> - Indestructible (at least always recoverable, in theory - ability to >> resurrect) >> - Ability to cross between different physical embodiments (ability to >> reincarnate) >> - Ability to exist in different physical universes/realms/planes >> (ability to transmigrate) >> >> >> OK. >> >> It is just that this is verified by “mind”, but “mind” and informational >> pattern, or number are immaterial, but still admit third person >> description. The soul, or consciousness , or first person, is not only >> immaterial, but is not identifiable to anything having a third person >> description. The soul like god has no “name” (that is no third person >> description at all). Yet, with mechanism, it admits meta-description, >> quasi-axiomatic definition, and then it can be proved it has no third >> person description, a bit like the notion of truth in Tarski theory of >> truth (which I am using all the time, explicitly or implicitly). >> > > Would a single observer-moment/experience admit a third-person > description? Is it only the time-evolution of experience that is not > definable? > > > The expression “observer-moment” is ambiguous. It is often used in a first > person sense, then confused with third person sense. > > In the third person sense, it is equivalent with the notion of > instantaneous state description. It is the state of a computer, at some > moment of its computation/running. > > A first person observer moment is just a conscious state, lived as > here-and-now, like when you open the box in Washington, and get the > experience “I am in Washington”. That cannot be formalised or predict in > any way, but is still amenable to a metamathematical treatments when we > assume mechanism. > > The []p & p definition, makes the first person notion non formalisable. We > can come back on this (it is not easy to understand, nor to explain). > > To be sure, to get the immediacy of the observer-moment, []p & <>t & p is > better (this suppress the transitivity). []p & p is the logic of > knowledgeable. []p & <>t & p is closer to the logic of known-here-and-now. > > Interesting. Might one say "[]p & p" is analagous to the world-soul / Atman from Hinduism as "[]p & <>t & p" is to the observer/thought moment as in Buddhist's concept of Anatta (no-self)? Jason -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to [email protected]. To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. Visit this group at https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. To view this discussion on the web visit https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/CA%2BBCJUhUUddaRD0rS%3D2ZS%2By9hCTyfzqNA8Vy%3Dzqw76c8%2BL26WQ%40mail.gmail.com. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
