> On 8 May 2019, at 17:44, Jason Resch <jasonre...@gmail.com> wrote: > > > > On Mon, Apr 29, 2019 at 7:57 AM Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be > <mailto:marc...@ulb.ac.be>> wrote: > >> On 26 Apr 2019, at 02:50, Jason Resch <jasonre...@gmail.com >> <mailto:jasonre...@gmail.com>> wrote: >> >> >> >> On Tue, Apr 23, 2019 at 9:57 AM Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be >> <mailto:marc...@ulb.ac.be>> wrote: >> >>> On 23 Apr 2019, at 03:32, Jason Resch <jasonre...@gmail.com >>> <mailto:jasonre...@gmail.com>> wrote: >>> >>> >>> >>> On Mon, Apr 22, 2019 at 7:51 PM 'Brent Meeker' via Everything List >>> <everything-list@googlegroups.com >>> <mailto:everything-list@googlegroups.com>> wrote: >>> >>> >>> On 4/22/2019 4:24 PM, Jason Resch wrote: >>>> >>>> >>>> On Tue, Nov 6, 2018 at 3:16 AM Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be >>>> <mailto:marc...@ulb.ac.be>> wrote: >>>> >>>>> On 5 Nov 2018, at 02:56, Martin Abramson <martinabrams...@gmail.com >>>>> <mailto:martinabrams...@gmail.com>> wrote: >>>>> >>>>> Consciousness is a program. >>>> >>>> Consciousness might be related to a program, but is not a program, that >>>> would identify a first person notion with a third person notion, like a >>>> glass of bear and its price. >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>>> It explores whatever entity it finds itself within and becomes that >>>>> creature's awareness of the world. For humans it becomes the identity or >>>>> soul which responds to anything that affects the organism. It can be >>>>> uploaded into a data bank but otherwise it dissipates with death. >>>> >>>> >>>> How? We can attach a soul to a machine, but a machine cannot attach its >>>> soul to any particular computations, only to the infinity of (relative) >>>> computations, and there is at least aleph_zero one, of not a continuum. >>>> >>>> Bruno >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> The above reminded me of this quote from Alan Turing: >>>> >>>> Personally I think that spirit is really eternally connected with matter >>>> but certainly not always by the same kind of body. I did believe it >>>> possible for a spirit at death to go to a universe entirely separate from >>>> our own, but now I consider that matter and spirit are so connected that >>>> this would be a contradiction in terms. It is possible however but >>>> unlikely that such universes may exist. >>>> Then as regards the actual connection between spirit and body I >>>> consider that the body by reason of being a living body can ``attract´´ >>>> and hold on to a ``spirit,´´ whilst the body is alive and awake the two >>>> are firmly connected. When the body is asleep I cannot guess what happens >>>> but when the body dies the ``mechanism´´ of the body, holding the spirit >>>> is gone and the spirit finds a new body sooner or later perhaps >>>> immediately. >>> >>> It seems otiose to postulate a separate spirit. A pitiful attempt to grasp >>> immortality. Isn't it plain that what is "immaterial" and distinguishes a >>> brain of a rock is that the brain instantiates processes which incorporate >>> memory, purpose, perception, and action. >>> >>> >>> Is it otiose to make a distinction between a "story" and a "book”, >> >> ? >> >> You might be too quick here. A book can instantiate a description of a >> story, but a story is a sequence of events (be them relative computation in >> arithmetic, or in some “universe”). >> >> >> You might be misinterpreting my point. I was attempting to show that there >> is an important distinction between "mind" and "brain", (as there is between >> "story" and "book", and "program" and "computer”). > > > I was a bit splitting the air, with respect to what you were trying to > convey. Sorry. > > No worries, greater clarification is always appreciated.
I appreciate. > > > > BTW, I forget to mention that Post Anticipation has really anticipated the > whole things, from Gödel up to immaterialism. In fact Post is the real first > person to discover both the Church-Turing thesis, the incompleteness implied > by it (something almost forgot since Gödel!, but clearly re-explained by > Kleene and Webb later). > > Emil Post was very sick all its life, and has been a math teacher in High > school almost all his life, but eventually, thanks to his paper of 1944 > (which led to Recursion theory) he will be recognised, and get a position in > a university, for a short time before death. > > I think that Emil Post was the deepest thinker here. > > > Interesting I didn't know anything about Post's life or contributions before. > I will look more into this. He found everything, just a bit too much early for his time. He found Gödel’s theorem, even the “simple” proof from “Church’s thesis”. He found the argument of Lucas-Penrose using “Gödel” against Mechanism. He found the deep error that such argument illustrates, he get the understanding that materialism is at stake, and the difficulties, etc. He is at the origin of "Recursion Theory” (theoretical computer science, a branch of mathematical logic). That is not in his anticipation, but in his paper, which is also in Davis Anthology: POST E., 1944 , Recursively Enumerable Sets of Positive Integers and their Decision Problems, Bull. Am. Math. Soc. 50, pp. 284-316. also in Davis 1965, pp. 304-337. > > >> >> In all cases, the brain, book, computer, are physical, and can have specific >> physical incarnations. However, despite differing physically, they can be >> used to implement the same (potentially identical) abstract patterns (minds, >> stories, programs). >> >> Because the latter category refers to abstract, informational, duplicable, >> patterns, they are in a sense immaterial. Many attributes you might >> attribute to a "soul" you could apply to these abstract informational >> patterns, such as: >> >> No physical location >> No mass or energy >> Indestructible (at least always recoverable, in theory - ability to >> resurrect) >> Ability to cross between different physical embodiments (ability to >> reincarnate) >> Ability to exist in different physical universes/realms/planes (ability to >> transmigrate) > > OK. > > It is just that this is verified by “mind”, but “mind” and informational > pattern, or number are immaterial, but still admit third person description. > The soul, or consciousness , or first person, is not only immaterial, but is > not identifiable to anything having a third person description. The soul like > god has no “name” (that is no third person description at all). Yet, with > mechanism, it admits meta-description, quasi-axiomatic definition, and then > it can be proved it has no third person description, a bit like the notion of > truth in Tarski theory of truth (which I am using all the time, explicitly or > implicitly). > > Would a single observer-moment/experience admit a third-person description? > Is it only the time-evolution of experience that is not definable? The expression “observer-moment” is ambiguous. It is often used in a first person sense, then confused with third person sense. In the third person sense, it is equivalent with the notion of instantaneous state description. It is the state of a computer, at some moment of its computation/running. A first person observer moment is just a conscious state, lived as here-and-now, like when you open the box in Washington, and get the experience “I am in Washington”. That cannot be formalised or predict in any way, but is still amenable to a metamathematical treatments when we assume mechanism. The []p & p definition, makes the first person notion non formalisable. We can come back on this (it is not easy to understand, nor to explain). To be sure, to get the immediacy of the observer-moment, []p & <>t & p is better (this suppress the transitivity). []p & p is the logic of knowledgeable. []p & <>t & p is closer to the logic of known-here-and-now. Bruno > > Jason > > > > >> >> >>> or a "program" and a "computer", or might there be value in that nuance? >> >> I guess you mean a universal program and a computer. But then you use >> “computer” in the sense of “universal digital machine/number”. In this list, >> I use more often “computer” for the physical implementation of a computer, >> >> (Here I meant a physical computer, I was trying to contrast the >> software/hardware distinction) > > OK. > > >> >> which is typically not a computer, nor even anything emubable on a computer, >> given that to emulate even a piece of the physical vacuum, we already needs >> the complete universal dovetailing (the full sigma_1 arithmetical truth). A >> physical computer is only an appearance in the number’s mind, and it is not >> emulable, if only because we cannot algorithmically decide which >> computations, in arithmetic, run through our state of mind, and which does >> not. >> >> The difference between software and hardware is only locally dispensable. >> Eventually, the apparent primitive matter is a sum on infinitely many >> computations, belonging to a non recursively enumerable domain. >> A part of the mystery is why physics, or the observable realm, looks so much >> computational, but it is not, and QM confirms this. >> >> >> >>> >>> Clearly a program stops executing locally when a computer executing that >>> program is destroyed, but of course this says nothing about the >>> destruction, existence, non-existence, continuation, quantity, or locations >>> of other instances of that program. I think here Turing was making a >>> similar point, in the nuanced distinction between a mind and a brain. >> >> I see it that way, except that Turing refers to bodies, which in his mind, >> meant material bodies, if not, he would have invoked the universal >> dovetailing (whose existence in arithmetic is obvious). But many texts by >> Turing seem to confirm that Turing was a naturalist (metaphysically). >> >> >> Interesting. Thanks for your comments. > > You are welcome, > > Bruno > > > >> >> Jason >> >> -- >> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups >> "Everything List" group. >> To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an >> email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com >> <mailto:everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com>. >> To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com >> <mailto:everything-list@googlegroups.com>. >> Visit this group at https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list >> <https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list>. >> For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout >> <https://groups.google.com/d/optout>. > > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an > email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com > <mailto:everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com>. > To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com > <mailto:everything-list@googlegroups.com>. > Visit this group at https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list > <https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list>. > For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout > <https://groups.google.com/d/optout>. > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an > email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com > <mailto:everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com>. > To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com > <mailto:everything-list@googlegroups.com>. > Visit this group at https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list > <https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list>. > To view this discussion on the web visit > https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/CA%2BBCJUg0zkr%2BFyxy5%3D5bmWgmFLJJJngYijO7%2B%2BfNVOr9cpwg_A%40mail.gmail.com > > <https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/CA%2BBCJUg0zkr%2BFyxy5%3D5bmWgmFLJJJngYijO7%2B%2BfNVOr9cpwg_A%40mail.gmail.com?utm_medium=email&utm_source=footer>. > For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout > <https://groups.google.com/d/optout>. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. 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