> On 23 Apr 2019, at 01:24, Jason Resch <jasonre...@gmail.com> wrote:
> 
> 
> 
> On Tue, Nov 6, 2018 at 3:16 AM Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be 
> <mailto:marc...@ulb.ac.be>> wrote:
> 
>> On 5 Nov 2018, at 02:56, Martin Abramson <martinabrams...@gmail.com 
>> <mailto:martinabrams...@gmail.com>> wrote:
>> 
>> Consciousness is a program.
> 
> Consciousness might be related to a program, but is not a program, that would 
> identify a first person notion with a third person notion, like a glass of 
> bear and its price.
> 
> 
> 
>> It explores whatever entity it finds itself within and becomes that 
>> creature's awareness of the world. For humans it becomes the identity or 
>> soul which responds to anything that affects the organism. It can be 
>> uploaded into a data bank but otherwise it dissipates with death.  
> 
> 
> How? We can attach a soul to a machine, but a machine cannot attach its soul 
> to any particular computations, only to the infinity of (relative) 
> computations, and there is at least aleph_zero one, of not a continuum.
> 
> Bruno
> 
> 
> 
> The above reminded me of this quote from Alan Turing:
> 
> Personally I think that spirit is really eternally connected with matter but 
> certainly not always by the same kind of body. I did believe it possible for 
> a spirit at death to go to a universe entirely separate from our own, but now 
> I consider that matter and spirit are so connected that this would be a 
> contradiction in terms. It is possible however but unlikely that such 
> universes may exist.
>         Then as regards the actual connection between spirit and body I 
> consider that the body by reason of being a living body can ``attract´´ and 
> hold on to a ``spirit,´´ whilst the body is alive and awake the two are 
> firmly connected. When the body is asleep I cannot guess what happens but 
> when the body dies the ``mechanism´´ of the body, holding the spirit is gone 
> and the spirit finds a new body sooner or later perhaps immediately.


This shows also how much Turing was blinded by its belief in some primary 
matter. If, he would have understood at once that our consciousness follows the 
differentiating computations in arithmetic.

Emil Post eventually got the immateriality”, but change its mind after reading 
… Turing.

With mechanism, it is simpler to not assume bodies and primitively material 
bodies unless we get some evidences for them. Yet, until now, the evidences 
gathered from the observation of nature confirms mechanism, and refute 
physicalism. For anyone remembering dreams, seeing is not a valid way to 
attribute any ontological existence, others than a subject, which we already 
have in arithmetic.

Bruno



> 
> Jason
>  
> 
> 
>> 
>> On Sun, Nov 4, 2018 at 7:49 PM John Clark <johnkcl...@gmail.com 
>> <mailto:johnkcl...@gmail.com>> wrote:
>> On Sun, Nov 4, 2018 at 7:22 PM Philip Thrift <cloudver...@gmail.com 
>> <mailto:cloudver...@gmail.com>> wrote:
>> 
>> > By "experience", philosophers (like Galen Strawson, Philip Goff) mean that 
>> > which you have within yourself right now: the awareness that [...]
>> 
>> Awareness? But awareness is just another word for consciousness, so when you 
>> say  "It's that experience (not just information) that needs processing to 
>> produce consciousness" you're saying that to produce consciousness you must 
>> process consciousness. I don't find that very helpful.
>> > I assume I can be outsmarted by Watson on Jeopardy!
>> 
>> Then Watson't intelligence isn't very pseudo.
>> 
>> John K Clark   
>> 
>>  
>> 
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