On Tue, Apr 30, 2019, at 12:03, Bruno Marchal wrote: > >> On 29 Apr 2019, at 18:03, Telmo Menezes <[email protected]> wrote: >> >> >> >> On Sun, Apr 21, 2019, at 12:02, Bruno Marchal wrote: >>> >>>> On 19 Apr 2019, at 14:09, Telmo Menezes <[email protected]> wrote: >>>> >>>> >>>> On Fri, Apr 19, 2019, at 09:09, 'Cosmin Visan' via Everything List wrote: >>>>> 1) The qualia of black-and-white is not on the same level with the qualia >>>>> of colors. The qualia of colors include the qualia of black-and-white. >>>>> You cannot see a color if that color is not emergent upon black-and-white >>>>> (or more specifically shades-of-gray). You cannot experience music if >>>>> music is not emergent upon sounds. You cannot taste chocolate if >>>>> chocolate is not emergent upon sweet. You cannot understand Pythagoras >>>>> Theorem if the understanding of Pythagoras Theorem doesn't emerge upon >>>>> the understandings of triangles, angles, lengths, etc. And this is real >>>>> emergence, because you really get new existent entities that never >>>>> existed before in the history of existence. God himself never experienced >>>>> these qualia. >>>> >>>> Ok, I think I understand your presentation better now. You make an >>>> interesting point, I don't think I ever considered emergence purely on the >>>> side of qualia as you describe. >>>> >>>> There is something here that still does not convince me. For example, you >>>> say that the "chocolate taste" qualia emerges from simpler qualia, such as >>>> "sweet". Can you really justify this hierarchical relation without >>>> implicitly alluding to the quanti side? Consider the qualias of eating a >>>> piece of chocolate, a spoonful of sugar and french fries. You can feel >>>> that the first two have something in common that distinguishes them from >>>> the third, and you can give it the label "sweet". At the same time, you >>>> could say that the chocolate and french fries are pleasant to eat, while >>>> the spoonful of sugar not so much. You can also label this abstraction >>>> with some word. Without empirical grounding, nothing makes one distinction >>>> more meaningful than another. >>> >>> Do you really mean “without empirical grounding”, or “without experiential >>> grounding”. >>> >>> The “empirical grounding” seems to me still too much “quanti”. >> >> You are right. I guess what I mean is something more like "without >> empirically grounded models/theories (I don't know anymore :)" >> >>> >>> >>> >>>> >>>> What makes the "sweat" abstraction so special? Well, it's that we know >>>> about sweet receptors in the tongue and we know it's one of the >>>> four(five?) basic flavors because of that. I'm afraid you smuggle this >>>> knowledge into the pure qualia world. Without it, there is no preferable >>>> hierarchical relation and emergence becomes nonsensical again. There's >>>> just a field of qualia. >>> >>> OK. >>> >>> >>>> >>>>> >>>>> I don't understand your second part of the question regarding our >>>>> "cognitive processes". Are you referring to our specific form of human >>>>> consciousness ? I don't think this is only restricted to our human >>>>> consciousness, for the reason that it happens to all qualia that we have. >>>>> All qualia domains are structured in an emergent way. >>>> >>>> I was referring to your observation that things lose meaning by >>>> repetition, like staring at yourself in the mirror for a long time. I to >>>> find this interesting, but I can imagine prosaic explanations. For >>>> example, that our brain requires a certain amount of variety in its >>>> inputs, otherwise it tends to a simpler state were apprehension of meaning >>>> is no longer possible. In other words, I am proposing a plumber-style >>>> explanation, and asking you why/if you think it can be discarded? >>>> >>>>> >>>>> 2) The main ideas in my book are the emergent structure of consciousness >>>>> and the self-reference which gives birth to the emergent structure. The >>>>> ideas about self-reference that I have are rooted in phenomenology. First >>>>> I observe that consciousness is structured in an emergent way, and then I >>>>> conclude that the reason it is like this is because there is an entity >>>>> called "self-reference" that looks-back-at-itself and in this process >>>>> includes the previously existing self and brings a new transcendent self >>>>> into existence, like in the case of colors emerging on top of >>>>> black-and-white. >>>> >>>> I have the problem above with the first part of what you say, but I like >>>> the second part. >>> >>> Using the theory of machine self-reference (which is really the base of the >>> whole of theoretical computer science or recursion theory), we have a try >>> pique of “self”: >>> >>> G (third person self-reference which are rationally justifiable modulo the >>> bet on the substitution level) >>> It is close for Necessitation, and admit the Löb’s axiom (as a theorem) >>> >>> G* (third person self-reference, rationally justifiable or not. >>> Incompleteness assures that G is properly included in G*). It NOT closed >>> for necessitation, but admit the Löb axiom (again as a (meta-theorem) about >>> the sound machines). >>> >>> S4Grz (first person self-reference, non definable by the machine, and >>> typically on the qualia side: indubitable but no exprimable immediate >>> knowledge (well: immediate only in its []p & <>t & p form, to be sure). >>> >>> Cosmic is unclear on the []p distinction with []p & p, with third person >>> self, and the first person self, the doxastic belief and the >>> epistemological (and non communicable) personal knowledge. >>> >>> >>> >>> >>>> >>>>> >>>>> 3) The difference is that in an emergent system you have top-down >>>>> influence in levels. Electrons in simple systems like the ones in >>>>> physical experiments have little input from any top level, so they >>>>> behaving according to their own level and display certain laws. But when >>>>> they are part of a greater holistic system, like in the brain (which is >>>>> just an appearance of internal workings in consciousness) they receive >>>>> top-down influence from the intentions in consciousness, and so they >>>>> behave according to the will of consciousness. Is the same phenomenon >>>>> when we speak, that I also gave in my presentation. When we speak, we act >>>>> from the level of intending to transmit certain ideas. And this level >>>>> exercises top-down influence in levels and the sentences, words and >>>>> letters are coming out in accordance with the intention from the higher >>>>> level. >>>> >>>> Here I think you are making the ontological/epistemological confusion. >>>> Another way to describe what you are alluding to above is this: the more >>>> complex a system, the higher the amount of branching in the trees of >>>> causation that extend into the past. To describe the movement of an >>>> election in the ideal conditions of some laboratory experiment, you might >>>> just require a couple of equations and variables. To describe the movement >>>> of an election in the incredible wet mess that is the human brain, you >>>> require trillions of equations with trillions of variables. >>>> >>>> The identification of patterns across scales allows us to vastly compress >>>> the information of the object we are looking at, making it somewhat >>>> tractable by our limited intellects. Some of these patters have names such >>>> as "speaking", "word", "presentation", "red", etc. These patterns are not >>>> arbitrarily grounded, they are grounded by some correspondence with >>>> qualia, as I argue above. Why? I don't have the answer, I think it's a >>>> mystery. >>> >>> I think that mystery is solved by the machine when she understand that []p >>> and ([]p & p) are equivalent for God (G* proves []p <-> []p & p), but >>> inequivalent from the machine’s point of view. []p obeys a doxastic notion >>> of rational belief, >>> >> >> A bit offtopic, but I am working a lot with beliefs (fake news / NLP sort of >> thing). Doxastic logic seems quite relevant. Do you have any textbook you >> recommend on this? > > That was the subject matter of Philippe Smets, the (co)founder of IRIDIA, > with a specialised account for the belief used in the medical diagnosis. > Well, his work has been used by Sweedish to track the Russian Nuclear > Submarines, with some success! > > The bible of Philippe Smets would be “A mathematical theory of evidences”. By > Glenn Shafer, Princeton University Press, 1976.
Thanks Bruno, already ordered, looking forward to studying it! Telmo. > > This ha inspired me for the discovery of the []p & <>t mode of > self-reference, which obey to a KD logics (D = the “deontic” axiom []p -> > <>p), and Barbara Alechina has modelled the Dempster-Shafer theory of > evidences using the modal logic KD. In practice, people use often KD5, so > that a machine/data-base can assert “no” for unknown belief (like if I ask > you if there is life in other galaxies). > > Of course, for the rational belief of the universal “rich” machine, belief is > modelled simply by Gödel’s arithmetical provability predicate (beweisbar). > That it is belief, and not knowledge, was already emphasised by Gödel, and … > G*. But that is useful to derive physics, and not so applicable in the > application of the belief-function theory of Dempster-Shafer (which is mainly > a theory of probability, where the Poincaré identity is replaced by an > inequality). > > > > >> >>> >>> where S4Grz (the logic of []p & p) obeys to a logic of (temporal) knowledge >>> of an unnameable subject. The first consider the second as mysterious, the >>> second knows, but cannot justify it through words or any representation. >> >> "The unnamable is the eternally real. > > OK. I would have put it like “the eternally real is unnamable. > > > >> Naming is the origin of all particular things." >> >> I guess… > > You guess well, with respect to the universal machine, and Lao-Ze (the tao > with a name is not the tao, giving it a name open to door to the myriad of > things (the garden with all the marvels …). > > Bruno > > > > >> >> Telmo. >> >>> >>> Bruno >>> >>> >>> >>> >>>> >>>> I am not saying that the point of view you describe above is not valid or >>>> interesting, but I am saying that it is nothing more than epistemology. >>>> >>>> Telmo. >>>> >>>>> >>>>> On Thursday, 18 April 2019 16:22:18 UTC+3, telmo wrote: >>>>>> Hi Cosmin, >>>>>> >>>>>> 1) >>>>>> >>>>>> Ok, I saw your presentation. We agree on several things, but I don't >>>>>> quite get your qualia emergence idea. The things you describe make >>>>>> sense, for example the dissolution of meaning by repetition, but what >>>>>> makes you think that this is anything more than an observation in the >>>>>> domain of the cognitive sciences? Or, putting it another way, and >>>>>> observation / model on how our cognitive processes work? >>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> 2) Consciousness is not mysterious. And this is exactly what my book is >>>>>>> doing: demystifying consciousness. If you decide to read my book, you >>>>>>> will gain at the end of it a clarity of thinking through these issues >>>>>>> that all people should have such that they will stop making the >>>>>>> confusions that robots are alive. >>>>>> >>>>>> I don't mean to discourage or attack you in anyway, but one in a while >>>>>> someone with a book to promote shows up in this mailing list. No problem >>>>>> with me, I have promoted some of my work sometimes. My problem is with >>>>>> "if you read my book...". There are many books to read, please give the >>>>>> main ideas. Then I might read it. >>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> 3) No, they are not extraordinarily claims. They are quite trivial. And >>>>>>> they start from the trivial realization that the brain does not exist. >>>>>>> The "brain" is just an idea in consciousness. >>>>>> >>>>>> I have no problem with "the brain is just an idea in consciousess". I am >>>>>> not sure if this type of claim can be verified, or if it falls into the >>>>>> category of things we cannot assert, as Bruno would say. I do tend to >>>>>> think privately in those terms. >>>>>> >>>>>> So ok, the brain does not exist. It is just a bunch of qualia in >>>>>> consciousness. But this is then true of every single thing! Again, no >>>>>> problem with this, but also no reason to abandon science. The machine >>>>>> doesn't exist either, but its elections (that don't exist either) follow >>>>>> a certain pattern of behavior that we call the laws of physics. Why not >>>>>> the electrons in the brain? What's the difference? >>>>>> >>>>>> Telmo. >>>>>> >>>>> >>>>> -- >>>>> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups >>>>> "Everything List" group. >>>>> To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an >>>>> email to [email protected]. >>>>> To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. >>>>> Visit this group at https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. >>>>> For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. >>>> >>>> >>>> -- >>>> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups >>>> "Everything List" group. >>>> To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an >>>> email to [email protected]. >>>> To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. >>>> Visit this group at https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. >>>> For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. >>> >>> >>> -- >>> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups >>> "Everything List" group. >>> To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an >>> email to [email protected]. >>> To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. >>> Visit this group at https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. >>> For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. >> >> >> -- >> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups >> "Everything List" group. >> To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an >> email to [email protected]. >> To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. >> Visit this group at https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. >> For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. > > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an > email to [email protected]. > To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. > Visit this group at https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. > For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. 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