> On 2 Aug 2019, at 12:40, Philip Thrift <[email protected]> wrote: > > > > On Friday, August 2, 2019 at 4:20:58 AM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal wrote: > > > On 2 Aug 2019, at 00:57, 'Brent Meeker' via Everything List > > <[email protected] <javascript:>> wrote: > > > > > > > > On 8/1/2019 5:34 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: > >> This is the tour de force of the Theaetetus definition when applied in the > >> Mechanist frame: it explains why machines are necessarily confronted with > >> things which are not only not computable, but not representable in any > >> third person way. > >> The corresponding logic (the modal logic of [1]p, with [1]p defined by []p > >> & p), i.e. S4Grz is a formal logic describing a non formalisable reality > >> accessed by all (sound) machine. Yes, that is a (meta- tour de force, made > >> possible tanks to Gödel completeness and Incompleteness theorem, together > >> with Tarski un-definability of truth theorem (and Scott-Montague > >> un-definability of knowledge theorem). > >> > >> Qualia are non physical and non numerical, yet phenomenologically real and > >> explained or “meta-explained”, like for consciousness. > > > > But this is not at all convincing. Just because some things (reflective > > relations) are not computable by the prefect logic machine does not show > > they are models or instances of qualia. Qualia are perceptions for example, > > which are partly shareable. > > We share only the number relations. Not the qualia itself. We only projects > ours on others, when enough similar to us. > > The machine qualia are not just non computable, they are non definable and > obey to a logic of qualia known before we found it in the discourse of the > machines. They have a conical perceive field associated with them. A good > paper is the paper on quantum logic by John Bell (not the physicists, but the > logician). There are some mistake in that paper, but not relevant here. > > Bell, J. L. (1986). A new approach to quantum logic. Brit. J. Phil. Sci., > 37:83-99. > > Bruno > > > > If qualia are not "number relations" then they must be substances on their > own.
Why should something be either “number relation” or substance? When a digital machine introspect itself, it is confronted with some truth concerning both numerical (or numericalisable) aspect of itself, and non numerical aspect of itself, which are semantical and related to the arithmetical truth (itself a non numericalisable reality). The arithmetical reality is full of semantical notions which are non numerical, when seen from inside. The arithmetical truth itself is non numerical. To model it, we use the assertion themselves. Today that “1+1=2” we can say simply that 1+1=2, but we cannot translate “true(“1+1=2”) in any numerical way that the machine concerned would make sense of, unless “true” is a restricted truth predicate, not working for all proposition that the machine can assert. All the self-modes involving the conjunction “& p”, like []p & p, or []p & <>t & p”, or just “p” itself are not definable in the language of the machine. They are necessarily not numerical for the machine, but the machine can bet that they correspond to complex set of sentences/numbers once she postulates the Mechanist hypothesis. That asks for a big leap of faith fr the machine, as []p & p, for example, describes a non numerical subject. The machine is born “non mechanist”, somehow. It *is* (and has to be) counter-intuitive. Bruno > > And what is substance that is (at least partly) non-numerical: matter. > > @philipthrift > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an > email to [email protected] > <mailto:[email protected]>. > To view this discussion on the web visit > https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/abfea10f-22b1-4225-aeeb-ad69bcf25e8b%40googlegroups.com > > <https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/abfea10f-22b1-4225-aeeb-ad69bcf25e8b%40googlegroups.com?utm_medium=email&utm_source=footer>. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to [email protected]. To view this discussion on the web visit https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/58133BA9-A4A6-4B52-80EB-2A3B89B57DC6%40ulb.ac.be.
