On Friday, August 2, 2019 at 7:40:14 AM UTC-5, Lawrence Crowell wrote: > > On Friday, August 2, 2019 at 5:40:34 AM UTC-5, Philip Thrift wrote: >> >> >> >> On Friday, August 2, 2019 at 4:20:58 AM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal wrote: >>> >>> >>> > On 2 Aug 2019, at 00:57, 'Brent Meeker' via Everything List < >>> [email protected]> wrote: >>> > >>> > >>> > >>> > On 8/1/2019 5:34 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: >>> >> This is the tour de force of the Theaetetus definition when applied >>> in the Mechanist frame: it explains why machines are necessarily confronted >>> with things which are not only not computable, but not representable in any >>> third person way. >>> >> The corresponding logic (the modal logic of [1]p, with [1]p defined >>> by []p & p), i.e. S4Grz is a formal logic describing a non formalisable >>> reality accessed by all (sound) machine. Yes, that is a (meta- tour de >>> force, made possible tanks to Gödel completeness and Incompleteness >>> theorem, together with Tarski un-definability of truth theorem (and >>> Scott-Montague un-definability of knowledge theorem). >>> >> >>> >> Qualia are non physical and non numerical, yet phenomenologically >>> real and explained or “meta-explained”, like for consciousness. >>> > >>> > But this is not at all convincing. Just because some things >>> (reflective relations) are not computable by the prefect logic machine does >>> not show they are models or instances of qualia. Qualia are perceptions for >>> example, which are partly shareable. >>> >>> We share only the number relations. Not the qualia itself. We only >>> projects ours on others, when enough similar to us. >>> >>> The machine qualia are not just non computable, they are non definable >>> and obey to a logic of qualia known before we found it in the discourse of >>> the machines. They have a conical perceive field associated with them. A >>> good paper is the paper on quantum logic by John Bell (not the physicists, >>> but the logician). There are some mistake in that paper, but not relevant >>> here. >>> >>> Bell, J. L. (1986). A new approach to quantum logic. Brit. J. Phil. >>> Sci., 37:83-99. >>> >>> Bruno >>> >>> >>> >> If qualia are not "number relations" then they must be substances on >> their own. >> >> And what is substance that is (at least partly) non-numerical: matter. >> >> @philipthrift >> > > Matter has its origin in either the condensate interaction of > Goldstone-Higgs bosons or with strong asymptotic QCD. With the Goldstone > bosons the degree of freedom of the scalar fields enters into a > longitudinal degree of freedom in weak flavor changing or isospin fields or > in fermions. With QCD the interaction is strong so there is no possible > escape for a the massless gauge boson or gluon. So one can think of these > as a situation where a massless particle is trapped in some small volume so > from a large scale it appears to be a massive particle with a timelike > direction. There really is not anything else to it. > > LC > >
If *everything is matter* (against the idea that it's an illusion) then matter doesn't have its origin in anything. People who say there is matter and something else have to say exactly what that immaterial "something else" is. There seems to be little "substance" to the claim that there is something else that's not matter. @philipthrift -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to [email protected]. To view this discussion on the web visit https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/3aa22588-fc81-48b2-b832-c880b9e2efb6%40googlegroups.com.
