> On 1 Aug 2019, at 12:42, Philip Thrift <[email protected]> wrote: > > > > On Thursday, August 1, 2019 at 3:51:45 AM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal wrote: > >> On 31 Jul 2019, at 09:25, Philip Thrift <[email protected] <javascript:>> >> wrote: >> >> >> If it isn't stuff (at the bottom of it), it it isn't real. >> >> Otherwise, it is idealism, which physics (as today's "popular" physicists >> present it to the public) has become today. >> >> In philosophy, idealism is the group of metaphysical philosophies that >> assert that reality, or reality as humans can know it, is fundamentally >> mental, mentally constructed, or otherwise immaterial. > > > In a first approximation, this can help. But, at some point, it might be > handy to distinguish between > > - human idealism (what you describe by “ that assert that reality, or reality > as humans can know it, is fundamentally mental, mentally constructed”) > > -universal idealism (the same with “human” replace by digital machine or > (intensional) number (I will lake this notion clear in the glossary that I > have promised). > > - immaterialism (the belief in a Turing universal system and in no more than > that for the ontology). > > The last case is more a neutral monism than an idealism, as the ideas are not > really primitive, they occur in the mind of numbers, which are taken as the > “independent ontology” that we assume. > > Metter is not “just” an idea in the mind of some numbers: it is a > phenomenological reality that *all* universal number encounter. The physical > reality is a deep invariant sharable by all machine/number, and which has for > them also a non sharable part (the qualia, the immediate consciousness, …). > > Bruno > > > To identify qualia themselves with purely numerical entities is the question. > > If qualia are nonnumerical, and assuming they are real (which I do), then > they must be nonnumerical (or non-"physical") material constituents of nature.
The machine can define “[]p” numerically, like a “machine’s body” or “machine’s relative code”. The machine cannot be sure it is really its own code, but by betting on mechanism and on the doctor choice of substitution level, she can conceive that such a code exists, and reason from this.. BUT... …the machine can’t define “[]p & p” numerically at all. It is logically impossible. The machine’s soul know that she is not a machine (except perhaps from God’s point of view, but she knows that she can’t have that view, or assess it publicly). This is the tour de force of the Theaetetus definition when applied in the Mechanist frame: it explains why machines are necessarily confronted with things which are not only not computable, but not representable in any third person way. The corresponding logic (the modal logic of [1]p, with [1]p defined by []p & p), i.e. S4Grz is a formal logic describing a non formalisable reality accessed by all (sound) machine. Yes, that is a (meta- tour de force, made possible tanks to Gödel completeness and Incompleteness theorem, together with Tarski un-definability of truth theorem (and Scott-Montague un-definability of knowledge theorem). Qualia are non physical and non numerical, yet phenomenologically real and explained or “meta-explained”, like for consciousness. “We” can meta-define knowledge and qualia, by referring to the “simple” god of mechanism: some notion of arithmetical truth, and the truth of Mechanism which is assumed. We can also understand intuitively that we cannot really define the notion of arithmetical truth, and indeed, that is why logicians have invented “first order logic”, which gives a way to talk and reason on things that we cannot define (but that we can approximate). Concerning the definability of the self-mode we have, from the machine’s public opinion: p undefinable, []p definable, []p & p undefinable, []p & <>t definable, []p & <>t & p undefinable Bruno > > @philipthrift > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an > email to [email protected] > <mailto:[email protected]>. > To view this discussion on the web visit > https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/8cbb27c6-0f81-44c5-b59e-fd04f2b00248%40googlegroups.com > > <https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/8cbb27c6-0f81-44c5-b59e-fd04f2b00248%40googlegroups.com?utm_medium=email&utm_source=footer>. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to [email protected]. To view this discussion on the web visit https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/D58AA0F7-315E-4758-8166-73C165EA846A%40ulb.ac.be.
