On Friday, August 2, 2019 at 8:07:49 AM UTC-5, Philip Thrift wrote: > > > > On Friday, August 2, 2019 at 7:40:14 AM UTC-5, Lawrence Crowell wrote: >> >> On Friday, August 2, 2019 at 5:40:34 AM UTC-5, Philip Thrift wrote: >>> >>> >>> >>> On Friday, August 2, 2019 at 4:20:58 AM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal wrote: >>>> >>>> >>>> > On 2 Aug 2019, at 00:57, 'Brent Meeker' via Everything List < >>>> [email protected]> wrote: >>>> > >>>> > >>>> > >>>> > On 8/1/2019 5:34 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: >>>> >> This is the tour de force of the Theaetetus definition when applied >>>> in the Mechanist frame: it explains why machines are necessarily >>>> confronted >>>> with things which are not only not computable, but not representable in >>>> any >>>> third person way. >>>> >> The corresponding logic (the modal logic of [1]p, with [1]p defined >>>> by []p & p), i.e. S4Grz is a formal logic describing a non formalisable >>>> reality accessed by all (sound) machine. Yes, that is a (meta- tour de >>>> force, made possible tanks to Gödel completeness and Incompleteness >>>> theorem, together with Tarski un-definability of truth theorem (and >>>> Scott-Montague un-definability of knowledge theorem). >>>> >> >>>> >> Qualia are non physical and non numerical, yet phenomenologically >>>> real and explained or “meta-explained”, like for consciousness. >>>> > >>>> > But this is not at all convincing. Just because some things >>>> (reflective relations) are not computable by the prefect logic machine >>>> does >>>> not show they are models or instances of qualia. Qualia are perceptions >>>> for >>>> example, which are partly shareable. >>>> >>>> We share only the number relations. Not the qualia itself. We only >>>> projects ours on others, when enough similar to us. >>>> >>>> The machine qualia are not just non computable, they are non definable >>>> and obey to a logic of qualia known before we found it in the discourse of >>>> the machines. They have a conical perceive field associated with them. A >>>> good paper is the paper on quantum logic by John Bell (not the physicists, >>>> but the logician). There are some mistake in that paper, but not relevant >>>> here. >>>> >>>> Bell, J. L. (1986). A new approach to quantum logic. Brit. J. Phil. >>>> Sci., 37:83-99. >>>> >>>> Bruno >>>> >>>> >>>> >>> If qualia are not "number relations" then they must be substances on >>> their own. >>> >>> And what is substance that is (at least partly) non-numerical: matter. >>> >>> @philipthrift >>> >> >> Matter has its origin in either the condensate interaction of >> Goldstone-Higgs bosons or with strong asymptotic QCD. With the Goldstone >> bosons the degree of freedom of the scalar fields enters into a >> longitudinal degree of freedom in weak flavor changing or isospin fields or >> in fermions. With QCD the interaction is strong so there is no possible >> escape for a the massless gauge boson or gluon. So one can think of these >> as a situation where a massless particle is trapped in some small volume so >> from a large scale it appears to be a massive particle with a timelike >> direction. There really is not anything else to it. >> >> LC >> >> > > > If *everything is matter* (against the idea that it's an illusion) then > matter doesn't have its origin in anything. > > People who say there is matter and something else have to say exactly what > that immaterial "something else" is. There seems to be little "substance" > to the claim that there is something else that's not matter. > > @philipthrift >
There is energy that by E = mc^2 has an equivalence to mass. However, the mass content of a particle or object is derived. The mass-gap of YM gauge fields such as QCD and the role of the Higgs condensate in effect derives the mass of particles at low energy. This is established physics. LC -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to [email protected]. To view this discussion on the web visit https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/8fe914b4-4fe7-4100-a811-a19014cf30cd%40googlegroups.com.
