> On 2 Aug 2019, at 00:57, 'Brent Meeker' via Everything List > <[email protected]> wrote: > > > > On 8/1/2019 5:34 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: >> This is the tour de force of the Theaetetus definition when applied in the >> Mechanist frame: it explains why machines are necessarily confronted with >> things which are not only not computable, but not representable in any third >> person way. >> The corresponding logic (the modal logic of [1]p, with [1]p defined by []p & >> p), i.e. S4Grz is a formal logic describing a non formalisable reality >> accessed by all (sound) machine. Yes, that is a (meta- tour de force, made >> possible tanks to Gödel completeness and Incompleteness theorem, together >> with Tarski un-definability of truth theorem (and Scott-Montague >> un-definability of knowledge theorem). >> >> Qualia are non physical and non numerical, yet phenomenologically real and >> explained or “meta-explained”, like for consciousness. > > But this is not at all convincing. Just because some things (reflective > relations) are not computable by the prefect logic machine does not show they > are models or instances of qualia. Qualia are perceptions for example, which > are partly shareable.
We share only the number relations. Not the qualia itself. We only projects ours on others, when enough similar to us. The machine qualia are not just non computable, they are non definable and obey to a logic of qualia known before we found it in the discourse of the machines. They have a conical perceive field associated with them. A good paper is the paper on quantum logic by John Bell (not the physicists, but the logician). There are some mistake in that paper, but not relevant here. Bell, J. L. (1986). A new approach to quantum logic. Brit. J. Phil. Sci., 37:83-99. Bruno > > Brent > > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an > email to [email protected]. > To view this discussion on the web visit > https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/8fddd50f-85ec-51a7-2598-67b53bf63102%40verizon.net. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to [email protected]. To view this discussion on the web visit https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/8A74269B-59DE-41ED-8FA4-90EEDC469C8C%40ulb.ac.be.
