> On 25 Feb 2020, at 21:58, 'Brent Meeker' via Everything List > <everything-list@googlegroups.com> wrote: > > > > On 2/25/2020 3:43 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: >> >>> On 24 Feb 2020, at 03:43, Alan Grayson <agrayson2...@gmail.com >>> <mailto:agrayson2...@gmail.com>> wrote: >>> >>> >>> >>> On Sunday, February 23, 2020 at 7:29:26 PM UTC-7, Brent wrote: >>> >>> >>> On 2/23/2020 6:17 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: >>>> >>>>> On 23 Feb 2020, at 01:12, 'Brent Meeker' via Everything List >>>>> <everyth...@googlegroups.com <javascript:>> wrote: >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> On 2/22/2020 3:52 PM, Alan Grayson wrote: >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> On Saturday, February 22, 2020 at 10:40:12 AM UTC-7, PGC wrote: >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> On Thursday, February 20, 2020 at 1:55:39 PM UTC+1, Bruno Marchal wrote: >>>>>> >>>>>>> On 20 Feb 2020, at 01:20, 'Brent Meeker' via Everything List >>>>>>> <everyth...@googlegroups.com <>> wrote: >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> On 2/19/2020 12:15 PM, Philip Thrift wrote: >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> Wittgenstein is at the core really of linguistic pragmatism >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Neopragmatism >>>>>>>> <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Neopragmatism> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> Languages are tools. There is no truth "out there". >>>>>>> >>>>>>> My view is that "true" means different things in different contexts. >>>>>> >>>>>> And in different modes (of self-reference). The platonists dis >>>>>> understand that the absolute truth requires faith in something beyond >>>>>> “my consciousness” or “consciousness” (to take into account Terren >>>>>> Suydam’ remark). >>>>>> >>>>>> Wittgestein up to now still has the upper hand with those old arguments >>>>>> over anybody proposing science based ontological packages >>>>>> metaphysically: language will seduce people to overgeneralize, to >>>>>> confuse personal mysticism with reality, to engage in false >>>>>> equivalencies between terms used in formal contexts and everyday use of >>>>>> language, scientism etc. Slowly, yours truly is coming around to the >>>>>> idea that folks agreeing on ontology/reality/religion, which would guide >>>>>> research in some allegedly correct direction; spilling over positive >>>>>> effects into the world... that Wittgenstein may prove correct in that >>>>>> this is a confused product of muddled armchair thinking, not because of >>>>>> his generally negative stance, but because there seem to be positive >>>>>> developments out there that he couldn't have informed those arguments >>>>>> with. >>>>>> >>>>>> I see/predict metaphysics shifting from the naive armchair forms of >>>>>> identity, reality, matter etc. practiced here on this list with profound >>>>>> erudition, walking in circles for 20 years now (Wittgenstein says >>>>>> thousands of years) to optimization and more efficient pursuit of value >>>>>> and benefit questions instead, through say orchestration of highly >>>>>> sophisticated forms of organization applied to education, governing, >>>>>> finance, technology, problem solving, applied or theoretical etc. that >>>>>> are permissionless, universally accessible, require no hierarchy of >>>>>> politics, charlatan experts, control freaks, their sycophants, and >>>>>> bibles of some Messiah achieving miracles such as eternal life, >>>>>> self-duplication etc. >>>>>> >>>>>> Metaphysical setups that place less emphasis on truth, trust, power, >>>>>> control, or proof and more emphasis on "can entities such as ourselves >>>>>> be highly organized, solve specific survival problems over short and >>>>>> long terms, without trusting each other + instead assuming that folks >>>>>> will be opportunistic and idealistic?" Example: we don't agree on what >>>>>> reality may be, but we do agree on the need for habitable living space >>>>>> in the long term, nutrition, water, health, limiting self-destruction, >>>>>> expensive wars, standards of living etc. quite clearly. There ARE more >>>>>> appropriate politics and economics on the horizon. Metaphysics here, >>>>>> shifting our old-school conceptions of what first principles are, and >>>>>> you'd refute Wittgenstein instead of running from him. Engineering >>>>>> incentive and not what the game is but how the game of life on this >>>>>> planet could be. >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> About this, it is clear to me that in “I think thus I am”, Descartes use >>>>>> the “first person” I. Indeed he start from the doubt. Dubito ergo >>>>>> cogito, cogito ergo sum. Descartes did not prove the existence of >>>>>> Descartes, bit of his own consciousness, hoping others can do the same >>>>>> reasoning for themselves. Consciousness always refer to a first person >>>>>> experience implicitly: like God (truth) it is not a thing. >>>>>> >>>>>> You concede to Terren that "true means different things in different >>>>>> contexts" but everyday like clockwork you still barrage the list with >>>>>> your use of "large truth, 3p, reality that cannot be named, mechanism is >>>>>> incompatible with physicalism" and all the rest of it. I used to wonder >>>>>> why you don't pursue contact with linguists, physicists, a wider >>>>>> audience, and philosophers but this has ceased to surprise me. PNGC >>>>>> >>>>>> I think I finally got it -- what mechanism means for Bruno -- namely, >>>>>> that a human being can be perfectly simulated by a computer. But if >>>>>> that's what he means, how does it follow that mechanism is incompatible >>>>>> with physicalism? >>>>> >>>>> Because all possible computations (in the Turing sense) are implicit in >>>>> arithmetic. And Bruno thinks arithmetic exists, and hence all threads of >>>>> human (and non-human) consciousness exist in arithmetic. >>>>> >>>>>> What exactly does Bruno mean by physicalism? >>>>> >>>>> That physics is the basic science; i.e. the ontology of physics, whatever >>>>> it is, must give rise to everything else, including conscious thought. >>>>> >>>>>> Why the incompatibility? Bruno? TIA, AG >>>>> >>>>> Bruno's a fundamentalist. You can only have one, really real, true >>>>> fundamental ontology. >>>> >>>> Given the sense of “fundamentalism” in the religious (pseudo-religious) >>>> domain, it might be useful to make precise that I do not defend any theory >>>> or religion. I just say that IF we can survive with an artificial brain, >>>> then physics becomes the science of available predictions by universal >>>> machine implemented in arithmetic. >>> >>> If arithmetic exists independent of physics. >> >> >> Fair enough. But then physicist who use the number must provides a physical >> explanation of those numbers, and without using the numbers or anything >> (Turing) equivalent, and that is just logically impossible. You can’t >> extract the numbers (with add. and mult.) from something not already Turing >> universal. > > They do. They look at spots on the film and count, 1 2 3 4 ... They don't > start from axioms, but from ostensive definitions. Axioms are a convenient > assumption allow theorizing.
But 1 2 3 4 … is not Turing universal. Let us consider Robinson arithmetic, which is a very weak theory of arithmetic (indeed consistent with the assumption that there is a biggest natural number, i.e. RA is consistent with ultra-finitisme, and indeed their basic assumption. RA cannot even prove that 0 + x = x for all x, but it can prove that 0 + 1 = 1, 0 + 2 = 2, 0 + 3 = 3, etc. Yet, RA is Turing complete (Turing universal). What I want to say is well illustrated by the fact that "RA minus any one of its axioms", is no more Turing universal. If you put one axiom away from: 1) 0 ≠ s(x) 2) x ≠ y -> s(x) ≠ s(y) 3) x ≠ 0 -> Ey(x = s(y)) 4) x+0 = x 5) x+s(y) = s(x+y) 6) x*0=0 7) x*s(y)=(x*y)+x You lose the Turing universality. So what I say is that it is impossible to prove the existence of universal machine and computation in a theory which does not assume them in a way or in another. Then, once you can prove the existence of one universal machine, you can prove the existence of any universal machine. You get them all. You can define and prove the axiom above from just the two combinators axioms Kxy = x, and Sxyz = xz(yz). So SK -> RA, and you can prove the SK axioms in RA, so RA -> SK. In fact, Church’s thesis can be replaced by the weaker axiom: it exists a universal machine (the original thesis of church is more like: it exist a universal machine, and indeed there exist a universal lambda expression. But without assuming some universal machine or machinery, you cannot prove their existence. It is like the axiom of infinity, or the axiom of choice: you cannot prove them form less. > >> >> Then, between us, I am personally more convinced that 24 is divisible by 8 >> than of the (primary) existence of the moon, > > But not when you're looking a the Moon. Especially when looking at the moon. > Being sure of that sentence is true, "Dr Watson was a friend of Sherlock > Holmes." doesn't mean the things named in the sentence exist. It certainly means that Watson and Homes exist, in some sense. The question is “is that sense interesting with respect to our goal of explaining "everything” (matter and consciousness) in a coherent way? > >> bosons brain and other such complex theoretical construct done unconsciously >> in the histories bringing brains and stuff. >> >> >> >>> >>> Brent >>> >>> The likely flaw in Bruno's theory is that the axioms of arithmetic don't >>> imply the existence of space and time. >> >> >> It implies the appearance of space and time and physical realities. At least >> it works up to now, that is why it is testable theory. >> >> >> >> >>> Hence, mechanism is false. >> >> >> Then Darwin is false, and most current theories are false. We have not yet >> found a natural phenomenon which would not be Turing emulable, except by >> using sophisticated construct near black hole, suing pure General >> relativity, but already made impossible if we add quantum mechanics. >> >> Postulating that mechanism is false is usually done by people defending >> fairy tales explanation of existence. >> >> >> >>> Simulating a human brain, even if possible, is not enough to copying a >>> universe. AG >> >> That is a consequence of Mechanism. There is no universe, and every piece of >> matter becomes NOT Turing emulable. Indeed, to get “all decimals” you will >> need to execute the entire universal dovetailer everywhere, and this in one >> instant. You might need to read the 8 step of the reasoning: matter emerges >> from all computations. >> Note that this too is somehow confirmed by the quantum field theories, where >> to get “all decimal correct”, you need to take into account an infinity of >> more and more complex Feynman diagrams, even just to computer the >> probability that an electron starting at A arrives at B. > > Just one of many computational techniques for calculating the Green's > function. OK, but the technic illustrates the need to consider all path to get the correct answer, which is what mechanism enforces when we describes a piece of matter at a level below our substitution level. (I didn't mean this as a proof, but as an empirical evidence for Mechanism). > >> >> Mechanism entails that neither matter, nor consciousness are Turing >> emulable. They appear due to the non computable first person indeterminacy >> in the seven step protocol: in front of a universal dovetail, or just >> arithmetic (the tiny sigma_1, partial computable part). >> >> When a digital computer simulate a brain, it does not create my >> consciousness. It borrows it from the arithmetical truth (a highly non >> computable notion) and makes it possible to manifest itself in a relative >> way, with a higher probability than without it. > > In a way relative to what?...to the physical world. Relative to other universal machine. Not necessarily those subset of the physical laws which emulates me, but also relatively to the universal number run along with me (my body). Bruno > > Brent > >> >> Don’t confuse Digital Mechanism, with Digital physicalism (the thesis that >> the physical universe is computable) because those thesis are inconsistent >> when taken together. In fact, Digital Physicalism is simply inconsistent, >> because it implies mechanism, but mechanism implies its negation, and so >> Digital Mechanism implies its negation, and thus is false, with or without >> mechanism. >> >> Bruno >> >> >> >> >> >>> >>>> And that this makes Mechanism Versus Materialism testable, and indeed >>>> confirmed by the observation, notably by QM without collapse. There is a >>>> "many-world" interpretation of arithmetic (in the head of all universal >>>> numbers), and we can test it. We can use any Turing universal formalism >>>> instead of arithmetic. They all lead to the same theology, and the same >>>> physics. >>>> >>>> Bruno >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>>> >>>>> Brent >>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> -- >>>>>> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google >>>>>> Groups "Everything List" group. >>>>>> To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send >>>>>> an email to everyth...@googlegroups.com <javascript:>. >>>>>> To view this discussion on the web visit >>>>>> https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/9725ab5e-d50e-41aa-8932-0eafeecf6b4d%40googlegroups.com >>>>>> >>>>>> <https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/9725ab5e-d50e-41aa-8932-0eafeecf6b4d%40googlegroups.com?utm_medium=email&utm_source=footer>. >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> -- >>>>> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups >>>>> "Everything List" group. >>>>> To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an >>>>> email to everyth...@googlegroups.com <javascript:>. >>>>> To view this discussion on the web visit >>>>> https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/b6ea3692-2307-294c-292d-e0a5292c48cd%40verizon.net >>>>> >>>>> <https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/b6ea3692-2307-294c-292d-e0a5292c48cd%40verizon.net?utm_medium=email&utm_source=footer>. >>>> >>>> -- >>>> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups >>>> "Everything List" group. >>>> To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an >>>> email to everyth...@googlegroups.com <javascript:>. >>>> To view this discussion on the web visit >>>> https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/2EFD4799-0C1D-4EAC-BFA5-D13D221755DE%40ulb.ac.be >>>> >>>> <https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/2EFD4799-0C1D-4EAC-BFA5-D13D221755DE%40ulb.ac.be?utm_medium=email&utm_source=footer>. >>> >>> >>> -- >>> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups >>> "Everything List" group. >>> To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an >>> email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com >>> <mailto:everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com>. >>> To view this discussion on the web visit >>> https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/a06f5819-1e53-49d6-918f-845fa799543d%40googlegroups.com >>> >>> <https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/a06f5819-1e53-49d6-918f-845fa799543d%40googlegroups.com?utm_medium=email&utm_source=footer>. >> >> -- >> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups >> "Everything List" group. >> To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an >> email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com >> <mailto:everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com>. >> To view this discussion on the web visit >> https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/18BFAA95-EFFD-4029-939A-839C63A097E0%40ulb.ac.be >> >> <https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/18BFAA95-EFFD-4029-939A-839C63A097E0%40ulb.ac.be?utm_medium=email&utm_source=footer>. > > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an > email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com > <mailto:everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com>. > To view this discussion on the web visit > https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/6f325ca0-c252-10b3-9561-c08dcf37a622%40verizon.net > > <https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/6f325ca0-c252-10b3-9561-c08dcf37a622%40verizon.net?utm_medium=email&utm_source=footer>. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. 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