> On 29 Feb 2020, at 06:35, Alan Grayson <[email protected]> wrote: > > > > On Thursday, February 27, 2020 at 5:41:57 AM UTC-7, Bruno Marchal wrote: > >> On 26 Feb 2020, at 18:06, Alan Grayson <[email protected] <javascript:>> >> wrote: >> >> >> >> On Wednesday, February 26, 2020 at 4:35:54 AM UTC-7, Bruno Marchal wrote: >> >>> On 25 Feb 2020, at 12:43, Bruce Kellett <[email protected] <>> wrote: >>> >>> On Tue, Feb 25, 2020 at 10:26 PM Bruno Marchal <[email protected] <>> wrote: >>> On 24 Feb 2020, at 23:22, Bruce Kellett <[email protected] <>> wrote: >>>> On Tue, Feb 25, 2020 at 12:10 AM Bruno Marchal <[email protected] <>> wrote: >>>> On 23 Feb 2020, at 23:49, Bruce Kellett <[email protected] <>> wrote: >>>>> On Mon, Feb 24, 2020 at 12:21 AM Bruno Marchal <[email protected] <>> >>>>> wrote: >>>>> On 23 Feb 2020, at 04:11, Bruce Kellett <[email protected] <>> wrote: >>>>>> >>>>>> I don't really understand your comment. I was thinking of Bruno's >>>>>> WM-duplication. You could impose the idea that each duplication at each >>>>>> branch point on every branch is an independent Bernoulli trial with p = >>>>>> 0.5 on this (success being defined arbitrarily as W or M). Then, if >>>>>> these probabilities carry over from trial to trial, you end up with >>>>>> every binary sequence, each with weight 1/2^N. Summing sequences with >>>>>> the same number of 0s and 1s, you get the Pascal Triangle distribution >>>>>> that Bruno wants. >>>>>> >>>>>> The trouble is that such a procedure is entirely arbitrary. The only >>>>>> probability that one could objectively assign to say, W, on each >>>>>> Bernoulli trial is one, >>>>> >>>>> That is certainly wrong. If you are correct, then P(W) = 1 is written in >>>>> the personal diary, >>>>> >>>>> I did say "objectively assign". In other words, this was a 3p comment. >>>>> You confuse 1p with 3p yet again. >>>> >>>> Well, if you “objectively” assign P(W) = 1, the guy in M will subjectively >>>> refute that prediction, and as the question was about the subjective >>>> accessible experience, he objectively, and predictably, refute your >>>> statement. >>>> >>>> >>>> And if you objectively assign p(W) = p(M) = 0.5, then with the W-guy and >>>> the M-guy will both say that your theory is refuted, since they both see >>>> only one city: W-guy, W with p = 1.0, and the M-guy, M with p =1.0.. >>> >>> That is *very* weird. That works for the coin tossing experience too, even >>> for the lottery. I predicted that I have 1/10^6 to win the lottery, but I >>> was wrong, after the gale was played I won, so the probability was one! >>> >>> In Helsinki, the guy write P(W) = P(M) = 1/2. That means he does not yet >>> know what outcome he will feel to live. Once the experience is done, one >>> copy will see W, and that is coherent with his prediction, same for the >>> others. He would have written P(W) = 1, that would have been felt as >>> refuted by the M guy, and vice-versa. >>> >>> But if he wrote p(W) = 0.9 and p(M) = 0.1 he would get exactly the same >>> result. The proposed probabilities are here without effect. >> >> If I toss a perfect coin too. >> >> Of course, that would lead directly to some problem with the iterated case >> scenario. >> >> >> >> >> >>>> If not, tell me what is your prediction in Helsinki again, by keeping in >>>> mind that it concerns your future subjective experience only. >>>> >>>> >>>> In Helsinki I can offer no value for the probability since, given the >>>> protocol, I know that all probabilities will be realized on repetitions of >>>> the duplication. >>> >>> In the 3p picture. Indeed, that is, by definition, the protocol. But the >>> question is not about where you will live after the experience (we know >>> that it will be in both cities), but what do you expect to live from the >>> first person perspective, and here P(W & M) is null, as nobody will ever >>> *feel to live* in both city at once with this protocole. >>> >>> And, as I have repeated shown, the first person perspective does not give >>> you any expectations at all. >> >> If I am duplicated like in the 2^(16180 * 10000) * (60 * 90) * 24 “movie” >> scenario, I do expect seeing white noise, and I certainly don’t expect to >> see “2001, Space Odyssey” with Tibetan subtitle. >> >> I am not sure what you mean by “the first person perspective does not give >> any expectations”. >> >> Do you agree that if you are promised, in Helsinki, that a cup of coffee >> will be offered to you, both in M and W, you can expect, with probability >> one, to get a cup of coffee after pushing the button in Helsinki? (Assuming >> Mechanism, of course). >> >> I would expect, in Helsinki, to drink a cup of coffee with probability one >> (using this protocole and all default hypotheses, like no asteroids hurt the >> planet in the meantime, etc.). >> >> And I would consider myself maximally ignorant if that coffee will be >> Russian or American coffee. >> >> >> >> >>> >>> The experience is totally symmetrical in the 3p picture, but that symmetry >>> is broken from the 1p perspective of each copy. One will say “I feel to be >>> in W, and not in M” and the other will say “I feel to be in M and not in W”. >>> >>> Regardless of any prior probability assignment. >> >> Exactly. >> >> >> >>> >>> >>>> I cannot infer a probability from just one trial, but the probability I >>>> infer from N repetitions can be any value in [0,1]. >>> >>> But we try to find the probability from the theory. >>> >>> And we use the experimental data to test the theory. If you predict p(W) = >>> p(M) =0.5, after a large number of duplications that prediction will be >>> refuted by the majority of the copies. In fact, in the limit, only a set of >>> measure zero will obtain p = 0.5 from their data. >> >> Then that is true for the iterated coin tossing too, and there is no >> probabilities at all. >> >> >> >>> >>> As I illustrated with the WMS triplication, unknown to the candidate, we >>> see that we cannot infer any probabilities, from experiences alone. >>> >>> What the WMS example shows is that if you guess the wrong theory, you will >>> get the wrong answer. >> >> Yes, and that shows that the fact the guy in Helsinki knows the true >> protocol is important, to derive the theoretical first person indeterminacy. >> >> If you have a problem with the specific answer P = 1/2, keep in mind that >> this is not use in the reduction of the mind-body problem the derivation of >> matter appearance from a statistics on all computation (“all computations” >> being defined in arithmetic). What is used is only the first person >> indeterminacy (and some variants) and the fact that the means to calculate >> the probabilities, or the credibilities, or the plausibilities is invariant >> for the changes made at each step of the Universal Dovetailer Argument. (P >> = 1/2 is used just to fix the idea, and also because most people find this >> to be the natural easiest solution with this “simple” protocol). >> >> >> >>> >>> Keep in mind that we *postulate* Mechanism. We work precisely in the frame >>> of that theory/hypothesis. >>> >>> >>> You might do so. But I do not. I am working with the protocols and data as >>> they are generated. >> >> You seem to use also the assumption that there is a physical reality, even a >> unique one. That is the point which does no more work when we assume digital >> mechanism, or you need to say more about that ontological physical universe, >> and explain how it makes consciousness, and how it deprives the same >> computation in arithmetic of consciousness. >> >> Bruno >> >> Bruno; What's the difference between mechanism and digital mechanism? > > > In all my posts, there is none. I use Mechanism as a shortcut for “Digital > Mechanism”, or “Indexical Digital Mechanism”, that is what I sum up by YD + > CT (Yes doctor, for the acceptance of a digital brain, and CT = Church > Turing, of Church’s thesis or equivalent). > > Mathematically, we can give sense to “non computable phenomenon”, and some > non-digital form of mechanism could not been excluded, bu most described in > the literature fails to be non digitalisable, and I am not sure a non digital > mechanist hypothesis makes sense, or could be made precise enough. In fact, > when a non digital notion is made precise, it usullat can be shown to be > digitally emulable, after all. But from a pure logical point of view, we > cannot exclude this. Some people do argue that all forms of mechanism are > digital. I don’t know, but I study only the consequence of the digital > hypothesis. > > > > >> What's the difference between 1p and 3p? > > It is like the difference between seeing someone tortured and being tortured. > The 1p is the first person subjective account of you feel and could write in > a personal diary, where, at least in a first approximation, the 3p is the > account of an “external observer”. > > Actually, I have invested the duplication experience tp make clear that > difference. In the 3p account, we have a perfect symmetry between the copies, > but in the first person diary, it diverges. > > > > >> If digital mechanism (which I assume you mean a brain can be replaced by a >> digital computer) > > Roughly speaking, yes. When progressing in the reasoning, that has to be made > more precise, but this is better done au fur et à mesure. > > > >> and the postulates of arithmetic cannot create space, > > Nor does any postulate. The postulation of space does not create space either. > > Now, not only does the postulates of arithmetic not creating space, but the > arithmetical reality does not create space either too. > > To be honest, I don’t no what could create space, and I doubt such a thing > can ever exist in any other sense that by self-localisation experience made > by coherent dreams or “video-games”. > > > > >> how can these two concepts imply and create Many Worlds, presumably worlds >> without space? AG > > > What all mathematical logicians do know, (and apparently only them), is that > all computations (by definition: a computation is the activity of a universal > machine or machinery) are emulated (executed) in virtue of the number > relations. > > Exactly like you can prove the existence of all prime numbers, and study they > astonishing behaviour, using just the laws of succession, addition and > multiplication, you can prove the existence of all computations using just > the same laws. > > If you ask, I can explain more on this. I do that for time to time in this > list. With all details, or just a sketchy summary, as you want. They key > element is the Church-Turing thesis (found by Emil Post before, and > understood and made precise by Kleene). > Church’s thesis is everything but obvious. > > Bruno > > The bottom line IMO is that you acknowledge NOT being able to use arithmetic > to create space,
Yes. Actually I am not sure that anything can create space, but that is not a problem a priori, because with Mechanism, there is no space. Like in Kant; it is all in the mind (of the universal machine/number, which exists in the sense that prime numbers exist) > regardless of the number of computations, yet you claim to be able to create > worlds with arithmetic alone. I did not. > Have you any way to resolve this insufficiency? It's true that existence of > space leaves the question of its creation unresolved, but I fail to see why > infinite computations offers an answer. AG Because with the minimal amount of Mechanism to make sense of Darwin, you already get *all* computations, including their redundancy, in arithmetic, and things like world, space, energy, bosons, fermions, are show to be “in the head” of the universal number/machine. I can and probably will give more explanations, I have to go now. I will add some explanations on this in a new answer to a remark/question by Brent Meeker. Bruno > > > > > > >> >> -- >> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups >> "Everything List" group. >> To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an >> email to [email protected] <javascript:>. >> To view this discussion on the web visit >> https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/59c2cd33-b5a0-459d-abfd-6e9a7245b046%40googlegroups.com >> >> <https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/59c2cd33-b5a0-459d-abfd-6e9a7245b046%40googlegroups.com?utm_medium=email&utm_source=footer>. > > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an > email to [email protected] > <mailto:[email protected]>. > To view this discussion on the web visit > https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/d680c809-a642-4558-bece-a3f6088a71ab%40googlegroups.com > > <https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/d680c809-a642-4558-bece-a3f6088a71ab%40googlegroups.com?utm_medium=email&utm_source=footer>. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to [email protected]. To view this discussion on the web visit https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/00A3A4A4-D3E9-48DB-BEF1-4518403A9370%40ulb.ac.be.
