> On 24 Feb 2020, at 23:22, Bruce Kellett <bhkellet...@gmail.com> wrote: > > On Tue, Feb 25, 2020 at 12:10 AM Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be > <mailto:marc...@ulb.ac.be>> wrote: > On 23 Feb 2020, at 23:49, Bruce Kellett <bhkellet...@gmail.com > <mailto:bhkellet...@gmail.com>> wrote: >> On Mon, Feb 24, 2020 at 12:21 AM Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be >> <mailto:marc...@ulb.ac.be>> wrote: >> On 23 Feb 2020, at 04:11, Bruce Kellett <bhkellet...@gmail.com >> <mailto:bhkellet...@gmail.com>> wrote: >>> >>> I don't really understand your comment. I was thinking of Bruno's >>> WM-duplication. You could impose the idea that each duplication at each >>> branch point on every branch is an independent Bernoulli trial with p = 0.5 >>> on this (success being defined arbitrarily as W or M). Then, if these >>> probabilities carry over from trial to trial, you end up with every binary >>> sequence, each with weight 1/2^N. Summing sequences with the same number of >>> 0s and 1s, you get the Pascal Triangle distribution that Bruno wants. >>> >>> The trouble is that such a procedure is entirely arbitrary. The only >>> probability that one could objectively assign to say, W, on each Bernoulli >>> trial is one, >> >> That is certainly wrong. If you are correct, then P(W) = 1 is written in the >> personal diary, >> >> I did say "objectively assign". In other words, this was a 3p comment. You >> confuse 1p with 3p yet again. > > Well, if you “objectively” assign P(W) = 1, the guy in M will subjectively > refute that prediction, and as the question was about the subjective > accessible experience, he objectively, and predictably, refute your > statement. > > > And if you objectively assign p(W) = p(M) = 0.5, then with the W-guy and the > M-guy will both say that your theory is refuted, since they both see only one > city: W-guy, W with p = 1.0, and the M-guy, M with p =1.0..
That is *very* weird. That works for the coin tossing experience too, even for the lottery. I predicted that I have 1/10^6 to win the lottery, but I was wrong, after the gale was played I won, so the probability was one! In Helsinki, the guy write P(W) = P(M) = 1/2. That means he does not yet know what outcome he will feel to live. Once the experience is done, one copy will see W, and that is coherent with his prediction, same for the others. He would have written P(W) = 1, that would have been felt as refuted by the M guy, and vice-versa. > > > If not, tell me what is your prediction in Helsinki again, by keeping in mind > that it concerns your future subjective experience only. > > > In Helsinki I can offer no value for the probability since, given the > protocol, I know that all probabilities will be realized on repetitions of > the duplication. In the 3p picture. Indeed, that is, by definition, the protocol. But the question is not about where you will live after the experience (we know that it will be in both cities), but what do you expect to live from the first person perspective, and here P(W & M) is null, as nobody will ever *feel to live* in both city at once with this protocole. The experience is totally symmetrical in the 3p picture, but that symmetry is broken from the 1p perspective of each copy. One will say “I feel to be in W, and not in M” and the other will say “I feel to be in M and not in W”. > I cannot infer a probability from just one trial., but the probability I > infer from N repetitions can be any value in [0,1]. But we try to find the probability from the theory. As I illustrated with the WMS triplication, unknown to the candidate, we see that we cannot infer any probabilities, from experiences alone. Keep in mind that we *postulate* Mechanism. We work precisely in the frame of that theory/hypothesis. Bruno > > Bruce > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an > email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com > <mailto:everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com>. > To view this discussion on the web visit > https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/CAFxXSLR%3DwaxzOKFupNKBVKszHgTW4CB6ruthObap7mqxdL3z7g%40mail.gmail.com > > <https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/CAFxXSLR%3DwaxzOKFupNKBVKszHgTW4CB6ruthObap7mqxdL3z7g%40mail.gmail.com?utm_medium=email&utm_source=footer>. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To view this discussion on the web visit https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/99559E20-D7D8-4B9D-BC3E-BB7512ABEF85%40ulb.ac.be.
