On Saturday, February 29, 2020 at 2:22:34 AM UTC-7, Quentin Anciaux wrote: > > > > Le sam. 29 févr. 2020 à 06:35, Alan Grayson <[email protected] > <javascript:>> a écrit : > >> >> >> On Thursday, February 27, 2020 at 5:41:57 AM UTC-7, Bruno Marchal wrote: >>> >>> >>> On 26 Feb 2020, at 18:06, Alan Grayson <[email protected]> wrote: >>> >>> >>> >>> On Wednesday, February 26, 2020 at 4:35:54 AM UTC-7, Bruno Marchal wrote: >>>> >>>> >>>> On 25 Feb 2020, at 12:43, Bruce Kellett <[email protected]> wrote: >>>> >>>> On Tue, Feb 25, 2020 at 10:26 PM Bruno Marchal <[email protected]> >>>> wrote: >>>> >>>>> On 24 Feb 2020, at 23:22, Bruce Kellett <[email protected]> wrote: >>>>> >>>>> On Tue, Feb 25, 2020 at 12:10 AM Bruno Marchal <[email protected]> >>>>> wrote: >>>>> >>>>>> On 23 Feb 2020, at 23:49, Bruce Kellett <[email protected]> wrote: >>>>>> >>>>>> On Mon, Feb 24, 2020 at 12:21 AM Bruno Marchal <[email protected]> >>>>>> wrote: >>>>>> >>>>>>> On 23 Feb 2020, at 04:11, Bruce Kellett <[email protected]> wrote: >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> I don't really understand your comment. I was thinking of Bruno's >>>>>>> WM-duplication. You could impose the idea that each duplication at each >>>>>>> branch point on every branch is an independent Bernoulli trial with p = >>>>>>> 0.5 >>>>>>> on this (success being defined arbitrarily as W or M). Then, if these >>>>>>> probabilities carry over from trial to trial, you end up with every >>>>>>> binary >>>>>>> sequence, each with weight 1/2^N. Summing sequences with the same >>>>>>> number of >>>>>>> 0s and 1s, you get the Pascal Triangle distribution that Bruno wants. >>>>>>> >>>>>>> The trouble is that such a procedure is entirely arbitrary. The only >>>>>>> probability that one could objectively assign to say, W, on each >>>>>>> Bernoulli >>>>>>> trial is one, >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> That is certainly wrong. If you are correct, then P(W) = 1 is >>>>>>> written in the personal diary, >>>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> I did say "objectively assign". In other words, this was a 3p >>>>>> comment. You confuse 1p with 3p yet again. >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> Well, if you “objectively” assign P(W) = 1, the guy in M will >>>>>> subjectively refute that prediction, and as the question was about the >>>>>> subjective accessible experience, he objectively, and predictably, >>>>>> refute >>>>>> your statement. >>>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> And if you objectively assign p(W) = p(M) = 0.5, then with the W-guy >>>>> and the M-guy will both say that your theory is refuted, since they both >>>>> see only one city: W-guy, W with p = 1.0, and the M-guy, M with p =1.0.. >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> That is *very* weird. That works for the coin tossing experience too, >>>>> even for the lottery. I predicted that I have 1/10^6 to win the lottery, >>>>> but I was wrong, after the gale was played I won, so the probability was >>>>> one! >>>>> >>>>> In Helsinki, the guy write P(W) = P(M) = 1/2. That means he does not >>>>> yet know what outcome he will feel to live. Once the experience is done, >>>>> one copy will see W, and that is coherent with his prediction, same for >>>>> the >>>>> others. He would have written P(W) = 1, that would have been felt as >>>>> refuted by the M guy, and vice-versa. >>>>> >>>> >>>> But if he wrote p(W) = 0.9 and p(M) = 0.1 he would get exactly the same >>>> result. The proposed probabilities are here without effect. >>>> >>>> >>>> If I toss a perfect coin too. >>>> >>>> Of course, that would lead directly to some problem with the iterated >>>> case scenario. >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> If not, tell me what is your prediction in Helsinki again, by keeping >>>>>> in mind that it concerns your future subjective experience only. >>>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> In Helsinki I can offer no value for the probability since, given the >>>>> protocol, I know that all probabilities will be realized on repetitions >>>>> of >>>>> the duplication. >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> In the 3p picture. Indeed, that is, by definition, the protocol. But >>>>> the question is not about where you will live after the experience (we >>>>> know >>>>> that it will be in both cities), but what do you expect to live from the >>>>> first person perspective, and here P(W & M) is null, as nobody will ever >>>>> *feel to live* in both city at once with this protocole. >>>>> >>>> >>>> And, as I have repeated shown, the first person perspective does not >>>> give you any expectations at all. >>>> >>>> >>>> If I am duplicated like in the 2^(16180 * 10000) * (60 * 90) * 24 >>>> “movie” scenario, I do expect seeing white noise, and I certainly don’t >>>> expect to see “2001, Space Odyssey” with Tibetan subtitle. >>>> >>>> I am not sure what you mean by “the first person perspective does not >>>> give any expectations”. >>>> >>>> Do you agree that if you are promised, in Helsinki, that a cup of >>>> coffee will be offered to you, both in M and W, you can expect, with >>>> probability one, to get a cup of coffee after pushing the button in >>>> Helsinki? (Assuming Mechanism, of course). >>>> >>>> I would expect, in Helsinki, to drink a cup of coffee with probability >>>> one (using this protocole and all default hypotheses, like no asteroids >>>> hurt the planet in the meantime, etc.). >>>> >>>> And I would consider myself maximally ignorant if that coffee will be >>>> Russian or American coffee. >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> The experience is totally symmetrical in the 3p picture, but that >>>>> symmetry is broken from the 1p perspective of each copy. One will say “I >>>>> feel to be in W, and not in M” and the other will say “I feel to be in M >>>>> and not in W”. >>>>> >>>> >>>> Regardless of any prior probability assignment. >>>> >>>> >>>> Exactly. >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> I cannot infer a probability from just one trial, but the probability I >>>>> infer from N repetitions can be any value in [0,1]. >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> But we try to find the probability from the theory. >>>>> >>>> >>>> And we use the experimental data to test the theory. If you predict >>>> p(W) = p(M) =0.5, after a large number of duplications that prediction >>>> will >>>> be refuted by the majority of the copies. In fact, in the limit, only a >>>> set >>>> of measure zero will obtain p = 0.5 from their data. >>>> >>>> >>>> Then that is true for the iterated coin tossing too, and there is no >>>> probabilities at all. >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> As I illustrated with the WMS triplication, unknown to the candidate, >>>>> we see that we cannot infer any probabilities, from experiences alone. >>>>> >>>> >>>> What the WMS example shows is that if you guess the wrong theory, you >>>> will get the wrong answer. >>>> >>>> >>>> Yes, and that shows that the fact the guy in Helsinki knows the true >>>> protocol is important, to derive the theoretical first person >>>> indeterminacy. >>>> >>>> If you have a problem with the specific answer P = 1/2, keep in mind >>>> that this is not use in the reduction of the mind-body problem the >>>> derivation of matter appearance from a statistics on all computation (“all >>>> computations” being defined in arithmetic). What is used is only the first >>>> person indeterminacy (and some variants) and the fact that the means to >>>> calculate the probabilities, or the credibilities, or the plausibilities >>>> is >>>> invariant for the changes made at each step of the Universal Dovetailer >>>> Argument. (P = 1/2 is used just to fix the idea, and also because most >>>> people find this to be the natural easiest solution with this “simple” >>>> protocol). >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> Keep in mind that we *postulate* Mechanism. We work precisely in the >>>>> frame of that theory/hypothesis. >>>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> You might do so. But I do not. I am working with the protocols and data >>>> as they are generated. >>>> >>>> >>>> You seem to use also the assumption that there is a physical reality, >>>> even a unique one. That is the point which does no more work when we >>>> assume >>>> digital mechanism, or you need to say more about that ontological physical >>>> universe, and explain how it makes consciousness, and how it deprives the >>>> same computation in arithmetic of consciousness. >>>> >>>> Bruno >>>> >>> >>> *Bruno; What's the difference between mechanism and digital mechanism? * >>> >>> >>> >>> In all my posts, there is none. I use Mechanism as a shortcut for >>> “Digital Mechanism”, or “Indexical Digital Mechanism”, that is what I sum >>> up by YD + CT (Yes doctor, for the acceptance of a digital brain, and CT = >>> Church Turing, of Church’s thesis or equivalent). >>> >>> Mathematically, we can give sense to “non computable phenomenon”, and >>> some non-digital form of mechanism could not been excluded, bu most >>> described in the literature fails to be non digitalisable, and I am not >>> sure a non digital mechanist hypothesis makes sense, or could be made >>> precise enough. In fact, when a non digital notion is made precise, it >>> usullat can be shown to be digitally emulable, after all. But from a pure >>> logical point of view, we cannot exclude this. Some people do argue that >>> all forms of mechanism are digital. I don’t know, but I study only the >>> consequence of the digital hypothesis. >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> *What's the difference between 1p and 3p? * >>> >>> >>> It is like the difference between seeing someone tortured and being >>> tortured. The 1p is the first person subjective account of you feel and >>> could write in a personal diary, where, at least in a first approximation, >>> the 3p is the account of an “external observer”. >>> >>> Actually, I have invested the duplication experience tp make clear that >>> difference. In the 3p account, we have a perfect symmetry between the >>> copies, but in the first person diary, it diverges. >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> *If digital mechanism (which I assume you mean a brain can be replaced >>> by a digital computer) * >>> >>> >>> Roughly speaking, yes. When progressing in the reasoning, that has to be >>> made more precise, but this is better done au fur et à mesure. >>> >>> >>> >>> *and the postulates of arithmetic cannot create space,* >>> >>> >>> Nor does any postulate. The postulation of space does not create space >>> either. >>> >>> Now, not only does the postulates of arithmetic not creating space, but >>> the arithmetical reality does not create space either too. >>> >>> To be honest, I don’t no what could create space, and I doubt such a >>> thing can ever exist in any other sense that by self-localisation >>> experience made by coherent dreams or “video-games”. >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> * how can these two concepts imply and create Many Worlds, presumably >>> worlds without space? AG * >>> >>> >>> >>> What all mathematical logicians do know, (and apparently only them), is >>> that all computations (by definition: a computation is the activity of a >>> universal machine or machinery) are emulated (executed) in virtue of the >>> number relations. >>> >>> Exactly like you can prove the existence of all prime numbers, and study >>> they astonishing behaviour, using just the laws of succession, addition and >>> multiplication, you can prove the existence of all computations using just >>> the same laws. >>> >>> If you ask, I can explain more on this. I do that for time to time in >>> this list. With all details, or just a sketchy summary, as you want. They >>> key element is the Church-Turing thesis (found by Emil Post before, and >>> understood and made precise by Kleene). >>> Church’s thesis is everything but obvious. >>> >>> Bruno >>> >> >> The bottom line IMO is that you acknowledge NOT being able to use >> arithmetic to create space, >> > > He doesn't need to, he just have to get the appearance of space/matter. > And after all, that's all we get in reality, if we could be sure about the > ontological status of matter, we wouldn't discuss it. > > Quentin > >> *I don't think you understand the issue I am raising. Bruno says that arithmetic alone cannot create space, yet he claims that arithmetic alone creates other worlds. AG*
> regardless of the number of computations, yet you claim to be able to >> create worlds with arithmetic alone. Have you any way to resolve this >> insufficiency? It's true that existence of space leaves the question of its >> creation unresolved, but I fail to see why infinite computations offers an >> answer. AG >> >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> -- >>> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google >>> Groups "Everything List" group. >>> To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send >>> an email to [email protected]. >>> To view this discussion on the web visit >>> https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/59c2cd33-b5a0-459d-abfd-6e9a7245b046%40googlegroups.com >>> >>> <https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/59c2cd33-b5a0-459d-abfd-6e9a7245b046%40googlegroups.com?utm_medium=email&utm_source=footer> >>> . >>> >>> >>> -- >> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups >> "Everything List" group. >> To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an >> email to [email protected] <javascript:>. >> To view this discussion on the web visit >> https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/d680c809-a642-4558-bece-a3f6088a71ab%40googlegroups.com >> >> <https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/d680c809-a642-4558-bece-a3f6088a71ab%40googlegroups.com?utm_medium=email&utm_source=footer> >> . >> > > > -- > All those moments will be lost in time, like tears in rain. (Roy > Batty/Rutger Hauer) > -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to [email protected]. To view this discussion on the web visit https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/d02c7f47-8468-4e1f-b4c2-60d25f202bec%40googlegroups.com.
