On Tue, Feb 25, 2020 at 10:26 PM Bruno Marchal <[email protected]> wrote:
> On 24 Feb 2020, at 23:22, Bruce Kellett <[email protected]> wrote: > > On Tue, Feb 25, 2020 at 12:10 AM Bruno Marchal <[email protected]> wrote: > >> On 23 Feb 2020, at 23:49, Bruce Kellett <[email protected]> wrote: >> >> On Mon, Feb 24, 2020 at 12:21 AM Bruno Marchal <[email protected]> wrote: >> >>> On 23 Feb 2020, at 04:11, Bruce Kellett <[email protected]> wrote: >>> >>> >>> I don't really understand your comment. I was thinking of Bruno's >>> WM-duplication. You could impose the idea that each duplication at each >>> branch point on every branch is an independent Bernoulli trial with p = 0.5 >>> on this (success being defined arbitrarily as W or M). Then, if these >>> probabilities carry over from trial to trial, you end up with every binary >>> sequence, each with weight 1/2^N. Summing sequences with the same number of >>> 0s and 1s, you get the Pascal Triangle distribution that Bruno wants. >>> >>> The trouble is that such a procedure is entirely arbitrary. The only >>> probability that one could objectively assign to say, W, on each Bernoulli >>> trial is one, >>> >>> >>> That is certainly wrong. If you are correct, then P(W) = 1 is written in >>> the personal diary, >>> >> >> I did say "objectively assign". In other words, this was a 3p comment. >> You confuse 1p with 3p yet again. >> >> >> Well, if you “objectively” assign P(W) = 1, the guy in M will >> subjectively refute that prediction, and as the question was about the >> subjective accessible experience, he objectively, and predictably, refute >> your statement. >> > > > And if you objectively assign p(W) = p(M) = 0.5, then with the W-guy and > the M-guy will both say that your theory is refuted, since they both see > only one city: W-guy, W with p = 1.0, and the M-guy, M with p =1.0.. > > > That is *very* weird. That works for the coin tossing experience too, even > for the lottery. I predicted that I have 1/10^6 to win the lottery, but I > was wrong, after the gale was played I won, so the probability was one! > > In Helsinki, the guy write P(W) = P(M) = 1/2. That means he does not yet > know what outcome he will feel to live. Once the experience is done, one > copy will see W, and that is coherent with his prediction, same for the > others. He would have written P(W) = 1, that would have been felt as > refuted by the M guy, and vice-versa. > But if he wrote p(W) = 0.9 and p(M) = 0.1 he would get exactly the same result. The proposed probabilities are here without effect. > If not, tell me what is your prediction in Helsinki again, by keeping in >> mind that it concerns your future subjective experience only. >> > > > In Helsinki I can offer no value for the probability since, given the > protocol, I know that all probabilities will be realized on repetitions of > the duplication. > > > In the 3p picture. Indeed, that is, by definition, the protocol. But the > question is not about where you will live after the experience (we know > that it will be in both cities), but what do you expect to live from the > first person perspective, and here P(W & M) is null, as nobody will ever > *feel to live* in both city at once with this protocole. > And, as I have repeated shown, the first person perspective does not give you any expectations at all. The experience is totally symmetrical in the 3p picture, but that symmetry > is broken from the 1p perspective of each copy. One will say “I feel to be > in W, and not in M” and the other will say “I feel to be in M and not in W”. > Regardless of any prior probability assignment. I cannot infer a probability from just one trial, but the probability I > infer from N repetitions can be any value in [0,1]. > > > But we try to find the probability from the theory. > And we use the experimental data to test the theory. If you predict p(W) = p(M) =0.5, after a large number of duplications that prediction will be refuted by the majority of the copies. In fact, in the limit, only a set of measure zero will obtain p = 0.5 from their data. As I illustrated with the WMS triplication, unknown to the candidate, we > see that we cannot infer any probabilities, from experiences alone. > What the WMS example shows is that if you guess the wrong theory, you will get the wrong answer. Keep in mind that we *postulate* Mechanism. We work precisely in the frame > of that theory/hypothesis. > You might do so. But I do not. I am working with the protocols and data as they are generated. Bruce -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to [email protected]. To view this discussion on the web visit https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/CAFxXSLQh-g%3DmHcxE4Nt5vX8Ro0%2BMJUOckWCZPKCkzPpcAj6GeQ%40mail.gmail.com.
