Le sam. 29 févr. 2020 à 06:35, Alan Grayson <[email protected]> a écrit :
> > > On Thursday, February 27, 2020 at 5:41:57 AM UTC-7, Bruno Marchal wrote: >> >> >> On 26 Feb 2020, at 18:06, Alan Grayson <[email protected]> wrote: >> >> >> >> On Wednesday, February 26, 2020 at 4:35:54 AM UTC-7, Bruno Marchal wrote: >>> >>> >>> On 25 Feb 2020, at 12:43, Bruce Kellett <[email protected]> wrote: >>> >>> On Tue, Feb 25, 2020 at 10:26 PM Bruno Marchal <[email protected]> wrote: >>> >>>> On 24 Feb 2020, at 23:22, Bruce Kellett <[email protected]> wrote: >>>> >>>> On Tue, Feb 25, 2020 at 12:10 AM Bruno Marchal <[email protected]> >>>> wrote: >>>> >>>>> On 23 Feb 2020, at 23:49, Bruce Kellett <[email protected]> wrote: >>>>> >>>>> On Mon, Feb 24, 2020 at 12:21 AM Bruno Marchal <[email protected]> >>>>> wrote: >>>>> >>>>>> On 23 Feb 2020, at 04:11, Bruce Kellett <[email protected]> wrote: >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> I don't really understand your comment. I was thinking of Bruno's >>>>>> WM-duplication. You could impose the idea that each duplication at each >>>>>> branch point on every branch is an independent Bernoulli trial with p = >>>>>> 0.5 >>>>>> on this (success being defined arbitrarily as W or M). Then, if these >>>>>> probabilities carry over from trial to trial, you end up with every >>>>>> binary >>>>>> sequence, each with weight 1/2^N. Summing sequences with the same number >>>>>> of >>>>>> 0s and 1s, you get the Pascal Triangle distribution that Bruno wants. >>>>>> >>>>>> The trouble is that such a procedure is entirely arbitrary. The only >>>>>> probability that one could objectively assign to say, W, on each >>>>>> Bernoulli >>>>>> trial is one, >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> That is certainly wrong. If you are correct, then P(W) = 1 is written >>>>>> in the personal diary, >>>>>> >>>>> >>>>> I did say "objectively assign". In other words, this was a 3p comment. >>>>> You confuse 1p with 3p yet again. >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> Well, if you “objectively” assign P(W) = 1, the guy in M will >>>>> subjectively refute that prediction, and as the question was about the >>>>> subjective accessible experience, he objectively, and predictably, refute >>>>> your statement. >>>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> And if you objectively assign p(W) = p(M) = 0.5, then with the W-guy >>>> and the M-guy will both say that your theory is refuted, since they both >>>> see only one city: W-guy, W with p = 1.0, and the M-guy, M with p =1.0.. >>>> >>>> >>>> That is *very* weird. That works for the coin tossing experience too, >>>> even for the lottery. I predicted that I have 1/10^6 to win the lottery, >>>> but I was wrong, after the gale was played I won, so the probability was >>>> one! >>>> >>>> In Helsinki, the guy write P(W) = P(M) = 1/2. That means he does not >>>> yet know what outcome he will feel to live. Once the experience is done, >>>> one copy will see W, and that is coherent with his prediction, same for the >>>> others. He would have written P(W) = 1, that would have been felt as >>>> refuted by the M guy, and vice-versa. >>>> >>> >>> But if he wrote p(W) = 0.9 and p(M) = 0.1 he would get exactly the same >>> result. The proposed probabilities are here without effect. >>> >>> >>> If I toss a perfect coin too. >>> >>> Of course, that would lead directly to some problem with the iterated >>> case scenario. >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> If not, tell me what is your prediction in Helsinki again, by keeping in >>>>> mind that it concerns your future subjective experience only. >>>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> In Helsinki I can offer no value for the probability since, given the >>>> protocol, I know that all probabilities will be realized on repetitions of >>>> the duplication. >>>> >>>> >>>> In the 3p picture. Indeed, that is, by definition, the protocol. But >>>> the question is not about where you will live after the experience (we know >>>> that it will be in both cities), but what do you expect to live from the >>>> first person perspective, and here P(W & M) is null, as nobody will ever >>>> *feel to live* in both city at once with this protocole. >>>> >>> >>> And, as I have repeated shown, the first person perspective does not >>> give you any expectations at all. >>> >>> >>> If I am duplicated like in the 2^(16180 * 10000) * (60 * 90) * 24 >>> “movie” scenario, I do expect seeing white noise, and I certainly don’t >>> expect to see “2001, Space Odyssey” with Tibetan subtitle. >>> >>> I am not sure what you mean by “the first person perspective does not >>> give any expectations”. >>> >>> Do you agree that if you are promised, in Helsinki, that a cup of coffee >>> will be offered to you, both in M and W, you can expect, with probability >>> one, to get a cup of coffee after pushing the button in Helsinki? (Assuming >>> Mechanism, of course). >>> >>> I would expect, in Helsinki, to drink a cup of coffee with probability >>> one (using this protocole and all default hypotheses, like no asteroids >>> hurt the planet in the meantime, etc.). >>> >>> And I would consider myself maximally ignorant if that coffee will be >>> Russian or American coffee. >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> The experience is totally symmetrical in the 3p picture, but that >>>> symmetry is broken from the 1p perspective of each copy. One will say “I >>>> feel to be in W, and not in M” and the other will say “I feel to be in M >>>> and not in W”. >>>> >>> >>> Regardless of any prior probability assignment. >>> >>> >>> Exactly. >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> I cannot infer a probability from just one trial, but the probability I >>>> infer from N repetitions can be any value in [0,1]. >>>> >>>> >>>> But we try to find the probability from the theory. >>>> >>> >>> And we use the experimental data to test the theory. If you predict p(W) >>> = p(M) =0.5, after a large number of duplications that prediction will be >>> refuted by the majority of the copies. In fact, in the limit, only a set of >>> measure zero will obtain p = 0.5 from their data. >>> >>> >>> Then that is true for the iterated coin tossing too, and there is no >>> probabilities at all. >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> As I illustrated with the WMS triplication, unknown to the candidate, we >>>> see that we cannot infer any probabilities, from experiences alone. >>>> >>> >>> What the WMS example shows is that if you guess the wrong theory, you >>> will get the wrong answer. >>> >>> >>> Yes, and that shows that the fact the guy in Helsinki knows the true >>> protocol is important, to derive the theoretical first person indeterminacy. >>> >>> If you have a problem with the specific answer P = 1/2, keep in mind >>> that this is not use in the reduction of the mind-body problem the >>> derivation of matter appearance from a statistics on all computation (“all >>> computations” being defined in arithmetic). What is used is only the first >>> person indeterminacy (and some variants) and the fact that the means to >>> calculate the probabilities, or the credibilities, or the plausibilities is >>> invariant for the changes made at each step of the Universal Dovetailer >>> Argument. (P = 1/2 is used just to fix the idea, and also because most >>> people find this to be the natural easiest solution with this “simple” >>> protocol). >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> Keep in mind that we *postulate* Mechanism. We work precisely in the >>>> frame of that theory/hypothesis. >>>> >>> >>> >>> You might do so. But I do not. I am working with the protocols and data >>> as they are generated. >>> >>> >>> You seem to use also the assumption that there is a physical reality, >>> even a unique one. That is the point which does no more work when we assume >>> digital mechanism, or you need to say more about that ontological physical >>> universe, and explain how it makes consciousness, and how it deprives the >>> same computation in arithmetic of consciousness. >>> >>> Bruno >>> >> >> *Bruno; What's the difference between mechanism and digital mechanism? * >> >> >> >> In all my posts, there is none. I use Mechanism as a shortcut for >> “Digital Mechanism”, or “Indexical Digital Mechanism”, that is what I sum >> up by YD + CT (Yes doctor, for the acceptance of a digital brain, and CT = >> Church Turing, of Church’s thesis or equivalent). >> >> Mathematically, we can give sense to “non computable phenomenon”, and >> some non-digital form of mechanism could not been excluded, bu most >> described in the literature fails to be non digitalisable, and I am not >> sure a non digital mechanist hypothesis makes sense, or could be made >> precise enough. In fact, when a non digital notion is made precise, it >> usullat can be shown to be digitally emulable, after all. But from a pure >> logical point of view, we cannot exclude this. Some people do argue that >> all forms of mechanism are digital. I don’t know, but I study only the >> consequence of the digital hypothesis. >> >> >> >> >> *What's the difference between 1p and 3p? * >> >> >> It is like the difference between seeing someone tortured and being >> tortured. The 1p is the first person subjective account of you feel and >> could write in a personal diary, where, at least in a first approximation, >> the 3p is the account of an “external observer”. >> >> Actually, I have invested the duplication experience tp make clear that >> difference. In the 3p account, we have a perfect symmetry between the >> copies, but in the first person diary, it diverges. >> >> >> >> >> *If digital mechanism (which I assume you mean a brain can be replaced by >> a digital computer) * >> >> >> Roughly speaking, yes. When progressing in the reasoning, that has to be >> made more precise, but this is better done au fur et à mesure. >> >> >> >> *and the postulates of arithmetic cannot create space,* >> >> >> Nor does any postulate. The postulation of space does not create space >> either. >> >> Now, not only does the postulates of arithmetic not creating space, but >> the arithmetical reality does not create space either too. >> >> To be honest, I don’t no what could create space, and I doubt such a >> thing can ever exist in any other sense that by self-localisation >> experience made by coherent dreams or “video-games”. >> >> >> >> >> * how can these two concepts imply and create Many Worlds, presumably >> worlds without space? AG * >> >> >> >> What all mathematical logicians do know, (and apparently only them), is >> that all computations (by definition: a computation is the activity of a >> universal machine or machinery) are emulated (executed) in virtue of the >> number relations. >> >> Exactly like you can prove the existence of all prime numbers, and study >> they astonishing behaviour, using just the laws of succession, addition and >> multiplication, you can prove the existence of all computations using just >> the same laws. >> >> If you ask, I can explain more on this. I do that for time to time in >> this list. With all details, or just a sketchy summary, as you want. They >> key element is the Church-Turing thesis (found by Emil Post before, and >> understood and made precise by Kleene). >> Church’s thesis is everything but obvious. >> >> Bruno >> > > The bottom line IMO is that you acknowledge NOT being able to use > arithmetic to create space, > He doesn't need to, he just have to get the appearance of space/matter. And after all, that's all we get in reality, if we could be sure about the ontological status of matter, we wouldn't discuss it. Quentin > regardless of the number of computations, yet you claim to be able to > create worlds with arithmetic alone. Have you any way to resolve this > insufficiency? It's true that existence of space leaves the question of its > creation unresolved, but I fail to see why infinite computations offers an > answer. AG > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> -- >> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups >> "Everything List" group. >> To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an >> email to [email protected]. >> To view this discussion on the web visit >> https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/59c2cd33-b5a0-459d-abfd-6e9a7245b046%40googlegroups.com >> <https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/59c2cd33-b5a0-459d-abfd-6e9a7245b046%40googlegroups.com?utm_medium=email&utm_source=footer> >> . >> >> >> -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an > email to [email protected]. > To view this discussion on the web visit > https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/d680c809-a642-4558-bece-a3f6088a71ab%40googlegroups.com > <https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/d680c809-a642-4558-bece-a3f6088a71ab%40googlegroups.com?utm_medium=email&utm_source=footer> > . > -- All those moments will be lost in time, like tears in rain. 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