> On 26 Feb 2020, at 18:06, Alan Grayson <[email protected]> wrote: > > > > On Wednesday, February 26, 2020 at 4:35:54 AM UTC-7, Bruno Marchal wrote: > >> On 25 Feb 2020, at 12:43, Bruce Kellett <[email protected] <javascript:>> >> wrote: >> >> On Tue, Feb 25, 2020 at 10:26 PM Bruno Marchal <[email protected] >> <javascript:>> wrote: >> On 24 Feb 2020, at 23:22, Bruce Kellett <[email protected] <javascript:>> >> wrote: >>> On Tue, Feb 25, 2020 at 12:10 AM Bruno Marchal <[email protected] >>> <javascript:>> wrote: >>> On 23 Feb 2020, at 23:49, Bruce Kellett <[email protected] <javascript:>> >>> wrote: >>>> On Mon, Feb 24, 2020 at 12:21 AM Bruno Marchal <[email protected] >>>> <javascript:>> wrote: >>>> On 23 Feb 2020, at 04:11, Bruce Kellett <[email protected] <javascript:>> >>>> wrote: >>>>> >>>>> I don't really understand your comment. I was thinking of Bruno's >>>>> WM-duplication. You could impose the idea that each duplication at each >>>>> branch point on every branch is an independent Bernoulli trial with p = >>>>> 0.5 on this (success being defined arbitrarily as W or M). Then, if these >>>>> probabilities carry over from trial to trial, you end up with every >>>>> binary sequence, each with weight 1/2^N. Summing sequences with the same >>>>> number of 0s and 1s, you get the Pascal Triangle distribution that Bruno >>>>> wants. >>>>> >>>>> The trouble is that such a procedure is entirely arbitrary. The only >>>>> probability that one could objectively assign to say, W, on each >>>>> Bernoulli trial is one, >>>> >>>> That is certainly wrong. If you are correct, then P(W) = 1 is written in >>>> the personal diary, >>>> >>>> I did say "objectively assign". In other words, this was a 3p comment. You >>>> confuse 1p with 3p yet again. >>> >>> Well, if you “objectively” assign P(W) = 1, the guy in M will subjectively >>> refute that prediction, and as the question was about the subjective >>> accessible experience, he objectively, and predictably, refute your >>> statement. >>> >>> >>> And if you objectively assign p(W) = p(M) = 0.5, then with the W-guy and >>> the M-guy will both say that your theory is refuted, since they both see >>> only one city: W-guy, W with p = 1.0, and the M-guy, M with p =1.0.. >> >> That is *very* weird. That works for the coin tossing experience too, even >> for the lottery. I predicted that I have 1/10^6 to win the lottery, but I >> was wrong, after the gale was played I won, so the probability was one! >> >> In Helsinki, the guy write P(W) = P(M) = 1/2. That means he does not yet >> know what outcome he will feel to live. Once the experience is done, one >> copy will see W, and that is coherent with his prediction, same for the >> others. He would have written P(W) = 1, that would have been felt as refuted >> by the M guy, and vice-versa. >> >> But if he wrote p(W) = 0.9 and p(M) = 0.1 he would get exactly the same >> result. The proposed probabilities are here without effect. > > If I toss a perfect coin too. > > Of course, that would lead directly to some problem with the iterated case > scenario. > > > > > >>> If not, tell me what is your prediction in Helsinki again, by keeping in >>> mind that it concerns your future subjective experience only. >>> >>> >>> In Helsinki I can offer no value for the probability since, given the >>> protocol, I know that all probabilities will be realized on repetitions of >>> the duplication. >> >> In the 3p picture. Indeed, that is, by definition, the protocol. But the >> question is not about where you will live after the experience (we know that >> it will be in both cities), but what do you expect to live from the first >> person perspective, and here P(W & M) is null, as nobody will ever *feel to >> live* in both city at once with this protocole. >> >> And, as I have repeated shown, the first person perspective does not give >> you any expectations at all. > > If I am duplicated like in the 2^(16180 * 10000) * (60 * 90) * 24 “movie” > scenario, I do expect seeing white noise, and I certainly don’t expect to see > “2001, Space Odyssey” with Tibetan subtitle. > > I am not sure what you mean by “the first person perspective does not give > any expectations”. > > Do you agree that if you are promised, in Helsinki, that a cup of coffee will > be offered to you, both in M and W, you can expect, with probability one, to > get a cup of coffee after pushing the button in Helsinki? (Assuming > Mechanism, of course). > > I would expect, in Helsinki, to drink a cup of coffee with probability one > (using this protocole and all default hypotheses, like no asteroids hurt the > planet in the meantime, etc.). > > And I would consider myself maximally ignorant if that coffee will be Russian > or American coffee. > > > > >> >> The experience is totally symmetrical in the 3p picture, but that symmetry >> is broken from the 1p perspective of each copy. One will say “I feel to be >> in W, and not in M” and the other will say “I feel to be in M and not in W”. >> >> Regardless of any prior probability assignment. > > Exactly. > > > >> >> >>> I cannot infer a probability from just one trial, but the probability I >>> infer from N repetitions can be any value in [0,1]. >> >> But we try to find the probability from the theory. >> >> And we use the experimental data to test the theory. If you predict p(W) = >> p(M) =0.5, after a large number of duplications that prediction will be >> refuted by the majority of the copies. In fact, in the limit, only a set of >> measure zero will obtain p = 0.5 from their data. > > Then that is true for the iterated coin tossing too, and there is no > probabilities at all. > > > >> >> As I illustrated with the WMS triplication, unknown to the candidate, we see >> that we cannot infer any probabilities, from experiences alone. >> >> What the WMS example shows is that if you guess the wrong theory, you will >> get the wrong answer. > > Yes, and that shows that the fact the guy in Helsinki knows the true protocol > is important, to derive the theoretical first person indeterminacy. > > If you have a problem with the specific answer P = 1/2, keep in mind that > this is not use in the reduction of the mind-body problem the derivation of > matter appearance from a statistics on all computation (“all computations” > being defined in arithmetic). What is used is only the first person > indeterminacy (and some variants) and the fact that the means to calculate > the probabilities, or the credibilities, or the plausibilities is invariant > for the changes made at each step of the Universal Dovetailer Argument. (P = > 1/2 is used just to fix the idea, and also because most people find this to > be the natural easiest solution with this “simple” protocol). > > > >> >> Keep in mind that we *postulate* Mechanism. We work precisely in the frame >> of that theory/hypothesis. >> >> >> You might do so. But I do not. I am working with the protocols and data as >> they are generated. > > You seem to use also the assumption that there is a physical reality, even a > unique one. That is the point which does no more work when we assume digital > mechanism, or you need to say more about that ontological physical universe, > and explain how it makes consciousness, and how it deprives the same > computation in arithmetic of consciousness. > > Bruno > > Bruno; What's the difference between mechanism and digital mechanism?
In all my posts, there is none. I use Mechanism as a shortcut for “Digital Mechanism”, or “Indexical Digital Mechanism”, that is what I sum up by YD + CT (Yes doctor, for the acceptance of a digital brain, and CT = Church Turing, of Church’s thesis or equivalent). Mathematically, we can give sense to “non computable phenomenon”, and some non-digital form of mechanism could not been excluded, bu most described in the literature fails to be non digitalisable, and I am not sure a non digital mechanist hypothesis makes sense, or could be made precise enough. In fact, when a non digital notion is made precise, it usullat can be shown to be digitally emulable, after all. But from a pure logical point of view, we cannot exclude this. Some people do argue that all forms of mechanism are digital. I don’t know, but I study only the consequence of the digital hypothesis. > What's the difference between 1p and 3p? It is like the difference between seeing someone tortured and being tortured. The 1p is the first person subjective account of you feel and could write in a personal diary, where, at least in a first approximation, the 3p is the account of an “external observer”. Actually, I have invested the duplication experience tp make clear that difference. In the 3p account, we have a perfect symmetry between the copies, but in the first person diary, it diverges. > If digital mechanism (which I assume you mean a brain can be replaced by a > digital computer) Roughly speaking, yes. When progressing in the reasoning, that has to be made more precise, but this is better done au fur et à mesure. > and the postulates of arithmetic cannot create space, Nor does any postulate. The postulation of space does not create space either. Now, not only does the postulates of arithmetic not creating space, but the arithmetical reality does not create space either too. To be honest, I don’t no what could create space, and I doubt such a thing can ever exist in any other sense that by self-localisation experience made by coherent dreams or “video-games”. > how can these two concepts imply and create Many Worlds, presumably worlds > without space? AG What all mathematical logicians do know, (and apparently only them), is that all computations (by definition: a computation is the activity of a universal machine or machinery) are emulated (executed) in virtue of the number relations. Exactly like you can prove the existence of all prime numbers, and study they astonishing behaviour, using just the laws of succession, addition and multiplication, you can prove the existence of all computations using just the same laws. If you ask, I can explain more on this. I do that for time to time in this list. With all details, or just a sketchy summary, as you want. They key element is the Church-Turing thesis (found by Emil Post before, and understood and made precise by Kleene). Church’s thesis is everything but obvious. Bruno > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an > email to [email protected] > <mailto:[email protected]>. > To view this discussion on the web visit > https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/59c2cd33-b5a0-459d-abfd-6e9a7245b046%40googlegroups.com > > <https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/59c2cd33-b5a0-459d-abfd-6e9a7245b046%40googlegroups.com?utm_medium=email&utm_source=footer>. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to [email protected]. To view this discussion on the web visit https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/85FA4ACE-F725-4D09-8CBE-2EF1F4C599F5%40ulb.ac.be.
