On Wednesday, February 26, 2020 at 4:35:54 AM UTC-7, Bruno Marchal wrote: > > > On 25 Feb 2020, at 12:43, Bruce Kellett <[email protected] <javascript:>> > wrote: > > On Tue, Feb 25, 2020 at 10:26 PM Bruno Marchal <[email protected] > <javascript:>> wrote: > >> On 24 Feb 2020, at 23:22, Bruce Kellett <[email protected] <javascript:>> >> wrote: >> >> On Tue, Feb 25, 2020 at 12:10 AM Bruno Marchal <[email protected] >> <javascript:>> wrote: >> >>> On 23 Feb 2020, at 23:49, Bruce Kellett <[email protected] >>> <javascript:>> wrote: >>> >>> On Mon, Feb 24, 2020 at 12:21 AM Bruno Marchal <[email protected] >>> <javascript:>> wrote: >>> >>>> On 23 Feb 2020, at 04:11, Bruce Kellett <[email protected] >>>> <javascript:>> wrote: >>>> >>>> >>>> I don't really understand your comment. I was thinking of Bruno's >>>> WM-duplication. You could impose the idea that each duplication at each >>>> branch point on every branch is an independent Bernoulli trial with p = >>>> 0.5 >>>> on this (success being defined arbitrarily as W or M). Then, if these >>>> probabilities carry over from trial to trial, you end up with every binary >>>> sequence, each with weight 1/2^N. Summing sequences with the same number >>>> of >>>> 0s and 1s, you get the Pascal Triangle distribution that Bruno wants. >>>> >>>> The trouble is that such a procedure is entirely arbitrary. The only >>>> probability that one could objectively assign to say, W, on each Bernoulli >>>> trial is one, >>>> >>>> >>>> That is certainly wrong. If you are correct, then P(W) = 1 is written >>>> in the personal diary, >>>> >>> >>> I did say "objectively assign". In other words, this was a 3p comment. >>> You confuse 1p with 3p yet again. >>> >>> >>> Well, if you “objectively” assign P(W) = 1, the guy in M will >>> subjectively refute that prediction, and as the question was about the >>> subjective accessible experience, he objectively, and predictably, refute >>> your statement. >>> >> >> >> And if you objectively assign p(W) = p(M) = 0.5, then with the W-guy and >> the M-guy will both say that your theory is refuted, since they both see >> only one city: W-guy, W with p = 1.0, and the M-guy, M with p =1.0.. >> >> >> That is *very* weird. That works for the coin tossing experience too, >> even for the lottery. I predicted that I have 1/10^6 to win the lottery, >> but I was wrong, after the gale was played I won, so the probability was >> one! >> >> In Helsinki, the guy write P(W) = P(M) = 1/2. That means he does not yet >> know what outcome he will feel to live. Once the experience is done, one >> copy will see W, and that is coherent with his prediction, same for the >> others. He would have written P(W) = 1, that would have been felt as >> refuted by the M guy, and vice-versa. >> > > But if he wrote p(W) = 0.9 and p(M) = 0.1 he would get exactly the same > result. The proposed probabilities are here without effect. > > > If I toss a perfect coin too. > > Of course, that would lead directly to some problem with the iterated case > scenario. > > > > > > If not, tell me what is your prediction in Helsinki again, by keeping in >>> mind that it concerns your future subjective experience only. >>> >> >> >> In Helsinki I can offer no value for the probability since, given the >> protocol, I know that all probabilities will be realized on repetitions of >> the duplication. >> >> >> In the 3p picture. Indeed, that is, by definition, the protocol. But the >> question is not about where you will live after the experience (we know >> that it will be in both cities), but what do you expect to live from the >> first person perspective, and here P(W & M) is null, as nobody will ever >> *feel to live* in both city at once with this protocole. >> > > And, as I have repeated shown, the first person perspective does not give > you any expectations at all. > > > If I am duplicated like in the 2^(16180 * 10000) * (60 * 90) * 24 “movie” > scenario, I do expect seeing white noise, and I certainly don’t expect to > see “2001, Space Odyssey” with Tibetan subtitle. > > I am not sure what you mean by “the first person perspective does not give > any expectations”. > > Do you agree that if you are promised, in Helsinki, that a cup of coffee > will be offered to you, both in M and W, you can expect, with probability > one, to get a cup of coffee after pushing the button in Helsinki? (Assuming > Mechanism, of course). > > I would expect, in Helsinki, to drink a cup of coffee with probability > one (using this protocole and all default hypotheses, like no asteroids > hurt the planet in the meantime, etc.). > > And I would consider myself maximally ignorant if that coffee will be > Russian or American coffee. > > > > > > The experience is totally symmetrical in the 3p picture, but that symmetry >> is broken from the 1p perspective of each copy. One will say “I feel to be >> in W, and not in M” and the other will say “I feel to be in M and not in W”. >> > > Regardless of any prior probability assignment. > > > Exactly. > > > > > > I cannot infer a probability from just one trial, but the probability I >> infer from N repetitions can be any value in [0,1]. >> >> >> But we try to find the probability from the theory. >> > > And we use the experimental data to test the theory. If you predict p(W) = > p(M) =0.5, after a large number of duplications that prediction will be > refuted by the majority of the copies. In fact, in the limit, only a set of > measure zero will obtain p = 0.5 from their data. > > > Then that is true for the iterated coin tossing too, and there is no > probabilities at all. > > > > > As I illustrated with the WMS triplication, unknown to the candidate, we >> see that we cannot infer any probabilities, from experiences alone. >> > > What the WMS example shows is that if you guess the wrong theory, you will > get the wrong answer. > > > Yes, and that shows that the fact the guy in Helsinki knows the true > protocol is important, to derive the theoretical first person indeterminacy. > > If you have a problem with the specific answer P = 1/2, keep in mind that > this is not use in the reduction of the mind-body problem the derivation of > matter appearance from a statistics on all computation (“all computations” > being defined in arithmetic). What is used is only the first person > indeterminacy (and some variants) and the fact that the means to calculate > the probabilities, or the credibilities, or the plausibilities is invariant > for the changes made at each step of the Universal Dovetailer Argument. (P > = 1/2 is used just to fix the idea, and also because most people find this > to be the natural easiest solution with this “simple” protocol). > > > > > Keep in mind that we *postulate* Mechanism. We work precisely in the frame >> of that theory/hypothesis. >> > > > You might do so. But I do not. I am working with the protocols and data as > they are generated. > > > You seem to use also the assumption that there is a physical reality, even > a unique one. That is the point which does no more work when we assume > digital mechanism, or you need to say more about that ontological physical > universe, and explain how it makes consciousness, and how it deprives the > same computation in arithmetic of consciousness. > > Bruno >
*Bruno; What's the difference between mechanism and digital mechanism? What's the difference between 1p and 3p? If digital mechanism (which I assume you mean a brain can be replaced by a digital computer) and the postulates of arithmetic cannot create space, how can these two concepts imply and create Many Worlds, presumably worlds without space? AG * -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to [email protected]. To view this discussion on the web visit https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/59c2cd33-b5a0-459d-abfd-6e9a7245b046%40googlegroups.com.
