> On 5 May 2020, at 21:30, 'Brent Meeker' via Everything List > <[email protected]> wrote: > > > > On 5/5/2020 5:05 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: >> >>> On 4 May 2020, at 20:47, 'Brent Meeker' via Everything List >>> <[email protected] >>> <mailto:[email protected]>> wrote: >>> >>> >>> >>> On 5/4/2020 6:27 AM, Quentin Anciaux wrote: >>>> >>>> >>>> Le lun. 4 mai 2020 à 14:15, Lawrence Crowell >>>> <[email protected] >>>> <mailto:[email protected]>> a écrit : >>>> On Sunday, May 3, 2020 at 10:14:10 PM UTC-5, smitra wrote: >>>> On 03-05-2020 23:09, Philip Thrift wrote: >>>> > The SSH >>>> > >>>> > https://www.mdpi.com/1099-4300/22/2/247 >>>> > <https://www.mdpi.com/1099-4300/22/2/247> >>>> > >>>> > still lies in the "information turn" that plays in physics today.(IT >>>> > FROM QUBIT, etc.) - a rejection pf materialism in favor of idealism. >>>> > >>>> > It is more interesting to me to stick to the vocabulary of >>>> > materialist* physics - particles, fields, interactions, forces - but >>>> > to approach CONSCIOUSNESS AS PURELY MATERIAL - adding a new >>>> > force/interaction/particle/field as needed (like a sixth force/field). >>>> > >>>> > http://www.scholarpedia.org/article/Field_theories_of_consciousness >>>> > <http://www.scholarpedia.org/article/Field_theories_of_consciousness> >>>> > >>>> > https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Electromagnetic_theories_of_consciousness >>>> > <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Electromagnetic_theories_of_consciousness> >>>> > >>>> > >>>> > etc. >>>> > >>>> > * or physicalist >>>> > >>>> > @philipthrift >>>> >>>> Physicalism is a dead end. The hard problem of consciousness and other >>>> philosophical problems can be considered to be no-go theorems against >>>> physicalism. Abandoning physicalism solves all these problems in one >>>> fell swoop. But that also opens the door to wrong theories as people >>>> engaging with non-physicalist theories can too easily advertise their >>>> pet theories because they don't suffer from all the diseases physicalist >>>> theories suffer from. The bar has to be set higher, I would like to see >>>> a derivation of the laws of physics, not some vague argument that it is >>>> consistent with QM and unitary evolution but a lot more detail than just >>>> that. >>>> >>>> Saibal >>>> >>>> I think more likely this mean the hard problem or qualia are illusions. I >>>> have far more confidence in physics than I do in hopeful ideas about >>>> qualia, which are psychological form of elan vital thought in previous >>>> centuries to underlie biology. >>>> >>>> Either you have no quale, and then as a zombie... it could mean something >>>> (but not to you), or you have, and if a theory cannot account for that, it >>>> miss the things it purpose to explain. >>>> >>>> When you say "psychological form" you're talking about a quale... I don't >>>> see how that could be explained away... >>>> >>> >>> I think the problem here is with the word "explain". Yes, physics will >>> never explain quale. But physics doesn't explain matter, or gravity, or >>> entropy either. Physics is regarded as successful because it makes good >>> predictions, and that allows manipulation of things. Look at the >>> controversy over the interpretation of quantum mechanics. We have >>> drastically different "explanations" of what is happening...which have zero >>> effect on the application or usefulness of the theory. And that's exactly >>> the same situation with regard to consciousness and qualia. Chemistry and >>> biology have a lot of of good "explanations" of quale in the sense of being >>> able to predict them and manipulate them. Sure, it's no where near as deep >>> as physics explanations which reach down to sub-atomic level. But physics >>> aims for depth and bypasses the complex problems of biology as accidents of >>> evolution, mere geography problems. There's no reason to suppose that >>> chemistry and molecular biology and study of brain structure >> >> OK. >> >> >> >>> and AI will not reach the same depth of explanation of consciousness. >> >> Once you invoke AI or mechanism, the deep explanation will have to reduce >> physics to some mathematics (indeed to G* intensional variant). Or it brings >> magical ontological commitment just to hide ignorance, and that is bad >> religion/philosophy. >> >> >> >>> And it still won't "explain" quale, >> >> Where Mechanism does. >> >> >> >> >>> but it will manipulate them and reproduce them in AI and people will forget >>> all about how mysterious they were...just like they have forgotten elan >>> vitale. >> >> Even the AI will not been convinced by this. The élan vitale does not >> explain one thing. > > Right. And neither does "mechanism”.
? Without Mechanism, Darwin’s theory of evolution stops working. To negate Mechanism, you need to add magic in the brain. Diderot consider (right Imo) that Mechanism is the same as rationalism. Newton’s dynamic was threatening Mechanism, but quantum mechanics made all the corrections needed to save mechanism. Same with Gödel’s incompleteness, it saves the ChurchTuring thesis. Without the incompleteness of any theory about the natural numbers, Church-thesis would be refuted. Then, Mechanism is not used as an explanation, but as a tool to formulate the mind-body problem in a precise mathematical way, so as to make Mechanism testable, and, as I said, thanks to quantum mechanics, Mechanism is (not yet) refuted, and remains the simpler explanation—the one which assumes the less. > >> The qualia are just unavoidable data, which, when we suppose mechanism are >> easier to explain, and indeed already explains the existence of quanta as >> first person sharable qualia. >> >> Mechanism explains, in a coherent and testable way, why we feel like if >> there was a material reality, and a mental reality. > > No it doesn't. You just say it must. No, I explain this in detail, informal and formal. You know that. Ask a specific question about the point where you disagree. I suspect you forgot that all computations are run in (all) model(s) of arithmetic. > It does not explain why you and I agree on what this sentence says. What is missed? > >> Adding a magical primitive matter makes that explanation no more working, so >> why to add it? > > Every time I refer to matter in an explanation, you falsely accuse me of > invoking "primitive matter". I have no concept of "primitive matter". and I > don't even believe in "primitiveness". I think it is a religious > supersitition. If that is the case, you agree that we have to explain the physical appearances without invoking any physical laws. Primitive means “needed to be assumed”, or “not derivable from less”. With mechanism, the only primitive we have are the intended meaning of the terms of any Turing universal (and non inductive) theory. Yes, the belief in primitive matter is an illusion, but then, if interested in the fundamental science, we have to explain that illusion from something on which we agree, and with mechanism, we don’t need, and we cannot use, more than (any) universal Turing machinery. You can refer to matter in an explanation, but when you dismiss the consciousness problem, you seem to take some matter notion as granted, when, specifically, to explain the appearance of such matter, we have to use an immaterialist theory of mind (or to abandon Mechanism). I am an empiricist. Without the empirical confirmation of Mechanism, (including consciousness, though), I would have abandoned the idea that Mechanism might be plausible since long. So let us continue the math and the testing, and we will see (well our grandchildren will see). Bruno > > Brent > >> >> The goal is not to replaced physics by some better predictive science, >> except for the afterlife problem, where, with some exception like Tipler, is >> not part of the physical inquiry, but of metaphysics, and the point is that >> with mechanism, any Aristotelian theories cannot work. >> >> Physics and Metaphysics are different science. To make them equal *is* the >> Aristotelian act of faith, and this can work only by invoking non Turing >> elmulable element in the brain. But there is no evidences for this, and >> thanks to quantum mechanics, the startling many histories aspect needed for >> a mechanist theory of the observable is vindicated by the experiments. >> >> Bruno >> >> >> >>> >>> Brent >>> >>> >>> -- >>> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups >>> "Everything List" group. >>> To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an >>> email to [email protected] >>> <mailto:[email protected]>. >>> To view this discussion on the web visit >>> https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/793213e0-89f6-f6fa-bc72-4c3b7608fe34%40verizon.net >>> >>> <https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/793213e0-89f6-f6fa-bc72-4c3b7608fe34%40verizon.net?utm_medium=email&utm_source=footer>. >> >> -- >> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups >> "Everything List" group. >> To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an >> email to [email protected] >> <mailto:[email protected]>. >> To view this discussion on the web visit >> https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/ED07C8B8-5478-46C5-8398-6A5E56E338A9%40ulb.ac.be >> >> <https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/ED07C8B8-5478-46C5-8398-6A5E56E338A9%40ulb.ac.be?utm_medium=email&utm_source=footer>. > > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an > email to [email protected] > <mailto:[email protected]>. > To view this discussion on the web visit > https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/247391a7-96df-8cd6-0229-335e9f3aaa0a%40verizon.net > > <https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/247391a7-96df-8cd6-0229-335e9f3aaa0a%40verizon.net?utm_medium=email&utm_source=footer>. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. 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