Curious that so many images showed up. I guess this is good at drawing itself in more ways than one.
LC On Wednesday, May 6, 2020 at 7:26:00 AM UTC-5, telmo wrote: > > > > Am Mi, 6. Mai 2020, um 11:19, schrieb Lawrence Crowell: > > On Wednesday, May 6, 2020 at 5:28:04 AM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal wrote: > > > On 5 May 2020, at 17:36, Lawrence Crowell <goldenfield...@gmail.com> > wrote: > > As a strange loop consciousness may be an illusion having an illusion of > itself. > > > I cannot make sense of this. How could consciousness be an illusion, as an > illusion is a conscious expérience. > > [image: Escher # 10 - 8 x 10 Tee Shirt Iron On Transfer Hands] > [image: Escher # 10 - 8 x 10 Tee Shirt Iron On Transfer Hands] > > [image: Escher hands drawing hands.jpg] > > > Escher was great at drawing strange loops, as famously recognized by > Hofstadter. > > I certainly cannot argue at your level in theoretical physics (and I am > grateful for all I learn from your posts in this regard, and also Clark, > Brent and others). What I can't help but notice in this reply of yours is > that you seem to be aware of the deep problems, while at the same time > arguing that they are just an illusion somehow. I would even dare speculate > that you agree with Bruno, and mostly have a problem with certain terms he > uses. > > Best > Telmo > > > > I can imagine myself dreaming that my bicycle is conscious, and then wake > up; that was an illusion. But I cannot imagine dreaming that I am > conscious, then waking up, and understanding that consciousness is an > illusion. > > I would say that consciousness is the fixed point of the doubt: it is the > only thing that I am unable to doubt. To doubt consciousness is non > sensical, like a circular square. > > Only the content, and indeed all contents minus one exception > (consciousness itself), can be doubted (could be an illusion). > > When we postulate the Mechanist hypothesis, there is no ontological > phenomenological physical universe. The appearance of the physical universe > emerge from the statistics on all computations (a purely arithmetical > notion) going through “my” current state. That works in the sense that we > recover both the many-worlds/histories aspect of the observable, and the > quantum logical formalism, and the symmetries. Mechanism generalises > Noether theorem and Gleason theorem to arithmetic, and the laws of physics > becomes “machine independent”: they don’t depend on the choice of the > universal machinery that we have to postulate (to give sense to mechanism, > but also because we cannot deduce a universal machinery from anything non > universal). > > Bruno > > > > > LC > > On Tuesday, May 5, 2020 at 6:17:29 AM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal wrote: > > > On 4 May 2020, at 15:00, Telmo Menezes <te...@telmomenezes.net> wrote: > > > > Am Mo, 4. Mai 2020, um 12:15, schrieb Lawrence Crowell: > > On Sunday, May 3, 2020 at 10:14:10 PM UTC-5, smitra wrote: > > On 03-05-2020 23:09, Philip Thrift wrote: > > The SSH > > > > https://www.mdpi.com/1099-4300/22/2/247 > > > > still lies in the "information turn" that plays in physics today.(IT > > FROM QUBIT, etc.) - a rejection pf materialism in favor of idealism. > > > > It is more interesting to me to stick to the vocabulary of > > materialist* physics - particles, fields, interactions, forces - but > > to approach CONSCIOUSNESS AS PURELY MATERIAL - adding a new > > force/interaction/particle/field as needed (like a sixth force/field). > > > > http://www.scholarpedia.org/article/Field_theories_of_consciousness > > > > https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Electromagnetic_theories_of_consciousness > > > > etc. > > > > * or physicalist > > > > @philipthrift > > Physicalism is a dead end. The hard problem of consciousness and other > philosophical problems can be considered to be no-go theorems against > physicalism. Abandoning physicalism solves all these problems in one > fell swoop. But that also opens the door to wrong theories as people > engaging with non-physicalist theories can too easily advertise their > pet theories because they don't suffer from all the diseases physicalist > theories suffer from. The bar has to be set higher, I would like to see > a derivation of the laws of physics, not some vague argument that it is > consistent with QM and unitary evolution but a lot more detail than just > that. > > Saibal > > > I think more likely this mean the hard problem or qualia are illusions. > > > Isn't an illusion itself a qualia? Aren't you begging the question? > > > Yes. Consciousness cannot be an illusion, as a genuine illusion needs > consciousness. LC’s remark does not makes sense. It looks like the usual > physicalist attempt to put the mind-body problem under the rug. > > With mechanism, it is the PRIMITIVE physical universe which is an > illusion, and up to now, that illusion is explained by the number relation, > except for our belief in numbers, which is still completely explained as > being necessarily not explainable from less (or equivalent). That is why I > claim that mechanism does solve the mind body problem, where adding > infinities in the physical world just suggest a non mechanist theory of > mind, which add difficulties without reason. > > There are no evidence for a primitive physical universe. There strong > evidence for the existence of a physical universe or physical reality, but > no evidence for its pirmaryness, as the antic greek understood very well, > when inventing Mathematics (a mathematician was a pholospher skeptic about > he physicalness of the absolute reality). > > Bruno > > > > > Telmo. > > I have far more confidence in physics than I do in hopeful ideas about > qualia, which are psychological form of elan vital thought in previous > centuries to underlie biology. > > LC > > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an > email to everyth...@googlegroups.com. > To view this discussion on the web visit > https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/fc14bd06-c600-4e6a-abf1-b73943d36617%40googlegroups.com > > <https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/fc14bd06-c600-4e6a-abf1-b73943d36617%40googlegroups.com?utm_medium=email&utm_source=footer> > . > > > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an > email to everyth...@googlegroups.com. > To view this discussion on the web visit > https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/fb72afca-3b77-447d-88d2-65286e0fe542%40www.fastmail.com > > <https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/fb72afca-3b77-447d-88d2-65286e0fe542%40www.fastmail.com?utm_medium=email&utm_source=footer> > . > > > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an > email to everyth...@googlegroups.com. > To view this discussion on the web visit > https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/af4d2e45-79e5-4b4d-8e82-fb19fa3d339b%40googlegroups.com > > <https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/af4d2e45-79e5-4b4d-8e82-fb19fa3d339b%40googlegroups.com?utm_medium=email&utm_source=footer> > . > > > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an > email to everyth...@googlegroups.com <javascript:>. > To view this discussion on the web visit > https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/bf368d7a-ede8-4804-9ca9-df409a46a676%40googlegroups.com > > <https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/bf368d7a-ede8-4804-9ca9-df409a46a676%40googlegroups.com?utm_medium=email&utm_source=footer> > . > > > > *Dateianhänge:* > > - Escher hands drawing hands.jpg > > > -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. 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