> On 13 Jun 2020, at 04:01, Alan Grayson <agrayson2...@gmail.com> wrote: > > > > On Friday, June 12, 2020 at 3:43:59 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal wrote: > >> On 11 Jun 2020, at 17:35, Alan Grayson <agrays...@gmail.com <javascript:>> >> wrote: >> >> >> >> On Thursday, June 11, 2020 at 5:15:30 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal wrote: >> >>> On 11 Jun 2020, at 04:00, Alan Grayson <agrays...@gmail.com <>> wrote: >>> >>> >>> >>> On Monday, June 8, 2020 at 11:25:51 AM UTC-6, Alan Grayson wrote: >>> >>> >>> On Monday, June 8, 2020 at 10:29:34 AM UTC-6, Alan Grayson wrote: >>> >>> >>> On Monday, June 8, 2020 at 6:26:10 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal wrote: >>> >>>> On 7 Jun 2020, at 17:56, Alan Grayson <agrays...@gmail.com <>> wrote: >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> On Sunday, June 7, 2020 at 9:00:46 AM UTC-6, Alan Grayson wrote: >>>> It predicts everything, so it predicts nothing. AG >>>> >>>> It's not unlike the monkey typing at random and coming up with >>>> Shakespeare's plays, or the Bible. AG >>> >>> Using this analogy, it is more like the monkey typing *all* books. Except >>> that the monkey is elementary arithmetic, and there is non need of >>> randomness at that stage, and also, the books are not books, but true >>> (semantic) relations implementing computations, and then physics is shown >>> to be an internal measure, isolated from the Göde-Löb-Solvay theorem in the >>> mathematics iff self-reference. >>> >>> The theory is Kxy = x together with Sxyz = xz(yz), as I have explained a >>> year ago. >>> >>> The theology is the modal logics G and G*, and the intensional (modal) >>> variants imposed by incompleteness, and all that is justified without using >>> more than the two axioms above. >>> >>> “My” theory is a sub theory of al scientific theories. >>> >>> Look at the conceptual progresses even just on physics: >>> >>> Bohr: >>> - the wave equation (full arithmetic + analysis) >>> - a dualist unintelligible theory of mind. >>> >>> Everett >>> - the wave equation (full arithmetic + analysis) >>> - Mechanism >>> >>> Your servitor: >>> - arithmetic (a tiny part of arithmetic) >>> - Mechanism. >>> >>> If “my" theory (which is actually a theorem showing that “my” theory is the >>> Universal machine theory) predicts everything, then all theories predict >>> everything. >>> >>> I suspect that you have not really try to understand the theory. It is not >>> mine, it is the theory that any patient being can derive from mechanism and >>> computer science/arithmetic. The hard work have already be done by Gödel, >>> Kleene, Löb, and others. Two key theorems which summarise a lot are the two >>> theorem by Solovay, which summarise the theology of the machine in one >>> modal logic G*. Such question or read the papers if you want to really >>> address the “mechanist mind-body problem”. >>> >>> Bruno >>> >>> I am not motivated to study your theory. If all computation are possible, >>> it seems to imply, for example, that any G describes a possible Newtonian >>> gravity law, but can't tell is which G corresponds to our universe, let >>> alone show that Newton's law is just a weak field approximation of GR. AG >>> >>> Also, I don't believe that logic alone, with the postulates of arithmetic, >>> can distinguish one G from another, >> >> I don’t know. If you are right on this, this entails that “G” is >> geographical. Of course, this comes from the fact that mechanism has to >> re-define the physical by the laws on the observable available to all >> universal numbers. If not, some non Turing elulable magic is brought in the >> theory of mind (implicitly). >> >> Firstly, I don't take any firm position on the ontological status of the >> physical universe. > > OK. > > > > >> What I AM saying is that logic alone and the property of numbers do not have >> sufficient inherent information to distinguish the validity of physical >> theories, > > I doubt this. Since 1931/1936, we know that the simple laws of addition and > multiplication of the natural numbers (not the real numbers), when taking > together, leads to a Turing-complete theory, i.e. notably a Turing universal > system. They can define what is a computation, and prove the existence of all > of them. Assuming Mechanism, we belongs to all of them, so to make any > physical (observable) prediction, we have to take them into account to make > any prediction. Newtonian-like physics does not work without invoking an > ontological primary physical “computation selection” which can be shown > incompatible with mechanism. > > I disagree. One need not assume any ontological status for the physical > universe, but one can still determine whether Newtonian physics "works". AG
No problem. But whatever the physics you are assuming, eventually, if you want to get the qualia, you need to explain the physical laws from arithmetic (and its internal meta-arithmetic-aka-computer science). > > With QM: that selection (the wave collapse) is made more obvious, more > tangible, and … more doubtful, and indeed, if we reject it, QM becomes a > confirmation of the main startling aspect of mechanism (we have infinitely > many relative “bodies”. >> where validity means predictability. > > Actually, I believe only that predictability of the absurd means > non-validity. Non predictability by itself does not lead to non validity, > unless … you take Aristotle physicalist stance at the start (which *is* > invalid). > > The physical universe manifests some level of existence, even if it's not the > ultimate reality, and there's nothing absurd in testing physics with > reference to this reality. AG OK. > >> Good predictions are what we use to distinguish good theories, > OK. >> and this has nothing to do with the ontological status of the physical >> universe. > > It has, if you want to predict some physical happening, you need either a > physical universe to start with, or a theory which explains where the > physical universe comes from. > > One can verify a physical theory without having a theory of the origin of the > physical universe. Just do some measuring! AG Absolutely, but to get the qualia, you need to justify the appearance of the physical reality without invoking it. Physics is just not metaphysics, nor theology, unless you assume physicalism, and in that case you will need some form of non-mechanist theory of mind, and you are out of the scope of my working hypothesis. You will have to present a non computational theory of mind, or just not doing metaphysics/theology. Bruno > > With Mechanism, the first option is just not available, and you have to > recover the *appearance* of the physical universe from some statistic on all > computations going through your actual brain or body relative > representation/incarnation/implementation. Without Mechanism you need a non > mechanist theory of mind, which does not yet exist. >> As for "the observable available to all universal numbers", I also doubt >> that numbers can observe anything. AG > A number cannot think, or make observation, per se. Nor can a physical body. > Nor can anything purely third person describable. > > Nor can a number be universal per se. > > So when I say that a number can think, observe, or even just be (Turing) > universal, it is always a short manner to say that relatively to some “base” > phi_i, that number belongs to a (true) relation making it mirroring perfectly > (at the mechanist substitution level) the behaviour of a person, as related > to its brain. > > So, either you were mislead by my short way to express myself, or you are > just asserting that you believe that the Mechanist philosophy is wrong. I am > agnostic on all this. My point is that mechanism can be tested, and that the > currently available evidences favour Mechanism, and quasi-disprove > physicalism. > > Bruno >>> to obtain the weak field approximation of GR, aka Newtonian gravity; or >>> that the measured velocity of light is independent of the motions of source >>> and recipient. AG >>> >>> I got my answer, by default. AG >> >> ? >> >> Bruno >> >> >> >> >>> >>> -- >>> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups >>> "Everything List" group. >>> To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an >>> email to everyth...@googlegroups.com <>. >>> To view this discussion on the web visit >>> https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/4313005b-46dd-40dc-af15-743643cee643o%40googlegroups.com >>> >>> <https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/4313005b-46dd-40dc-af15-743643cee643o%40googlegroups.com?utm_medium=email&utm_source=footer>. >> >> >> -- >> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups >> "Everything List" group. >> To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an >> email to everyth...@googlegroups.com <javascript:>. >> To view this discussion on the web visit >> https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/7398f81b-ad38-4bae-b08c-55486abc0712o%40googlegroups.com >> >> <https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/7398f81b-ad38-4bae-b08c-55486abc0712o%40googlegroups.com?utm_medium=email&utm_source=footer>. > > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an > email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com > <mailto:everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com>. > To view this discussion on the web visit > https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/6df13501-6c2d-49f8-9b88-9a468bde571eo%40googlegroups.com > > <https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/6df13501-6c2d-49f8-9b88-9a468bde571eo%40googlegroups.com?utm_medium=email&utm_source=footer>. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. 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