On Friday, June 12, 2020 at 3:43:59 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal wrote: > > > On 11 Jun 2020, at 17:35, Alan Grayson <[email protected] <javascript:>> > wrote: > > > > On Thursday, June 11, 2020 at 5:15:30 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal wrote: >> >> >> On 11 Jun 2020, at 04:00, Alan Grayson <[email protected]> wrote: >> >> >> >> On Monday, June 8, 2020 at 11:25:51 AM UTC-6, Alan Grayson wrote: >>> >>> >>> >>> On Monday, June 8, 2020 at 10:29:34 AM UTC-6, Alan Grayson wrote: >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> On Monday, June 8, 2020 at 6:26:10 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal wrote: >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> On 7 Jun 2020, at 17:56, Alan Grayson <[email protected]> wrote: >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> On Sunday, June 7, 2020 at 9:00:46 AM UTC-6, Alan Grayson wrote: >>>>>> >>>>>> It predicts everything, so it predicts nothing. AG >>>>>> >>>>> >>>>> It's not unlike the monkey typing at random and coming up with >>>>> Shakespeare's plays, or the Bible. AG >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> Using this analogy, it is more like the monkey typing *all* books. >>>>> Except that the monkey is elementary arithmetic, and there is non need of >>>>> randomness at that stage, and also, the books are not books, but true >>>>> (semantic) relations implementing computations, and then physics is shown >>>>> to be an internal measure, isolated from the Göde-Löb-Solvay theorem in >>>>> the >>>>> mathematics iff self-reference. >>>>> >>>>> The theory is Kxy = x together with Sxyz = xz(yz), as I have explained >>>>> a year ago. >>>>> >>>>> The theology is the modal logics G and G*, and the intensional (modal) >>>>> variants imposed by incompleteness, and all that is justified without >>>>> using >>>>> more than the two axioms above. >>>>> >>>>> “My” theory is a sub theory of al scientific theories. >>>>> >>>>> Look at the conceptual progresses even just on physics: >>>>> >>>>> Bohr: >>>>> - the wave equation (full arithmetic + analysis) >>>>> - a dualist unintelligible theory of mind. >>>>> >>>>> Everett >>>>> - the wave equation (full arithmetic + analysis) >>>>> - Mechanism >>>>> >>>>> Your servitor: >>>>> - arithmetic (a tiny part of arithmetic) >>>>> - Mechanism. >>>>> >>>>> If “my" theory (which is actually a theorem showing that “my” theory >>>>> is the Universal machine theory) predicts everything, then all theories >>>>> predict everything. >>>>> >>>>> I suspect that you have not really try to understand the theory. It is >>>>> not mine, it is the theory that any patient being can derive from >>>>> mechanism >>>>> and computer science/arithmetic. The hard work have already be done by >>>>> Gödel, Kleene, Löb, and others. Two key theorems which summarise a lot >>>>> are >>>>> the two theorem by Solovay, which summarise the theology of the machine >>>>> in >>>>> one modal logic G*. Such question or read the papers if you want to >>>>> really >>>>> address the “mechanist mind-body problem”. >>>>> >>>>> Bruno >>>>> >>>> >>>> I am not motivated to study your theory. If all computation are >>>> possible, it seems to imply, for example, that any G describes a possible >>>> Newtonian gravity law, but can't tell is which G corresponds to our >>>> universe, let alone show that Newton's law is just a weak field >>>> approximation of GR. AG >>>> >>> >>> Also, I don't believe that logic alone, with the postulates of >>> arithmetic, can distinguish one G from another, >>> >> >> I don’t know. If you are right on this, this entails that “G” is >> geographical. Of course, this comes from the fact that mechanism has to >> re-define the physical by the laws on the observable available to all >> universal numbers. If not, some non Turing elulable magic is brought in the >> theory of mind (implicitly). >> > > Firstly, I don't take any firm position on the ontological status of the > physical universe. > > > OK. > > > > > What I AM saying is that logic alone and the property of numbers do not > have sufficient inherent information to distinguish the validity of > physical theories, > > > I doubt this. Since 1931/1936, we know that the simple laws of addition > and multiplication of the natural numbers (not the real numbers), when > taking together, leads to a Turing-complete theory, i.e. notably a Turing > universal system. They can define what is a computation, and prove the > existence of all of them. Assuming Mechanism, we belongs to all of them, so > to make any physical (observable) prediction, we have to take them into > account to make any prediction. Newtonian-like physics does not work > without invoking an ontological primary physical “computation selection” > which can be shown incompatible with mechanism. >
*I disagree. One need not assume any ontological status for the physical universe, but one can still determine whether Newtonian physics "works". AG* > With QM: that selection (the wave collapse) is made more obvious, more > tangible, and … more doubtful, and indeed, if we reject it, QM becomes a > confirmation of the main startling aspect of mechanism (we have infinitely > many relative “bodies”. > > where validity means predictability. > > > Actually, I believe only that predictability of the absurd means > non-validity. Non predictability by itself does not lead to non validity, > unless … you take Aristotle physicalist stance at the start (which *is* > invalid). > *The physical universe manifests some level of existence, even if it's not the ultimate reality, and there's nothing absurd in testing physics with reference to this reality. AG * > > Good predictions are what we use to distinguish good theories, > > OK. > > and this has nothing to do with the ontological status of the physical > universe. > > > It has, if you want to predict some physical happening, you need either a > physical universe to start with, or a theory which explains where the > physical universe comes from. > *One can verify a physical theory without having a theory of the origin of the physical universe. Just do some measuring! AG* > With Mechanism, the first option is just not available, and you have to > recover the *appearance* of the physical universe from some statistic on > all computations going through your actual brain or body relative > representation/incarnation/implementation. Without Mechanism you need a non > mechanist theory of mind, which does not yet exist. > > As for "the observable available to all universal numbers", I also doubt > that numbers can observe anything. AG > > A number cannot think, or make observation, per se. Nor can a physical > body. Nor can anything purely third person describable. > > Nor can a number be universal per se. > > So when I say that a number can think, observe, or even just be (Turing) > universal, it is always a short manner to say that relatively to some > “base” phi_i, that number belongs to a (true) relation making it mirroring > perfectly (at the mechanist substitution level) the behaviour of a person, > as related to its brain. > > So, either you were mislead by my short way to express myself, or you are > just asserting that you believe that the Mechanist philosophy is wrong. I > am agnostic on all this. My point is that mechanism can be tested, and that > the currently available evidences favour Mechanism, and quasi-disprove > physicalism. > > Bruno > > to obtain the weak field approximation of GR, aka Newtonian gravity; or >>> that the measured velocity of light is independent of the motions of source >>> and recipient. AG >>> >> >> I got my answer, by default. AG >> >> >> ? >> >> Bruno >> >> >> >> >> >> -- >> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups >> "Everything List" group. >> To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an >> email to [email protected]. >> To view this discussion on the web visit >> https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/4313005b-46dd-40dc-af15-743643cee643o%40googlegroups.com >> >> <https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/4313005b-46dd-40dc-af15-743643cee643o%40googlegroups.com?utm_medium=email&utm_source=footer> >> . >> >> >> > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an > email to [email protected] <javascript:>. > To view this discussion on the web visit > https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/7398f81b-ad38-4bae-b08c-55486abc0712o%40googlegroups.com > > <https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/7398f81b-ad38-4bae-b08c-55486abc0712o%40googlegroups.com?utm_medium=email&utm_source=footer> > . > > > -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to [email protected]. To view this discussion on the web visit https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/6df13501-6c2d-49f8-9b88-9a468bde571eo%40googlegroups.com.
