> On 15 Jun 2020, at 21:21, spudboy100 via Everything List > <everything-list@googlegroups.com> wrote: > > I have liked the arguments about 15 years ago tween Hameroff and Penrose on > one side and Max Tegmark on the other. What was involved with the idea that > the brain's microtubles function as quantum computing, while Tegmark said, No > it can't be because quantum computing involved insanely COLD environments and > that is not the human brain. What Penrose and Hameroff were really promoting > were quantum fields aka quantum electrodynamics, which we find everywhere in > nature, including bird splat on the sidewalks. I could surely see that > quantum fields functioning as a basis for consciousness. Tegmark and Hameroff > ended their argument several years, ago, amicably, with Tegmark.
But here, Hameroff has NOT follow Penrose “anti-mechanism”. Hameroff has defended the idea that the brain is a quantum computer, which are emulated in arithmetic. Hameroff has always been Mechanist, and his view is coherent with the consequence of Mechanism. It just put he substitution level very low. Tegmark put it implicitly, like Putnam’s functionalism, at some high level, and seems to miss entirely the first person indeterminacy. On the contrary Penrose get the right conclusion, like Maudlin, i.e. the impossibility to keep both Mechanism and Materialism. They seem to both keep Materialism and to abandon Mechanism. I keep Mechanism (because it is my working hypothesis, and my goal was to show it testable). Maudlin argument was valid, but Penrose argument was based on a misunderstanding of Gödel’s incompleteness theorem. He saw the error, and corrected it in his second book volume, but dismiss it, where in reality, that correction makes the whole difference. Penrose thought, like Lucas, that machine’s ineluctable incompleteness shows that we are not machine, but it shows only that IF we are machine, we cannot know which one (among infinitely many in arithmetic) which is the reason of the first person indeterminacy. The physicist have the right metaphysical motivation, but ignore mathematical logic. Mathematical logicians have the right tools, but for historical reason, have no interest in metaphysics. That is well explained in the book by Daniel E. Cohen(*), although the roots of this problem come from much early (the separation of metaphysics/theology from science around +500). Bruno (*) Cohen J. Daniel, 2007. Equations from God, Pure Mathematics and Victorian Faith, John Hopkins Press, Baltimore. > > > -----Original Message----- > From: Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be> > To: everything-list@googlegroups.com > Sent: Mon, Jun 15, 2020 7:49 am > Subject: Re: My view of Bruno's theory > > >> On 14 Jun 2020, at 16:12, Philip Thrift <cloudver...@gmail.com >> <mailto:cloudver...@gmail.com>> wrote: >> >> >> >> On Sunday, June 14, 2020 at 5:26:11 AM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal wrote: >> >>> On 13 Jun 2020, at 15:00, Philip Thrift <cloud...@gmail.com <>> wrote: >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> How In The Penrose-Hameroff Paradigm The Forms of Space-time Curvatures Can >>> Be Connected With The Eternal Platonic Ideas Or Forms In The Qualia Of Our >>> Experiences And Choices >>> Gerard Blommestijn (Amstelveen, Netherlands) >>> >>> >>> Crazy. >> >> Yes. >> >> Bruno >> >> >> >> I found this to be the most interesting (in physical terms) by a grad >> student: >> >> Which abstract (talks or posters) is most interesting to you? >> >> Is Subjectivity a Field? > > Subjectivity concerns the first person experience. We cannot equate a first > person notion with a third person notion. May be subjectivity can be > associated to some filed, and indeed, to any Turing universal one, but we > cannot associate a field to any subjective experience, we have to associate > all computation leading to that experience, which will contains those > supported by Turing universal fields, but also those supported by the game of > life, the lambda expressions, the natural numbers, etc. > > I let you read the paper to mention, and to see if it is coherent with > mechanism. > > Bruno > > PS I am interrogating student “at a distance” right now …. Apology if I am to > short in my answers. Ask any question, and be patient for the answer. > > > >> Greg Horne ( https://philosophy.utoronto.ca/directory/greg-horne/ >> <https://philosophy.utoronto.ca/directory/greg-horne/> ) >> (Philosophy, University of Toronto, Toronto, ONTARIO Canada) >> >> https://eagle.sbs.arizona.edu/sc/report_poster_detail.php?abs=3872 >> <https://eagle.sbs.arizona.edu/sc/report_poster_detail.php?abs=3872> >> >> (in Poster Sessions, TSC Consciousness Reboot, >> https://consciousness.arizona.edu/concurrents >> <https://consciousness.arizona.edu/concurrents> ) >> >> @phiiiptjhrift >> >> >> >> >> -- >> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups >> "Everything List" group. >> To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an >> email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com >> <mailto:everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com>. >> To view this discussion on the web visit >> https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/6cddb11d-c46b-4f37-bfe7-c37213bd030co%40googlegroups.com >> >> <https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/6cddb11d-c46b-4f37-bfe7-c37213bd030co%40googlegroups.com?utm_medium=email&utm_source=footer>. >> > > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an > email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com > <mailto:everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com>. > To view this discussion on the web visit > https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/FFDAD537-1A65-4F96-82F5-8F52F9717748%40ulb.ac.be > > <https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/FFDAD537-1A65-4F96-82F5-8F52F9717748%40ulb.ac.be?utm_medium=email&utm_source=footer> > . > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an > email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com > <mailto:everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com>. > To view this discussion on the web visit > https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/1813258408.966436.1592248875886%40mail.yahoo.com > > <https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/1813258408.966436.1592248875886%40mail.yahoo.com?utm_medium=email&utm_source=footer>. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To view this discussion on the web visit https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/A65425C5-4C9E-43BE-A381-FA96959B0CB8%40ulb.ac.be.
