Spudboy,
> On 17 Jun 2020, at 22:25, spudboy100 via Everything List > <everything-list@googlegroups.com> wrote: > > Bruno, we must also ask how well Goedel's maths fit the observable universe? That is the whole point, indeed. And the facts is that it fits well, thanks to the “quantum weirdness” which is a consequence of the digital mechanist assumption (qualitatively cf many worlds, and quantitatively, through the quantum logics and their interpretations). > Is the Hubble Volume rotating or not? That is way beyond what we can say today. We have not yet derived the idea of “volume”. Or are you talking about Gödel’s work in GR (the rotating universe). That is a different subject. But here too, Gödel’s main motivation was logical or philosophical, notably by showing that the existence of circular time was consistent with GR. > We have not detected it through astronomy, yet it could still be possible. > We'll know more (I believe) when we are able as a species, to place lots of > massive telescopes at the edge of solar system, avoiding interference from > solar emissions. Then, we will receive a better view of where we all are. With Mechanism, we are not human beings dreaming about numbers (and universes), but we are numbers dreaming about humans (and universes). My goal is not doing physics or astronomy, but to explain where the physical reality comes from, and how to relate it coherently with the universal machine’s theory of consciousness. Metaphysics and Physics are just not the same domain of inquiry, unless you *assume* a physical universe and assume that you have to assume it, (i.e a primitive or primary universe)? Yet that can be shown incoherent with the idea that a brain capture consciousness in virtue of implementing a universal machine (aka computer). This is more fundamental cognitive science or epistemology than physics. Bruno > > Mitch > > > -----Original Message----- > From: Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be> > To: everything-list@googlegroups.com > Sent: Tue, Jun 16, 2020 4:15 am > Subject: Re: My view of Bruno's theory > > >> On 15 Jun 2020, at 21:21, spudboy100 via Everything List >> <everything-list@googlegroups.com <mailto:everything-list@googlegroups.com>> >> wrote: >> >> I have liked the arguments about 15 years ago tween Hameroff and Penrose on >> one side and Max Tegmark on the other. What was involved with the idea that >> the brain's microtubles function as quantum computing, while Tegmark said, >> No it can't be because quantum computing involved insanely COLD environments >> and that is not the human brain. What Penrose and Hameroff were really >> promoting were quantum fields aka quantum electrodynamics, which we find >> everywhere in nature, including bird splat on the sidewalks. I could surely >> see that quantum fields functioning as a basis for consciousness. Tegmark >> and Hameroff ended their argument several years, ago, amicably, with Tegmark. > > > But here, Hameroff has NOT follow Penrose “anti-mechanism”. Hameroff has > defended the idea that the brain is a quantum computer, which are emulated in > arithmetic. Hameroff has always been Mechanist, and his view is coherent with > the consequence of Mechanism. It just put he substitution level very low. > Tegmark put it implicitly, like Putnam’s functionalism, at some high level, > and seems to miss entirely the first person indeterminacy. On the contrary > Penrose get the right conclusion, like Maudlin, i.e. the impossibility to > keep both Mechanism and Materialism. They seem to both keep Materialism and > to abandon Mechanism. I keep Mechanism (because it is my working hypothesis, > and my goal was to show it testable). > Maudlin argument was valid, but Penrose argument was based on a > misunderstanding of Gödel’s incompleteness theorem. He saw the error, and > corrected it in his second book volume, but dismiss it, where in reality, > that correction makes the whole difference. Penrose thought, like Lucas, that > machine’s ineluctable incompleteness shows that we are not machine, but it > shows only that IF we are machine, we cannot know which one (among infinitely > many in arithmetic) which is the reason of the first person indeterminacy. > > The physicist have the right metaphysical motivation, but ignore mathematical > logic. > Mathematical logicians have the right tools, but for historical reason, have > no interest in metaphysics. That is well explained in the book by Daniel E. > Cohen(*), although the roots of this problem come from much early (the > separation of metaphysics/theology from science around +500). > > Bruno > > (*) Cohen J. Daniel, 2007. Equations from God, Pure Mathematics and Victorian > Faith, John Hopkins Press, Baltimore. > > > > >> >> >> -----Original Message----- >> From: Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be <mailto:marc...@ulb.ac.be>> >> To: everything-list@googlegroups.com >> <mailto:everything-list@googlegroups.com> >> Sent: Mon, Jun 15, 2020 7:49 am >> Subject: Re: My view of Bruno's theory >> >> >>> On 14 Jun 2020, at 16:12, Philip Thrift <cloudver...@gmail.com >>> <mailto:cloudver...@gmail.com>> wrote: >>> >>> >>> >>> On Sunday, June 14, 2020 at 5:26:11 AM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal wrote: >>> >>>> On 13 Jun 2020, at 15:00, Philip Thrift <cloud...@gmail.com <>> wrote: >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> How In The Penrose-Hameroff Paradigm The Forms of Space-time Curvatures >>>> Can Be Connected With The Eternal Platonic Ideas Or Forms In The Qualia Of >>>> Our Experiences And Choices >>>> Gerard Blommestijn (Amstelveen, Netherlands) >>>> >>>> >>>> Crazy. >>> >>> Yes. >>> >>> Bruno >>> >>> >>> >>> I found this to be the most interesting (in physical terms) by a grad >>> student: >>> >>> Which abstract (talks or posters) is most interesting to you? >>> >>> Is Subjectivity a Field? >> >> Subjectivity concerns the first person experience. We cannot equate a first >> person notion with a third person notion. May be subjectivity can be >> associated to some filed, and indeed, to any Turing universal one, but we >> cannot associate a field to any subjective experience, we have to associate >> all computation leading to that experience, which will contains those >> supported by Turing universal fields, but also those supported by the game >> of life, the lambda expressions, the natural numbers, etc. >> >> I let you read the paper to mention, and to see if it is coherent with >> mechanism. >> >> Bruno >> >> PS I am interrogating student “at a distance” right now …. Apology if I am >> to short in my answers. Ask any question, and be patient for the answer. >> >> >> >>> Greg Horne ( https://philosophy.utoronto.ca/directory/greg-horne/ >>> <https://philosophy.utoronto.ca/directory/greg-horne/> ) >>> (Philosophy, University of Toronto, Toronto, ONTARIO Canada) >>> >>> https://eagle.sbs.arizona.edu/sc/report_poster_detail.php?abs=3872 >>> <https://eagle.sbs.arizona.edu/sc/report_poster_detail.php?abs=3872> >>> >>> (in Poster Sessions, TSC Consciousness Reboot, >>> https://consciousness.arizona.edu/concurrents >>> <https://consciousness.arizona.edu/concurrents> ) >>> >>> @phiiiptjhrift >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> -- >>> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups >>> "Everything List" group. >>> To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an >>> email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com >>> <mailto:everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com>. >>> To view this discussion on the web visit >>> https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/6cddb11d-c46b-4f37-bfe7-c37213bd030co%40googlegroups.com >>> >>> <https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/6cddb11d-c46b-4f37-bfe7-c37213bd030co%40googlegroups.com?utm_medium=email&utm_source=footer>. >>> >> >> >> -- >> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups >> "Everything List" group. >> To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an >> email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com >> <mailto:everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com>. >> To view this discussion on the web visit >> https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/FFDAD537-1A65-4F96-82F5-8F52F9717748%40ulb.ac.be >> >> <https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/FFDAD537-1A65-4F96-82F5-8F52F9717748%40ulb.ac.be?utm_medium=email&utm_source=footer> >> >> . >> >> -- >> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups >> "Everything List" group. >> To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an >> email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com >> <mailto:everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com>. >> To view this discussion on the web visit >> https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/1813258408.966436.1592248875886%40mail.yahoo.com >> >> <https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/1813258408.966436.1592248875886%40mail.yahoo.com?utm_medium=email&utm_source=footer>. >> > > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an > email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com > <mailto:everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com>. > To view this discussion on the web visit > https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/A65425C5-4C9E-43BE-A381-FA96959B0CB8%40ulb.ac.be > > <https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/A65425C5-4C9E-43BE-A381-FA96959B0CB8%40ulb.ac.be?utm_medium=email&utm_source=footer> > . > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an > email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com > <mailto:everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com>. > To view this discussion on the web visit > https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/1118167777.518509.1592425521975%40mail.yahoo.com > > <https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/1118167777.518509.1592425521975%40mail.yahoo.com?utm_medium=email&utm_source=footer>. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. 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