On Tuesday, January 26, 2021 at 9:17:54 AM UTC-7 Bruno Marchal wrote:

>
> On 15 Jan 2021, at 06:01, Alan Grayson <[email protected]> wrote:
>
>
>
> On Thursday, January 14, 2021 at 3:15:47 PM UTC-7, Pierz wrote:
>>
>>
>>
>> On Thursday, January 14, 2021 at 11:07:59 PM UTC+11 [email protected] 
>> wrote:
>>
>>> On Thursday, January 14, 2021 at 2:26:42 AM UTC-7 Pierz wrote:
>>>
>>>> On Thursday, January 14, 2021 at 2:42:43 PM UTC+11 [email protected] 
>>>> wrote:
>>>>
>>>>> On Wednesday, January 13, 2021 at 8:29:16 PM UTC-7 Pierz wrote:
>>>>>
>>>>>> On Thursday, January 14, 2021 at 1:23:11 PM UTC+11 
>>>>>> [email protected] wrote:
>>>>>>
>>>>>>> On Wednesday, January 13, 2021 at 4:33:20 PM UTC-7 Pierz wrote:
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> On Wednesday, January 13, 2021 at 5:50:29 PM UTC+11 
>>>>>>>> [email protected] wrote:
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> On Tuesday, January 12, 2021 at 10:19:59 PM UTC-7 Pierz wrote:
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> On Monday, January 4, 2021 at 12:09:06 PM UTC+11 
>>>>>>>>>> [email protected] wrote:
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>> On Sunday, January 3, 2021 at 3:56:51 PM UTC-7 
>>>>>>>>>>> [email protected] wrote:
>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>> On Sun, Jan 3, 2021 at 5:21 PM Alan Grayson <
>>>>>>>>>>>> [email protected]> wrote:
>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>> *> The MWI doesn't guarantee that these subsequent 
>>>>>>>>>>>>> measurements, for subsequent horse races say, are occurring in 
>>>>>>>>>>>>> the SAME 
>>>>>>>>>>>>> OTHER worlds as trials progress, to get ensembles in those OTHER 
>>>>>>>>>>>>> worlds. *
>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>  
>>>>>>>>>>>> I don't know what you mean by "SAME OTHER worlds", the same as 
>>>>>>>>>>>> what? In one world Alan Grayson remembers having seen the electron 
>>>>>>>>>>>> go left, 
>>>>>>>>>>>> in another world Alan Grayson remembers having seen the electron 
>>>>>>>>>>>> go right, 
>>>>>>>>>>>> other than that the two worlds are absolutely identical, so which 
>>>>>>>>>>>> one was 
>>>>>>>>>>>> the "SAME OTHER world"?
>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>> > You seem to avoid the fact that no where does the MWI 
>>>>>>>>>>>>> guarantee [...]
>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>> Quantum mechanics is not in the guarantee business, it deals 
>>>>>>>>>>>> with probability.  
>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>> *> I don't think you understand my point, which isn't 
>>>>>>>>>>>>> complicated. *
>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>> Yes, your point is very simple indeed, but the word simple can 
>>>>>>>>>>>> have 2 meanings, one of them is complementary and the other 
>>>>>>>>>>>> not so much.  
>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>> In first trial, the MWI postulates other worlds comes into 
>>>>>>>>>>> existence. Same other worlds in second trial? Same other worlds in 
>>>>>>>>>>> third 
>>>>>>>>>>> trial, etc? Where does the MWI assert these other worlds are the 
>>>>>>>>>>> SAME other 
>>>>>>>>>>> worlds? Unless it does, you only have ONE measurement in each of 
>>>>>>>>>>> these 
>>>>>>>>>>> worlds. No probability exists in these other worlds since no 
>>>>>>>>>>> ensemble of 
>>>>>>>>>>> measurements exist in these other world. AG
>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>  
>>>>>>>>>> You grossly misunderstand MWI. There are no "same other" worlds. 
>>>>>>>>>> The worlds that arise at each trial are different in precisely one 
>>>>>>>>>> way and 
>>>>>>>>>> one way only: the eigenvalue recorded for the experiment. The 
>>>>>>>>>> different 
>>>>>>>>>> eigenvalues will then give rise to a "wave of differentiations" as 
>>>>>>>>>> the 
>>>>>>>>>> consequences of that singular difference ramifies, causing the 
>>>>>>>>>> different 
>>>>>>>>>> worlds generated by the original experimental difference to 
>>>>>>>>>> multiply. 
>>>>>>>>>> "World" really means a unique configuration of the universal wave 
>>>>>>>>>> function, 
>>>>>>>>>> so two worlds at different trials can't possibly be the "same 
>>>>>>>>>> world", and 
>>>>>>>>>> yes, there is only one measurement in each.
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> This is what I have been saying all along! AG
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> No it isn't. I agree you have been saying there is only one 
>>>>>>>> measurement outcome in each world. However this business about "same 
>>>>>>>> other 
>>>>>>>> worlds" betrays your lack of comprehension. It's not that MWI "doesn't 
>>>>>>>> guarantee" that the the worlds at each trial are the same world. It's 
>>>>>>>> that 
>>>>>>>> the whole notion of "same other worlds" means nothing in this context 
>>>>>>>> and 
>>>>>>>> has no bearing on anything. A bit like arguing when we add 1 and 1 
>>>>>>>> twice 
>>>>>>>> whether we are guaranteed that the ones we add each time are the "SAME 
>>>>>>>> ones" at each addition. If mathematics can't guarantee that then how 
>>>>>>>> can we 
>>>>>>>> be sure the answer is the same? Basically the only answer to that is 
>>>>>>>> "WTF?"
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>  
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> That is precisely the stipulation of MWI. If we have a quantum 
>>>>>>>>>> experiment with two eigenvalues 1 and 0, and each is equally likely 
>>>>>>>>>> per the 
>>>>>>>>>> Born rule, then the MWI interpretation is that - effectively - two 
>>>>>>>>>> worlds 
>>>>>>>>>> are created. You, the experimenter, end up in both, each version 
>>>>>>>>>> knowing 
>>>>>>>>>> nothing about the other. 
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> Again, what I have been saying all along! AG
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> If you get that, then the next bit follows. 
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>  
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> So, in the "objective world" (the view from outside the whole 
>>>>>>>>>> wave function as it were), no probability is involved. But if you 
>>>>>>>>>> repeat 
>>>>>>>>>> this experiment many times, each version of you will record an 
>>>>>>>>>> apparently 
>>>>>>>>>> random sequence of 1s and 0s. Your best prediction of what happens 
>>>>>>>>>> in the 
>>>>>>>>>> next experiment is that it's a 50/50 toss up between 1 and 0. 
>>>>>>>>>> Objectively 
>>>>>>>>>> there's no randomness, subjectively it appears that way.
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>  
>>>>>>>>> Here's where you go astray. AG 
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>  
>>>>>>>> So you say! Without justifying yourself in any way. You *seem* to 
>>>>>>>> be saying that probability can't describe QM experiments because in 
>>>>>>>> each 
>>>>>>>> world there is only one outcome and therefore no "ensemble" of 
>>>>>>>> outcomes 
>>>>>>>> from which a probability can be derived. That is totally wrong-headed. 
>>>>>>>> There are two "ensembles": the ensemble of different multiverse 
>>>>>>>> branches at 
>>>>>>>> each experiment, and the ensemble of each experimenter's prior 
>>>>>>>> measurements, and those are enough to derive the appearance of 
>>>>>>>> randomness 
>>>>>>>> and to justify a probabilistic description despite the objective lack 
>>>>>>>> of 
>>>>>>>> randomness. If you agree with "what you have been saying all along", 
>>>>>>>> then 
>>>>>>>> you must agree that every experimenter in every world in an MWI 
>>>>>>>> multiverse 
>>>>>>>> will see a record of an apparently random sequence of 1s and 0s in the 
>>>>>>>> described experiment. Right? And if not why not? 
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> IMO, since the trials are independent, the other observers are 
>>>>>>> disjoint from each other and each records only one measurement. So the 
>>>>>>> only 
>>>>>>> observer who sees an ensemble is the observer in THIS world. To get an 
>>>>>>> ensemble of outcomes in those other worlds, and hence a probability, 
>>>>>>> you 
>>>>>>> need to appeal to a non-existent observer, also called the Bird's Eye 
>>>>>>> observer. AG 
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>  
>>>>>> Respectfully, you did not answer my question. Do you agree or not 
>>>>>> that every experimenter in every branch of the multiverse who records a 
>>>>>> series of experiments as described in my scenario will record a 
>>>>>> *seemingly* random string of 1s and 0s? If you do, that's really all 
>>>>>> that's required. Abstract debates about "ensembles required to get a 
>>>>>> probability" are moot. If the world is as described by MWI, the 
>>>>>> appearance 
>>>>>> of probability is an outcome, and probability is the best possible 
>>>>>> description of how quantum experiments turn out from any real observer's 
>>>>>> POV (as opposed to the Bird's Eye observer). If you disagree that 
>>>>>> experimenters will get a seemingly random string of 1s and 0s, then 
>>>>>> you'll 
>>>>>> need to explain why you think that.
>>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> I did answer your question. Since the trials are independent, a NEW 
>>>>> OTHER WORLD observer is created on each THIS WORLD trial. So the other 
>>>>> observers see ONE outcome each. No reason to assume otherwise. You need 
>>>>> another postulate for this to work. AG 
>>>>>
>>>>
>>>> You're talking like a politician. Does each observer in each world who 
>>>> repeats said experiment record a seemingly random series of 1s and 0s or 
>>>> not? Yes/no. It's not hard. Come on, you can do it now...
>>>>
>>>
>>> The answer is NO. In the spin experiment we're discussing, AG in this 
>>> world measures an apparently random sequence of 0's and 1's. 
>>>
>>
>> That's all we need. Remember, we are talking about *if MWI were true* here. 
>> This is a thought experiment in which we are imagining how things would go 
>> if the MWI picture were correct. So if you're admitting that, in such a 
>> world, "AG in this world measures an apparently random sequence of 0's and 
>> 1's", then you have all the preconditions for making probabilistic 
>> predictions from it. 
>>
> On each trial an imaginary other AG measures the complement of what AG in 
>>> this world measured.
>>>
>>  
>>
> They are not imaginary in MWI. I agree with this statement once you remove 
>> the word "imaginary", which we can do ex-hypothesi. I'm not asking you to 
>> believe in them here, only to advance an argument based of "if" MWI were 
>> true.
>>
> Now since the trials are independent, different imaginary AGs always 
>>> measure complements, but none measure more than ONE RESULT.
>>>
>>  
>>
> Again, discarding the word "imaginary", I agree. Of course they don't 
>> measure more than one outcome at the same trial. 
>>
>
> *I meant, of course, that each other AG measures ONE value when created 
> for some trial, but that's all this observer EVER observes because, unless 
> you can offer an argument, he's disjoint, that is NOT related or connected 
> any other "other AG". AG *
>
> As I previously indicated, these other AGs are disjoint from each other.
>>>
>>  
>>
> What do you mean by "disjoint" exactly? Mathematically "disjoint" means 
>> "having no elements in common". In the case of AG's who have measured 
>> different results, initially their worlds have only this difference between 
>> them, so in that sense they are not disjoint. If you mean they cannot 
>> interact with one another, and inhabit diverging realities, then that is 
>> only the case discounting interference, which we cannot do, because without 
>> interference effects we dot have quantum mechanics. This word disjoint 
>> seems to be central to your objection, but you need to define precisely 
>> what is meant by it or we cannot assess the validity of your claims.
>>
>
>> The only way to remedy this situation is to add another postulate to your 
>>> MWI. AG
>>>
>>  
>>
> No idea what we need to remedy. I'll ask my question again, adjusting it 
>> slightly. Does AG record a seemingly a random string of 1s and 0s in this 
>> experiment if MWI describes reality?
>>
>
> *You seem to be assuming the other worlds created according to the MWI 
> interact with other due to interference. Since these other worlds are never 
> observed, I call them "imaginary"; and more important, no observations of 
> interacting other worlds have ever been made, within QM or without QM. So 
> the MWI is a huge stretch, at best. AG *
>
>
> Histories (world if you want) interfere statistically, without any 
> interaction. You don’t need interaction to change the statistical outcome 
> of an history. Adding different histories change the statistic, even if 
> they do not interact with each other.
>
> That happens already in arithmetic.
>
> Bruno
>

*In a competition among the biggest BS artists on this thread, you're 
certainly holding your own. AG *

>
>
>
>
>>  
>>
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