On Tuesday, January 26, 2021 at 9:17:54 AM UTC-7 Bruno Marchal wrote:
> > On 15 Jan 2021, at 06:01, Alan Grayson <[email protected]> wrote: > > > > On Thursday, January 14, 2021 at 3:15:47 PM UTC-7, Pierz wrote: >> >> >> >> On Thursday, January 14, 2021 at 11:07:59 PM UTC+11 [email protected] >> wrote: >> >>> On Thursday, January 14, 2021 at 2:26:42 AM UTC-7 Pierz wrote: >>> >>>> On Thursday, January 14, 2021 at 2:42:43 PM UTC+11 [email protected] >>>> wrote: >>>> >>>>> On Wednesday, January 13, 2021 at 8:29:16 PM UTC-7 Pierz wrote: >>>>> >>>>>> On Thursday, January 14, 2021 at 1:23:11 PM UTC+11 >>>>>> [email protected] wrote: >>>>>> >>>>>>> On Wednesday, January 13, 2021 at 4:33:20 PM UTC-7 Pierz wrote: >>>>>>> >>>>>>>> On Wednesday, January 13, 2021 at 5:50:29 PM UTC+11 >>>>>>>> [email protected] wrote: >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> On Tuesday, January 12, 2021 at 10:19:59 PM UTC-7 Pierz wrote: >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> On Monday, January 4, 2021 at 12:09:06 PM UTC+11 >>>>>>>>>> [email protected] wrote: >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> On Sunday, January 3, 2021 at 3:56:51 PM UTC-7 >>>>>>>>>>> [email protected] wrote: >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> On Sun, Jan 3, 2021 at 5:21 PM Alan Grayson < >>>>>>>>>>>> [email protected]> wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> *> The MWI doesn't guarantee that these subsequent >>>>>>>>>>>>> measurements, for subsequent horse races say, are occurring in >>>>>>>>>>>>> the SAME >>>>>>>>>>>>> OTHER worlds as trials progress, to get ensembles in those OTHER >>>>>>>>>>>>> worlds. * >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> I don't know what you mean by "SAME OTHER worlds", the same as >>>>>>>>>>>> what? In one world Alan Grayson remembers having seen the electron >>>>>>>>>>>> go left, >>>>>>>>>>>> in another world Alan Grayson remembers having seen the electron >>>>>>>>>>>> go right, >>>>>>>>>>>> other than that the two worlds are absolutely identical, so which >>>>>>>>>>>> one was >>>>>>>>>>>> the "SAME OTHER world"? >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> > You seem to avoid the fact that no where does the MWI >>>>>>>>>>>>> guarantee [...] >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> Quantum mechanics is not in the guarantee business, it deals >>>>>>>>>>>> with probability. >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> *> I don't think you understand my point, which isn't >>>>>>>>>>>>> complicated. * >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> Yes, your point is very simple indeed, but the word simple can >>>>>>>>>>>> have 2 meanings, one of them is complementary and the other >>>>>>>>>>>> not so much. >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> In first trial, the MWI postulates other worlds comes into >>>>>>>>>>> existence. Same other worlds in second trial? Same other worlds in >>>>>>>>>>> third >>>>>>>>>>> trial, etc? Where does the MWI assert these other worlds are the >>>>>>>>>>> SAME other >>>>>>>>>>> worlds? Unless it does, you only have ONE measurement in each of >>>>>>>>>>> these >>>>>>>>>>> worlds. No probability exists in these other worlds since no >>>>>>>>>>> ensemble of >>>>>>>>>>> measurements exist in these other world. AG >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> You grossly misunderstand MWI. There are no "same other" worlds. >>>>>>>>>> The worlds that arise at each trial are different in precisely one >>>>>>>>>> way and >>>>>>>>>> one way only: the eigenvalue recorded for the experiment. The >>>>>>>>>> different >>>>>>>>>> eigenvalues will then give rise to a "wave of differentiations" as >>>>>>>>>> the >>>>>>>>>> consequences of that singular difference ramifies, causing the >>>>>>>>>> different >>>>>>>>>> worlds generated by the original experimental difference to >>>>>>>>>> multiply. >>>>>>>>>> "World" really means a unique configuration of the universal wave >>>>>>>>>> function, >>>>>>>>>> so two worlds at different trials can't possibly be the "same >>>>>>>>>> world", and >>>>>>>>>> yes, there is only one measurement in each. >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> This is what I have been saying all along! AG >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> No it isn't. I agree you have been saying there is only one >>>>>>>> measurement outcome in each world. However this business about "same >>>>>>>> other >>>>>>>> worlds" betrays your lack of comprehension. It's not that MWI "doesn't >>>>>>>> guarantee" that the the worlds at each trial are the same world. It's >>>>>>>> that >>>>>>>> the whole notion of "same other worlds" means nothing in this context >>>>>>>> and >>>>>>>> has no bearing on anything. A bit like arguing when we add 1 and 1 >>>>>>>> twice >>>>>>>> whether we are guaranteed that the ones we add each time are the "SAME >>>>>>>> ones" at each addition. If mathematics can't guarantee that then how >>>>>>>> can we >>>>>>>> be sure the answer is the same? Basically the only answer to that is >>>>>>>> "WTF?" >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> That is precisely the stipulation of MWI. If we have a quantum >>>>>>>>>> experiment with two eigenvalues 1 and 0, and each is equally likely >>>>>>>>>> per the >>>>>>>>>> Born rule, then the MWI interpretation is that - effectively - two >>>>>>>>>> worlds >>>>>>>>>> are created. You, the experimenter, end up in both, each version >>>>>>>>>> knowing >>>>>>>>>> nothing about the other. >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> Again, what I have been saying all along! AG >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> If you get that, then the next bit follows. >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> So, in the "objective world" (the view from outside the whole >>>>>>>>>> wave function as it were), no probability is involved. But if you >>>>>>>>>> repeat >>>>>>>>>> this experiment many times, each version of you will record an >>>>>>>>>> apparently >>>>>>>>>> random sequence of 1s and 0s. Your best prediction of what happens >>>>>>>>>> in the >>>>>>>>>> next experiment is that it's a 50/50 toss up between 1 and 0. >>>>>>>>>> Objectively >>>>>>>>>> there's no randomness, subjectively it appears that way. >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> Here's where you go astray. AG >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> So you say! Without justifying yourself in any way. You *seem* to >>>>>>>> be saying that probability can't describe QM experiments because in >>>>>>>> each >>>>>>>> world there is only one outcome and therefore no "ensemble" of >>>>>>>> outcomes >>>>>>>> from which a probability can be derived. That is totally wrong-headed. >>>>>>>> There are two "ensembles": the ensemble of different multiverse >>>>>>>> branches at >>>>>>>> each experiment, and the ensemble of each experimenter's prior >>>>>>>> measurements, and those are enough to derive the appearance of >>>>>>>> randomness >>>>>>>> and to justify a probabilistic description despite the objective lack >>>>>>>> of >>>>>>>> randomness. If you agree with "what you have been saying all along", >>>>>>>> then >>>>>>>> you must agree that every experimenter in every world in an MWI >>>>>>>> multiverse >>>>>>>> will see a record of an apparently random sequence of 1s and 0s in the >>>>>>>> described experiment. Right? And if not why not? >>>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> IMO, since the trials are independent, the other observers are >>>>>>> disjoint from each other and each records only one measurement. So the >>>>>>> only >>>>>>> observer who sees an ensemble is the observer in THIS world. To get an >>>>>>> ensemble of outcomes in those other worlds, and hence a probability, >>>>>>> you >>>>>>> need to appeal to a non-existent observer, also called the Bird's Eye >>>>>>> observer. AG >>>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> Respectfully, you did not answer my question. Do you agree or not >>>>>> that every experimenter in every branch of the multiverse who records a >>>>>> series of experiments as described in my scenario will record a >>>>>> *seemingly* random string of 1s and 0s? If you do, that's really all >>>>>> that's required. Abstract debates about "ensembles required to get a >>>>>> probability" are moot. If the world is as described by MWI, the >>>>>> appearance >>>>>> of probability is an outcome, and probability is the best possible >>>>>> description of how quantum experiments turn out from any real observer's >>>>>> POV (as opposed to the Bird's Eye observer). If you disagree that >>>>>> experimenters will get a seemingly random string of 1s and 0s, then >>>>>> you'll >>>>>> need to explain why you think that. >>>>>> >>>>> >>>>> I did answer your question. Since the trials are independent, a NEW >>>>> OTHER WORLD observer is created on each THIS WORLD trial. So the other >>>>> observers see ONE outcome each. No reason to assume otherwise. You need >>>>> another postulate for this to work. AG >>>>> >>>> >>>> You're talking like a politician. Does each observer in each world who >>>> repeats said experiment record a seemingly random series of 1s and 0s or >>>> not? Yes/no. It's not hard. Come on, you can do it now... >>>> >>> >>> The answer is NO. In the spin experiment we're discussing, AG in this >>> world measures an apparently random sequence of 0's and 1's. >>> >> >> That's all we need. Remember, we are talking about *if MWI were true* here. >> This is a thought experiment in which we are imagining how things would go >> if the MWI picture were correct. So if you're admitting that, in such a >> world, "AG in this world measures an apparently random sequence of 0's and >> 1's", then you have all the preconditions for making probabilistic >> predictions from it. >> > On each trial an imaginary other AG measures the complement of what AG in >>> this world measured. >>> >> >> > They are not imaginary in MWI. I agree with this statement once you remove >> the word "imaginary", which we can do ex-hypothesi. I'm not asking you to >> believe in them here, only to advance an argument based of "if" MWI were >> true. >> > Now since the trials are independent, different imaginary AGs always >>> measure complements, but none measure more than ONE RESULT. >>> >> >> > Again, discarding the word "imaginary", I agree. Of course they don't >> measure more than one outcome at the same trial. >> > > *I meant, of course, that each other AG measures ONE value when created > for some trial, but that's all this observer EVER observes because, unless > you can offer an argument, he's disjoint, that is NOT related or connected > any other "other AG". AG * > > As I previously indicated, these other AGs are disjoint from each other. >>> >> >> > What do you mean by "disjoint" exactly? Mathematically "disjoint" means >> "having no elements in common". In the case of AG's who have measured >> different results, initially their worlds have only this difference between >> them, so in that sense they are not disjoint. If you mean they cannot >> interact with one another, and inhabit diverging realities, then that is >> only the case discounting interference, which we cannot do, because without >> interference effects we dot have quantum mechanics. This word disjoint >> seems to be central to your objection, but you need to define precisely >> what is meant by it or we cannot assess the validity of your claims. >> > >> The only way to remedy this situation is to add another postulate to your >>> MWI. AG >>> >> >> > No idea what we need to remedy. I'll ask my question again, adjusting it >> slightly. Does AG record a seemingly a random string of 1s and 0s in this >> experiment if MWI describes reality? >> > > *You seem to be assuming the other worlds created according to the MWI > interact with other due to interference. Since these other worlds are never > observed, I call them "imaginary"; and more important, no observations of > interacting other worlds have ever been made, within QM or without QM. So > the MWI is a huge stretch, at best. AG * > > > Histories (world if you want) interfere statistically, without any > interaction. You don’t need interaction to change the statistical outcome > of an history. Adding different histories change the statistic, even if > they do not interact with each other. > > That happens already in arithmetic. > > Bruno > *In a competition among the biggest BS artists on this thread, you're certainly holding your own. AG * > > > > >> >> > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an > email to [email protected]. > > To view this discussion on the web visit > https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/9028f9b4-f111-4366-bb84-f4024d15202do%40googlegroups.com > > <https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/9028f9b4-f111-4366-bb84-f4024d15202do%40googlegroups.com?utm_medium=email&utm_source=footer> > . > > > -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to [email protected]. To view this discussion on the web visit https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/6e68c089-8745-4709-8e77-2bccf97ce56dn%40googlegroups.com.

