Le mer. 27 janv. 2021 à 12:19, Alan Grayson <[email protected]> a écrit :
> > > On Wednesday, January 27, 2021 at 3:56:50 AM UTC-7 Quentin Anciaux wrote: > >> >> >> Le mer. 27 janv. 2021 à 11:54, Alan Grayson <[email protected]> a >> écrit : >> >>> >>> >>> On Tuesday, January 12, 2021 at 10:19:59 PM UTC-7 Pierz wrote: >>> >>>> >>>> >>>> On Monday, January 4, 2021 at 12:09:06 PM UTC+11 [email protected] >>>> wrote: >>>> >>>>> On Sunday, January 3, 2021 at 3:56:51 PM UTC-7 [email protected] >>>>> wrote: >>>>> >>>>>> On Sun, Jan 3, 2021 at 5:21 PM Alan Grayson <[email protected]> >>>>>> wrote: >>>>>> >>>>>> *> The MWI doesn't guarantee that these subsequent measurements, for >>>>>>> subsequent horse races say, are occurring in the SAME OTHER worlds as >>>>>>> trials progress, to get ensembles in those OTHER worlds. * >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> I don't know what you mean by "SAME OTHER worlds", the same as what? >>>>>> In one world Alan Grayson remembers having seen the electron go left, in >>>>>> another world Alan Grayson remembers having seen the electron go right, >>>>>> other than that the two worlds are absolutely identical, so which one was >>>>>> the "SAME OTHER world"? >>>>>> >>>>>> > You seem to avoid the fact that no where does the MWI guarantee >>>>>>> [...] >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> Quantum mechanics is not in the guarantee business, it deals with >>>>>> probability. >>>>>> >>>>>> *> I don't think you understand my point, which isn't complicated. * >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> Yes, your point is very simple indeed, but the word simple can have 2 >>>>>> meanings, one of them is complementary and the other not so much. >>>>>> >>>>> >>>>> In first trial, the MWI postulates other worlds comes into existence. >>>>> Same other worlds in second trial? Same other worlds in third trial, etc? >>>>> Where does the MWI assert these other worlds are the SAME other worlds? >>>>> Unless it does, you only have ONE measurement in each of these worlds. No >>>>> probability exists in these other worlds since no ensemble of measurements >>>>> exist in these other world. AG >>>>> >>>> >>>> You grossly misunderstand MWI. There are no "same other" worlds. The >>>> worlds that arise at each trial are different in precisely one way and one >>>> way only: the eigenvalue recorded for the experiment. The different >>>> eigenvalues will then give rise to a "wave of differentiations" as the >>>> consequences of that singular difference ramifies, causing the different >>>> worlds generated by the original experimental difference to multiply. >>>> "World" really means a unique configuration of the universal wave function, >>>> so two worlds at different trials can't possibly be the "same world", and >>>> yes, there is only one measurement in each. >>>> >>> >>> *If there is only one measurement in each other world -- which has been >>> my claim throughout -- how can Born's rule be satisfied in the MWI? AG* >>> >> >> Every world has a past... So if you do n experiments after n trials you >> have 2^n number of worlds each having a past of n trials. >> > > *On the second trial and another splitting, what is the assurance that the > new other world is the same as that created on the first splitting, so a > sequence of measurement history exists? AG* > It has the same past, if you say you'll do 9 trials in advance, then most "worlds" after your 9 trials will have done 9 trials(without considering ultra low probability worlds) and all nine worlds will share the same past before any trials. > > >>> >>> >>> >>>> That is precisely the stipulation of MWI. If we have a quantum >>>> experiment with two eigenvalues 1 and 0, and each is equally likely per the >>>> Born rule, then the MWI interpretation is that - effectively - two worlds >>>> are created. You, the experimenter, end up in both, each version knowing >>>> nothing about the other. So, in the "objective world" (the view from >>>> outside the whole wave function as it were), no probability is involved. >>>> But if you repeat this experiment many times, each version of you will >>>> record an apparently random sequence of 1s and 0s. Your best prediction of >>>> what happens in the next experiment is that it's a 50/50 toss up between 1 >>>> and 0. Objectively there's no randomness, subjectively it appears that way. >>>> >>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>>> John K Clark See my new list at Extropolis >>>>>> <https://groups.google.com/g/extropolis> >>>>>> >>>>> -- >>> >> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups >>> "Everything List" group. >>> To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send >>> an email to [email protected]. >>> >> To view this discussion on the web visit >>> https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/d71dbf38-5943-4f9f-9f1a-f7c5ea822c4cn%40googlegroups.com >>> <https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/d71dbf38-5943-4f9f-9f1a-f7c5ea822c4cn%40googlegroups.com?utm_medium=email&utm_source=footer> >>> . >>> >> -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an > email to [email protected]. > To view this discussion on the web visit > https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/2038e98e-2690-4a12-9516-43691b1694aan%40googlegroups.com > <https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/2038e98e-2690-4a12-9516-43691b1694aan%40googlegroups.com?utm_medium=email&utm_source=footer> > . > -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. 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