> On 14 Jan 2021, at 13:07, Alan Grayson <[email protected]> wrote:
> 
> 
> 
> On Thursday, January 14, 2021 at 2:26:42 AM UTC-7 Pierz wrote:
> On Thursday, January 14, 2021 at 2:42:43 PM UTC+11 [email protected] 
> <applewebdata://E95A4776-6388-4940-885B-D2E50F7B475B> wrote:
> On Wednesday, January 13, 2021 at 8:29:16 PM UTC-7 Pierz wrote:
> On Thursday, January 14, 2021 at 1:23:11 PM UTC+11 [email protected] <> 
> wrote:
> On Wednesday, January 13, 2021 at 4:33:20 PM UTC-7 Pierz wrote:
> On Wednesday, January 13, 2021 at 5:50:29 PM UTC+11 [email protected] <> 
> wrote:
> On Tuesday, January 12, 2021 at 10:19:59 PM UTC-7 Pierz wrote:
> 
> 
> On Monday, January 4, 2021 at 12:09:06 PM UTC+11 [email protected] <> wrote:
> On Sunday, January 3, 2021 at 3:56:51 PM UTC-7 [email protected] <> wrote:
> On Sun, Jan 3, 2021 at 5:21 PM Alan Grayson <[email protected] <>> wrote:
> 
> > The MWI doesn't guarantee that these subsequent measurements, for 
> > subsequent horse races say, are occurring in the SAME OTHER worlds as 
> > trials progress, to get ensembles in those OTHER worlds. 
>  
> I don't know what you mean by "SAME OTHER worlds", the same as what? In one 
> world Alan Grayson remembers having seen the electron go left, in another 
> world Alan Grayson remembers having seen the electron go right, other than 
> that the two worlds are absolutely identical, so which one was the "SAME 
> OTHER world"?
> 
> > You seem to avoid the fact that no where does the MWI guarantee [...]
> 
> Quantum mechanics is not in the guarantee business, it deals with 
> probability.  
> 
> > I don't think you understand my point, which isn't complicated. 
> 
> Yes, your point is very simple indeed, but the word simple can have 2 
> meanings, one of them is complementary and the other not so much.  
> 
> In first trial, the MWI postulates other worlds comes into existence. Same 
> other worlds in second trial? Same other worlds in third trial, etc? Where 
> does the MWI assert these other worlds are the SAME other worlds? Unless it 
> does, you only have ONE measurement in each of these worlds. No probability 
> exists in these other worlds since no ensemble of measurements exist in these 
> other world. AG
>  
> You grossly misunderstand MWI. There are no "same other" worlds. The worlds 
> that arise at each trial are different in precisely one way and one way only: 
> the eigenvalue recorded for the experiment. The different eigenvalues will 
> then give rise to a "wave of differentiations" as the consequences of that 
> singular difference ramifies, causing the different worlds generated by the 
> original experimental difference to multiply. "World" really means a unique 
> configuration of the universal wave function, so two worlds at different 
> trials can't possibly be the "same world", and yes, there is only one 
> measurement in each.
> 
> This is what I have been saying all along! AG
> No it isn't. I agree you have been saying there is only one measurement 
> outcome in each world. However this business about "same other worlds" 
> betrays your lack of comprehension. It's not that MWI "doesn't guarantee" 
> that the the worlds at each trial are the same world. It's that the whole 
> notion of "same other worlds" means nothing in this context and has no 
> bearing on anything. A bit like arguing when we add 1 and 1 twice whether we 
> are guaranteed that the ones we add each time are the "SAME ones" at each 
> addition. If mathematics can't guarantee that then how can we be sure the 
> answer is the same? Basically the only answer to that is "WTF?"
>  
> That is precisely the stipulation of MWI. If we have a quantum experiment 
> with two eigenvalues 1 and 0, and each is equally likely per the Born rule, 
> then the MWI interpretation is that - effectively - two worlds are created. 
> You, the experimenter, end up in both, each version knowing nothing about the 
> other.
> 
> Again, what I have been saying all along! AG
> If you get that, then the next bit follows. 
>  
> So, in the "objective world" (the view from outside the whole wave function 
> as it were), no probability is involved. But if you repeat this experiment 
> many times, each version of you will record an apparently random sequence of 
> 1s and 0s. Your best prediction of what happens in the next experiment is 
> that it's a 50/50 toss up between 1 and 0. Objectively there's no randomness, 
> subjectively it appears that way.
>  
> Here's where you go astray. AG 
>  
> So you say! Without justifying yourself in any way. You seem to be saying 
> that probability can't describe QM experiments because in each world there is 
> only one outcome and therefore no "ensemble" of outcomes from which a 
> probability can be derived. That is totally wrong-headed. There are two 
> "ensembles": the ensemble of different multiverse branches at each 
> experiment, and the ensemble of each experimenter's prior measurements, and 
> those are enough to derive the appearance of randomness and to justify a 
> probabilistic description despite the objective lack of randomness. If you 
> agree with "what you have been saying all along", then you must agree that 
> every experimenter in every world in an MWI multiverse will see a record of 
> an apparently random sequence of 1s and 0s in the described experiment. 
> Right? And if not why not? 
> 
> IMO, since the trials are independent, the other observers are disjoint from 
> each other and each records only one measurement. So the only observer who 
> sees an ensemble is the observer in THIS world. To get an ensemble of 
> outcomes in those other worlds, and hence a probability, you need to appeal 
> to a non-existent observer, also called the Bird's Eye observer. AG 
>  
> Respectfully, you did not answer my question. Do you agree or not that every 
> experimenter in every branch of the multiverse who records a series of 
> experiments as described in my scenario will record a seemingly random string 
> of 1s and 0s? If you do, that's really all that's required. Abstract debates 
> about "ensembles required to get a probability" are moot. If the world is as 
> described by MWI, the appearance of probability is an outcome, and 
> probability is the best possible description of how quantum experiments turn 
> out from any real observer's POV (as opposed to the Bird's Eye observer). If 
> you disagree that experimenters will get a seemingly random string of 1s and 
> 0s, then you'll need to explain why you think that.
> 
> I did answer your question. Since the trials are independent, a NEW OTHER 
> WORLD observer is created on each THIS WORLD trial. So the other observers 
> see ONE outcome each. No reason to assume otherwise. You need another 
> postulate for this to work. AG 
> 
> You're talking like a politician. Does each observer in each world who 
> repeats said experiment record a seemingly random series of 1s and 0s or not? 
> Yes/no. It's not hard. Come on, you can do it now...
> 
> The answer is NO. In the spin experiment we're discussing, AG in this world 
> measures an apparently random sequence of 0's and 1's. On each trial an 
> imaginary other AG measures the complement of what AG in this world measured. 
> Now since the trials are independent, different imaginary AGs always measure 
> complements, but none measure more than ONE RESULT. As I previously 
> indicated, these other AGs are disjoint from each other. The only way to 
> remedy this situation is to add another postulate to your MWI. AG

“Imaginary” will be a relative notion, or you lose the MWI interference, or you 
lose Mechanism (used by Everett, almost correctly up to a point as I have 
explained sometimes (the wave must be extracted from arithmetic to get things 
right with respect to the relation between consciousness and observation). 

Invoking a “world” is the same mistake as invoking a god. That does not work, 
and only make things more complex, independently of the true of falsity of that 
belief.

Bruno


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