On Sat, May 14, 2022 at 9:19 PM John Clark <johnkcl...@gmail.com> wrote:
> On Fri, May 13, 2022 at 10:41 PM Bruce Kellett <bhkellet...@gmail.com> > wrote: > > >> After my body has been duplicated but before I have open the door of >>> the duplicating chamber to see where I was I won't know if I will be >>> the John Clark who has seen Moscow or the John Clark who has seen Helsinki, >>> and indeed the distinction between the two would be meaningless because the >>> two would be identical until the door is opened and they differentiate >>> because then one has the memory of seeing Moscow but the other has the >>> memory of seeing Helsinki. So if both decided to place a bet on what they >>> would see after the door was opened (and if one decided to place a bet then >>> the other certainly would too because they're identical) then, provided >>> they were logical,and I think I am at least most of the time, they would >>> both put the odds at 50-50. >>> >> >> *> So how do you accommodate a situation in which there is a 90% chance >> of seeing Moscow and a 10% chance of seeing Helsinki?* >> > > *You've asked that exact same question several times before so I'll answer > it the exact same way I did before because you never made an argument > against what I said, you just keep asking the same question again. If I > know the duplicating machine has made 10 copies of me and that 9 of them > are in Helsinki and 1 is in Moscow then then 9 John Clark's will remember > seeing Helsinki but only 1 will remember seeing Moscow; so if they place > odds after the duplication but before the door was opened and they observe > where they are they would all say there was a 90% chance they were in > Helsinki, and 90% of them would turn out to be correct and would win their > bet. * > The trouble is that the duplicating machine makes only one copy, so there is one for Moscow and one for Helsinki. There are no multiple copies in the original scenario. Changing the nature of the question is not an answer. The reason I repeat this is that the Schrodinger equation gives one branch for each component of the superposition -- one branch for each dimension of the Hilbert space. So I ask again, how do you accommodate a situation in which there is a 90% chance of being on one branch and a 10% chance of being on the other branch, as per the Born rule? Changing the number of branches (or duplicates) is fine in a general theory, but not in QM. The SE gives only one branch for each outcome. What you are really saying is that the SE is inconsistent with the Born rule -- a point I have been making all along. Bruce > -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To view this discussion on the web visit https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/CAFxXSLR2Kkx7ffQBjxmM33tTqN5ZMfxofnQerQg4d4-fvM6URA%40mail.gmail.com.
