Hi David M.
2 Dec. you wrote: (I hope you remember what issues you
commented, unless this becomes too long)
> DM: Yes and no. I am suggesting that SOM is the evolving story of a
> distinction, one that sets out the subjective and objective and takes
> it to the max, but in the end the dominant secular culture in fact
> ends up suppressing the subjective side from knowledge enquiry
> although maintaining it and devaluing it as something personal and
> individual (personal taste, choice, fulfilment).
SOM seems to (end up) as just "objectivity" in your "book"
(thereby causing the same mistake as in LILA (see below) In my
"book" however it is the S/O aggregate - containing both in a
never-agreed-upon unity. Thus idealism (subjectivity) is as much
SOM as particle physics. To prove my thesis I start with a quote
from ZAMM:
The resolution of the arguments of the Cosmologists
came from a new direction entirely, from a group
Phædrus seemed to feel were early humanists. They
were teachers, but what they sought to teach was not
principles, but beliefs of men. Their object was not any
single absolute truth, but the improvement of men. All
principles, all truths, are relative, they said.
The above is telling. The Cosmologists is regarded as
"objectivist" (truth-seekers) against whom the "subjectivists"
(promoted beliefs of men) were pitted and ever since the two
have tried to "suppress" each other (without realizing that they
are each other's necessary contrast) The objective part
(knowledge) has dominated our Western scene since
Enlightenment, so much that Pirsig mistook SOM to only be
"knowledge". It's easy, you fell into that pit too. Over to LILA:
"What is the purpose of all this intellectual knowledge?"
the Metaphysics of Quality answers, "The fundamental
purpose of knowledge is to Dynamically improve and
preserve society." Knowledge has grown away from this
historic purpose and become an end in itself just as
society has grown away from its original purpose of
preserving physical human beings and become an end in
itself"
Pirsig points out how "knowledge" grew away from its social
parent to form a new level. Why use the term "knowledge" when
it was the intellectual level? Perhaps because - to him -
knowledge (objectivity) was all of SOM, in ZAMM he had
presented SOM as destroying Aretê.
And now the source of all trouble is revealed: In ZAMM SOM is
presented as objectivity (truth, knowledge) alone (not objectivity
AND subjectivity) against which Aretê is pittet. Thereby Quality
assumes the role of subjectivity (as if THAT is the "good guy'")
Then in LILA the impossible thing happens that at one moment
"knowledge" is the value that transcended social value, the next
knowledge (sciences) is the villain that invaded a pre-existing
"intellect"?
> DM: Was it not a new truth, a new form of truth.No longer
> gods truth (in a sense the ultimate objective truth) but yes man's
> truth, although reason is given divine attributes by many -i.e. as if
> beyond mere human perspective- and truth from experience rather than
> tradition.
Now to the true 4th. (S/Ol) level. It's emergence changed the
rules. Social value (f. ex. religion) in the intellect-dominated West
had to toe its line, and intellect's "objectivity" looked the best
approach, hence the rational arguments for God. The "subjective"
argument looked bleak, to say that God is a mind product isn't
very promising, except to "jesuitic" Christendom which is so
intellectualized that it uses "God in out hearts ...etc."
In the pre-intellect days when social value was top notch
however, the reality of God went without saying. No ancient Jew
asked if God was objectively real, perhaps no contemporary
orthodox Jew and/or Muslim do it. Tuth in this objective, scientific
sense was born along with the intellectual level. Your question
"was it not a new truth" shows how difficult it is to leave intellect,
we apply it on the existence levels before intellect.
> DM: We need to seethe difference between subjective and
> absolute idealists here.
Yes, let's return to that.
> DM: I think Pirsig can see that of the two extremes of SOM,
> the idealist one is more rich, dynamic and human, but the
> same errors are in idealism and need to be recognised.
> This is Heidegger starting point, i.e. his understanding
> of Hegel in the light of Nietzsche.
Right, but I don't think Phaedrus wanted the MOQ to be an
idealist philosophy, but Pirsig made it into one.
> DM: Intellectual for me means to reflective consider your langauge and
> distinctions, i.e. how you describe experience.
Agree! But intellect has come a long way until this became self-
evident.
> Tradition and religions describe experience unreflectively and are
> therefore mythic and not intellectual -at least to start with.
Unconditionally agreement.
> SOM comes along and describes reality-experience in a more reflective
> way and creates what we call intellectual.
Perfect agreement!
> But for me MOQ and other non-dualistic approaches give us new forms of
> the intellectual that CONTINUE to be intellectual but OVERCOME dualism
> and SOM.
The MOQ started from SOM's premises and like a wrestler it
used its opponents weight (arguments) to throw him. But "non-
dualist"? MOQ is very much a dualism (DQ/SQ) one that solves
the S/O dualism's paradoxes. Well, thanks anyway David, I have
a great time writing these treatises.
Bo
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