Ham

It's hard to resist when you talk MOQ.   

13 Nov. you cited Ron's:

> > When Pirsig wrote [in LILA] . . .

    "This problem of trying to describe value in terms of 
    substance has been the problem of a smaller container 
    trying to contain a larger one. Value is not a 
    subspecies of substance. Substance is a subspecies 
    of value. When you reverse the containment process 
    and define substance in terms of value the mystery 
    disappears: substance is a 'stable pattern of inorganic 
    values.' The problem then disappears. The world of 
    objects and the world of values is unified."  

> > . . . he mistakenly gave the impression of a meta-objectivism
> > which contradicts the statement of Value or Quality (ultimate
> > reality) as being indefinable ...snip.


First regarding the container analogy. It basically says that a greater 
system can't fit into a smaller. For instance Copernicus' cosmology 
"contains" the Ptolemaian because it can explain why the crystal 
spheres were necessary (to explain the planets' motion) from the 
premises of an earth-centered cosmology, while the Ptolemaian can't 
contain Copernicus' sun-centered one. 

To stick with the cosmology analogy, Ron's "meta-objectivism" is valid 
in the sense that the MOQ necessarily must claim that it is the true 
sun-centered metaphysics. It also "contains" SOM in the sense of 
explaining why the S/O-divide was necessary while confined to the 
static intellectual level (=earth-centered). We are now in the same 
situation "the Curch of Reason" refusing the new metaphysical shift.    

> You folks have cleared up the misconception of a Pirsig's phrase,
> although I doubt that anyone new to the MD would comprehend your
> clarification.  So, at the risk of being criticized for departing from
> official MoQ terminology, let me try to translate the problem in plain
> English.  Ron rightly contends that Pirsig's Menu/Reality analogy,
> which includes the statement that substance is a "stable pattern of
> inorganic values" 

The menu/food analogy was used by Pirsig to press his point that 
Quality is the food and the MOQ (just) a menu. A point I don't 
subscribe to, the DQ/SQ is the food!   

> leads to a false conclusion; namely, that the objective world
> "contains" the value pattern, which makes values an experienced subset
> of physical reality.  

The MOQ rejects the "earth-centered" subject/object metaphysics (of 
which psychic/physical is one offshoot) and introduces its "sun-
centered" DQ/SQ one, in which all S/O variants are static intellectual 
patterns, thus yours above makes no sense. The inorganic level does 
not correspond to "substance", nor is it "objective", the mind/matter 
and subjective/objective are all confined to the intellectual level.   

> In an attempt to rectify this misconception, Bovar has proposed that
> Intellect be regarded as a "universal" level from which patterns,
> relations, and logic are derived. 

The MOQ is "out of" SOM, but after being stripped of its metaphysical 
rank and the remaining S/O relegated the role of the static intellectual 
level it's no more "universal" than any other level while they were 
leading edge.    

> But Pirsig clearly states that value is not a "subspecies of substance"
> and, in fact, it actually "defines substance". 

As said, for Pirsig Quality was the main thing with the MOQ a second-
hand something, hence "Quality defines substance". I maintain that the 
MOQ is the main thing and that it "defines" SOM..     
 
> The cause of the confusion, it seems to me, is that although Pirsig
> posited Intellect as the highest of four "static" levels in his
> Metaphysics of Quality (SODV), he never described its epistemology
> relative to Value (DQ) which, because it is "dynamic", transcends
> static level allocations.

SQ's relationship to DQ is like a wave to water. The wave is water too, 
yet it is its wave form that counts.   

> Despite the confusion, it's apparent that at least three of us
> understand that the "patterning" of Value is conceptual, which is to
> say that objective phenomena are the intellectual constructs of value
> perception. 

No confusion anywhere. The patterns being conceptual!!! Christ, 
what's not conceptual in the sense of being conveyed by language? 


Bo











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