On Sun, Jul 10, 2011 at 8:12 PM, Steven Peterson <peterson.st...@gmail.com> wrote: > Hi Dan, > > >>>> Dan: > >>>> What Steve seems to be saying is: dilemma solved... no more need to >>>> talk about it. >>> >>> Steve: >>> That's not what I mean to say. >> >> Dan: >> >> Oh. I did get that impression from reading your posts. I am sorry if I >> was in error. > > Steve: > In fact I've been talking about it quite a lot. > > > > >>> Dan: >>>>But it isn't solved so much as it is reformulated. And >>>> there is every reason to further explore this line of inquiry, to >>>> build upon it and expand it. But that means letting go of some >>>> preconceived notions of which we are all very fond of, like the notion >>>> of free will. >>> >>> >>> Steve: >>> But I agree that this problem gets reformulated. The question of free >>> will versus determinism gets replaced by the question, to what extent >>> do we follow DQ and to what extent do we follow sq? The one dilemma >>> gets dissolved but is replaced by another puzzler. The difference in >>> our views may be the extent to which we still see a concept that is >>> similar enough to the traditional notion of free in the re-formulation >>> to warrant maintaining the old SOM term in talking about what we want >>> to talk about without being misunderstood. >> >> Dan: >> >> Possibly. This is tricky stuff to be sure. I am unsure though if your >> reformulation works; it seems to be mutually exclusive in regards to >> the extent one follows Dynamic Quality or to who's behavior is >> controlled by static quality patterns. > > Steve: > I'm not proposing any new personal reformulation. I'm talking about > Pirsig's reformulation which I think you are right to say does not > offer two mutually exclusive options.
Dan: You said: The question of free will versus determinism gets replaced by the question, to what extent do we follow DQ and to what extent do we follow sq? It appears from reading this that these are two mutually exclusive options, hence my observation that they are not. > > > Dan: >> Within the framework of the MOQ, it is not an exclusive, either/or >> proposition but rather both. From a static quality, conventional point >> of view, both free will and determinism are seen as correct. From a >> Dynamic point of view, both free will and determinism are illusions, >> the result of a dysfunctional narrative in which we have come to >> believe. . > > > Steve: > I still don't follow you on what these two different perspectives are. > I never claim to have anything other than a conventional perspective. Dan: Yes, I see. But Robert Pirsig does talk about it quite a lot. From LILA'S CHILD: The MOQ, as I understand it, denies any existence of a “self” that is independent of inorganic, biological, social or intellectual patterns. There is no “self” that contains these patterns. These patterns contain the self. This denial agrees with both religious mysticism and scientific knowledge. In Zen, there is reference to “big self” and “small self.” Small self is the patterns. Big self is Dynamic Quality. “Hunting for weaknesses, [in your paper] I find that on page one, paragraph four, there is a sentence, ‘Fundamentally Pirsig’s term is a mystic one, and refers to the undifferentiated, indeterminate, reality from which the universe has evolved (or grown) from.’ Although this is true at a Buddha’s level of understanding, it would be confusing and illogical in the world of everyday affairs to say that the world is evolving both from and toward the same thing. I have had some reader mail that has pointed out at one place I seem to imply that Quality and chaos are the same and at another that they are different, so I haven’t been clear on this myself and have left an opening to attack. To close it up, let us say that the universe is evolving from a condition of low quality (quantum forces only, no atoms, pre-Big Bang) toward a higher one (birds, trees, societies and thoughts) and that in a static sense (world of everyday affairs) these two are not the same.” (Letter from Robert Pirsig, March 29, 1997. The word “mystic” originally in bold not italics.) DG: ...a materialist might dream that someday science will develop a theory of everything. On the other hand, an idealist might tend to side with the Buddhists in saying intellectual concepts of reality are not central to or even part of reality itself? That we will never develop a theory of everything? That there’s no chance we can ever intellectually know reality? RMP: The confusion here seems to result from the two languages of Buddhism, the language of the Buddha’s world and language of everyday life. In the language of everyday life, reality and intellect are different. From the language of the Buddha’s world, they are the same, since there is no intellectual division that governs the Buddha’s world. Dan comments: >From the everyday perspective, free will and determinism are different and mutually exclusive notions. The MOQ brings them together, however, by stating that the dilemma of free will vs determinism doesn't come up. They are both correct in a conventional static quality sense. But from a Dynamic perspective, one free of any intellectual divisions, they are illusions. Does that help you see better what I am getting at? > > >> >>>Steve: >>> What I thinks tend to go on with the way the term free will gets used >>> in these parts is that it gets slipped in the back door as the extent >>> to which behavior is a response to DQ, but then it reverts back to the >>> SOM notion of free will once inside. So I think it would be better to >>> drop the term from the MOQ vocabulary and maintain it only as an SOM >>> term worth criticizing. >> >> Dan: >> Like subjects and objects, free will and determinism are useful >> intellectual patterns of quality as long as we understand the >> shorthand meaning behind them. To criticize and condemn the notion of >> free will is to ignore a good deal of what RMP has to say in LILA, >> does it not? > > > Steve: > I'm not one of those that sets out to "improve" the MOQ or make my > mark on it. I see the MOQ as the philosophy of RMP, and that is what I > am trying to articulate. I'm not talking about ignoring anything > Pirsig said on the topic. I'm explaining my understanding of what > Pirsig has to say about it. All I'm talking about is condemning the > SOM concepts of free will and determinism in the way that Pirsig > does--as the result of asking a question with a bad premise. > > Pirsig in Lila: > "It isn't Lila that has quality; it's Quality that has Lila. Nothing > can have Quality. To have something is to possess it, and to possess > something is to dominate it. Nothing dominates Quality. If there's > domination and possession involved, it's Quality that dominates and > possesses Lila. She's created by it. She's a cohesion of changing static > patterns of this Quality. There isn't any more to her than that. The > words Lila uses, the thoughts she thinks, the values she holds, are the end > product of three and a half billion years of the history of the entire > world. She's a kind of jungle of evolutionary patterns of value. She > doesn't know how they all got there any more than any jungle knows how it > came to be." > > Steve: > In the MOQ, all we are and in fact experience itself is Value. We are > not determined by values. We are not "free to choose" our values. We > ARE our values. "Choosing" is the manifestation of what we ARE as sets > of values with the capacity to respond to DQ. In the MOQ, it is the > fact of such choices (value patterns) from which "the will" or the > self is inferred rather than the other way around. In contrast, the > SOM notion of free will is of an autonomous subject with metaphysical > primacy. dmb keeps saying that if we drop the notion of a choosing > subject (though he does say he drops the notion of a metaphysical > soul), then morality goes out window. I see that as about the most > un-MOQish thing one could possibly say. The MOQ is about asserting an > understanding of the world as a moral order through _denying_ the > subject-object picture. Instead of free will as the possession of a > self, Pirsig retools the notion of freedom (note that in the quote you > posted he shifts from "free will" to "freedom") as the capacity to > respond to DQ. And in LC he says that you are going to talk about free > will in MOQ terms as this capacity, then you may as well say that > rocks and trees and atoms have free will. But let's not slip the SOM > version of a freely choosing subject with metaphysical primacy in > through the back door here. Pirsig's notion of freedom associated with > DQ is very different from traditional SOM free will that is suppose to > distinguish humanity from the animals. Dan: First of all, I tend to agree with you that there is no need to equate morality and causality. I addressed this to dmb but he didn't respond, at least not that I noticed. Still, I have to ask you: in what sense is the notion of free will and freedom different? And as to LC where RMP says what you say he says, I am having problems finding just what you're talking about. Perhaps if you have the time, you might point me to the exact quote. Thank you, Dan Moq_Discuss mailing list Listinfo, Unsubscribing etc. http://lists.moqtalk.org/listinfo.cgi/moq_discuss-moqtalk.org Archives: http://lists.moqtalk.org/pipermail/moq_discuss-moqtalk.org/ http://moq.org/md/archives.html
