Hi Ian,
Yes, but Ms. Albahari's investigation is whether the 'sense of self' does, in
fact, reflect a real 'self'. A far more important investigation consider that
RMP rejects an autonomous self.
"The MOQ, like the Buddhists and the Determinists (odd bedfellows) says this
“autonomous individual” is an illusion."
(RMP, Copleston)
Marsha
On Aug 17, 2011, at 4:05 AM, Ian Glendinning wrote:
> Thanks Marsha,
>
> So even an analytical buddhist agrees that "one must" ... attribute
> free-will to self.
>
> Ian
>
> On Wed, Aug 17, 2011 at 8:59 AM, MarshaV <[email protected]> wrote:
>>
>> 3.2.2 Role: Agent of actions and thinker of thoughts (autonomy)
>>
>> "The sense of boundedness is also brought out through considerations
>> pertaining to 'the self's' causal efficacy. For most people take themselves
>> to be autonomous agents in virtue of their assumed causal powers, thus
>> relating directly to the 'role-occupiers' _thinker of thoughts_,
>> _initiator of actions_. These roles point to common modes of assumed
>> self-identity. How, more precisely, do we identify as such thinkers and
>> agents? One way, already mentioned, is through 'this-ness': the felt value
>> attached to the idea that _I, this particular self_, as opposed to some
>> other self, am the agent of certain actions. Another way we construe
>> ourselves to be thinking agents is through the feeling that our deliberate
>> actions are not the result of impersonal factors but, rather, of special
>> causal powers pertaining to free-will. --- _our_ free-will. We feel, in
>> other words, that our choices are not blindly determined, but that with any
>> deliberate action, we could have chosen to
>> do otherwise. The feeling that one is able to exert unique causal powers
>> on the world through one's own thoughts and actions add weight to the
>> feeling of _being_ a separate, autonomous entity. Identifying as a (free)
>> thinker and agent would thus plausibly evoke a sense of boundary between our
>> 'free' selves and the world with which we interact (including other free
>> agents).
>>
>> "But the feelings of freedom do not seem to stop there. Like 'this-ness',
>> the belief in one's free-will seems to endow those free thoughts and actions
>> with value. One takes particular pride or shame not only in the apparent
>> fact that _this_, as opposed _that_ kind of action. It is through this
>> feeling of freedom that one feel's responsible for one's actions. In the
>> extensive literature of free-will, it has been noted that anyone who _truly_
>> believed there was no real choice in the matter --- that our every action
>> was determined from birth --- would not fully experience the emotions of
>> pride, shame, guilt, praise or blame, to name but a few. It seems that for
>> these emotions to be properly felt, one must, at _some_ level, buy into the
>> assumption that it is possible to have chosen differently. We do not
>> usually attribute heartfelt praise or blame to behaviours we perceive as
>> mechanistic or random (if we do, then it tends to be through unconsciously
>> anthropomorphising in
>> animate objects such as stalling cars and red traffic lights!). The
>> emotional investment in the outcome of one's actions serves to intensify the
>> sense of boundary between self-as-agent and other (or self-as-thinker and
>> other). The associated roles, 'thinker of thoughts' and 'initiator of
>> actions' thus depict distinct and repetitive _modes_ in which we, as
>> subjects, identify with things (in the capacity of these roles),
>> underscoring the sense of boundary between self and other. And the
>> associated sense of boundedness is best evidenced through the value we
>> attach to being, it would seem, a free author of our actions.
>>
>> "The reflections developed in this discussion on both 'this-ness' and
>> 'autonomy' (introduced by Baron) help to illuminate, from two different
>> angles, the sense of ontological uniqueness that we have. The sense of
>> being a uniquely separate _thing_, whether as something special, or as
>> something autonomous, is strong evidence for our reflexive ascription of
>> boundedness to the self we assume we are. We can also note its connection
>> with the long-running debate on free-will, and with the fact that many
>> philosophers, such as Kant and Frankfurt, have chosen to identify the most
>> central aspect of our 'selves' with 'the will'."
>>
>> (Albahari, Miri, 'Analytical Buddhism: The Two-tiered Illusion of
>> Self ', pp.96-97)
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>> ___
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