Ian,
to continue...
Coplston:
The propositions, current among "determinists", that a man's action is the
joint result of his character and circumstances , is true enough in a certain
sense, and , in that sense, is quite compatible with an assertion of human
freedom.' In Green's view, it is not a necessary condition for the proper use
of the word 'freedom' that a man should be able to do or to become anything
whatsoever. To justify our describing a man's actions as free, it is sufficient
that they should be his own, in the sense that he is truly the author of them.
And if a man's action follows from his character, if, that is to say, he
responds to a situation which calls for action in a certain way because he is a
certain sort of man, the action is his own; he, and nobody else, is the
responsible author of it.
RMP:
The freedom-order issue is handled much more simply and precisely in the MOQ by
the static-Dynamic split.
-------------
"To the extent that one's behavior is controlled by static patterns of quality
it is without choice. But to the extent that one follows Dynamic Quality,
which is undefinable, one's behavior is free."
(RMP, LILA: Chapter 12)
On Aug 17, 2011, at 6:34 AM, MarshaV wrote:
>
>
> Ian,
>
> And I think I've said before if you want to play within the conventional
> (static) reality, that is your choice. One can justify debating the number
> of angels that can dance on a pin. The real changes will come when one,,,???
>
>
>
>
> Copleston:
> Now it is certain that it is only through action that a man can realize
> himself, in the sense of actualizing his potentialities and developing his
> personality towards the ideal state of harmonious integration of his powers.
>
> RMP:
> Zen argues that it is through stillness, not action, that a man can realize
> himself, in the sense of actualizing his potentialities and developing his
> personality towards the ideal state of harmonious integration of his powers.
>
> Copleston:
> And it is also obvious that every human act, in the proper sense of the term,
> is motivated. It is performed in view of some immediate end or goal.
>
> RMP:
> Quality
>
> Copleston:
> But it is arguable that a man's motives are determined by his existing
> character, in conjunction with other circumstances, and that character is
> itself the result of empirical causes.
>
> RMP:
> static quality.
>
> Copleston:
> In this case are not a man's actions determined in such a way that what he
> will be depends on what he is, what he is depending in turn on circumstances
> other than his free choice? True, circumstances vary; but the ways in which
> men react to varying circumstances seem to be determined.
>
> RMP:
> statically
>
> Copleston:
> And if all a man's acts are determined, is there any room for an ethical
> theory which sets up a certain ideal of human personality as that which we
> ought to strive to realize through our actions?
>
> RMP:
> Yes, Dynamic Quality.
>
> Copleston:
> Green is quite prepared to concede to the determinists a good deal of the
> ground on which they base their case. But at the same time he tries to take
> the sting out of these concessions.
>
> RMP:
> The MOQ needs to concede nothing.
>
>
>
>
>
> On Aug 17, 2011, at 6:20 AM, Ian Glendinning wrote:
>
>> Marsha, I don't call that rejection, but a warning as to the illusory
>> nature of the autonomous individual self.
>>
>> Many people's texts & titles associate self & will with illusory. It's
>> real enough, (as real as anything in this world), just not quite what
>> it appears to be.
>>
>> Ian
>>
>> On Wed, Aug 17, 2011 at 10:19 AM, MarshaV <[email protected]> wrote:
>>>
>>> Hi Ian,
>>>
>>> Yes, but Ms. Albahari's investigation is whether the 'sense of self' does,
>>> in fact, reflect a real 'self'. A far more important investigation
>>> consider that RMP rejects an autonomous self.
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> "The MOQ, like the Buddhists and the Determinists (odd bedfellows) says
>>> this “autonomous individual” is an illusion."
>>> (RMP, Copleston)
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> Marsha
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> On Aug 17, 2011, at 4:05 AM, Ian Glendinning wrote:
>>>
>>>> Thanks Marsha,
>>>>
>>>> So even an analytical buddhist agrees that "one must" ... attribute
>>>> free-will to self.
>>>>
>>>> Ian
>>>>
>>>> On Wed, Aug 17, 2011 at 8:59 AM, MarshaV <[email protected]> wrote:
>>>>>
>>>>> 3.2.2 Role: Agent of actions and thinker of thoughts (autonomy)
>>>>>
>>>>> "The sense of boundedness is also brought out through considerations
>>>>> pertaining to 'the self's' causal efficacy. For most people take
>>>>> themselves to be autonomous agents in virtue of their assumed causal
>>>>> powers, thus relating directly to the 'role-occupiers' _thinker of
>>>>> thoughts_, _initiator of actions_. These roles point to common modes of
>>>>> assumed self-identity. How, more precisely, do we identify as such
>>>>> thinkers and agents? One way, already mentioned, is through 'this-ness':
>>>>> the felt value attached to the idea that _I, this particular self_, as
>>>>> opposed to some other self, am the agent of certain actions. Another way
>>>>> we construe ourselves to be thinking agents is through the feeling that
>>>>> our deliberate actions are not the result of impersonal factors but,
>>>>> rather, of special causal powers pertaining to free-will. --- _our_
>>>>> free-will. We feel, in other words, that our choices are not blindly
>>>>> determined, but that with any deliberate action, we could have chosen to
>>>>> do otherwise. The feeling that one is able to exert unique causal powers
>>>>> on the world through one's own thoughts and actions add weight to the
>>>>> feeling of _being_ a separate, autonomous entity. Identifying as a
>>>>> (free) thinker and agent would thus plausibly evoke a sense of boundary
>>>>> between our 'free' selves and the world with which we interact (including
>>>>> other free agents).
>>>>>
>>>>> "But the feelings of freedom do not seem to stop there. Like
>>>>> 'this-ness', the belief in one's free-will seems to endow those free
>>>>> thoughts and actions with value. One takes particular pride or shame not
>>>>> only in the apparent fact that _this_, as opposed _that_ kind of action.
>>>>> It is through this feeling of freedom that one feel's responsible for
>>>>> one's actions. In the extensive literature of free-will, it has been
>>>>> noted that anyone who _truly_ believed there was no real choice in the
>>>>> matter --- that our every action was determined from birth --- would not
>>>>> fully experience the emotions of pride, shame, guilt, praise or blame, to
>>>>> name but a few. It seems that for these emotions to be properly felt,
>>>>> one must, at _some_ level, buy into the assumption that it is possible to
>>>>> have chosen differently. We do not usually attribute heartfelt praise or
>>>>> blame to behaviours we perceive as mechanistic or random (if we do, then
>>>>> it tends to be through unconsciously anthropomorphising in
>>>>> animate objects such as stalling cars and red traffic lights!). The
>>>>> emotional investment in the outcome of one's actions serves to intensify
>>>>> the sense of boundary between self-as-agent and other (or self-as-thinker
>>>>> and other). The associated roles, 'thinker of thoughts' and 'initiator
>>>>> of actions' thus depict distinct and repetitive _modes_ in which we, as
>>>>> subjects, identify with things (in the capacity of these roles),
>>>>> underscoring the sense of boundary between self and other. And the
>>>>> associated sense of boundedness is best evidenced through the value we
>>>>> attach to being, it would seem, a free author of our actions.
>>>>>
>>>>> "The reflections developed in this discussion on both 'this-ness' and
>>>>> 'autonomy' (introduced by Baron) help to illuminate, from two different
>>>>> angles, the sense of ontological uniqueness that we have. The sense of
>>>>> being a uniquely separate _thing_, whether as something special, or as
>>>>> something autonomous, is strong evidence for our reflexive ascription of
>>>>> boundedness to the self we assume we are. We can also note its
>>>>> connection with the long-running debate on free-will, and with the fact
>>>>> that many philosophers, such as Kant and Frankfurt, have chosen to
>>>>> identify the most central aspect of our 'selves' with 'the will'."
>>>>>
>>>>> (Albahari, Miri, 'Analytical Buddhism: The Two-tiered Illusion of
>>>>> Self ', pp.96-97)
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> ___
>>>>>
>>>>>
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