Ian,
And I think I've said before if you want to play within the conventional (static) reality, that is your choice. One can justify debating the number of angels that can dance on a pin. The real changes will come when one,,,??? Copleston: Now it is certain that it is only through action that a man can realize himself, in the sense of actualizing his potentialities and developing his personality towards the ideal state of harmonious integration of his powers. RMP: Zen argues that it is through stillness, not action, that a man can realize himself, in the sense of actualizing his potentialities and developing his personality towards the ideal state of harmonious integration of his powers. Copleston: And it is also obvious that every human act, in the proper sense of the term, is motivated. It is performed in view of some immediate end or goal. RMP: Quality Copleston: But it is arguable that a man's motives are determined by his existing character, in conjunction with other circumstances, and that character is itself the result of empirical causes. RMP: static quality. Copleston: In this case are not a man's actions determined in such a way that what he will be depends on what he is, what he is depending in turn on circumstances other than his free choice? True, circumstances vary; but the ways in which men react to varying circumstances seem to be determined. RMP: statically Copleston: And if all a man's acts are determined, is there any room for an ethical theory which sets up a certain ideal of human personality as that which we ought to strive to realize through our actions? RMP: Yes, Dynamic Quality. Copleston: Green is quite prepared to concede to the determinists a good deal of the ground on which they base their case. But at the same time he tries to take the sting out of these concessions. RMP: The MOQ needs to concede nothing. On Aug 17, 2011, at 6:20 AM, Ian Glendinning wrote: > Marsha, I don't call that rejection, but a warning as to the illusory > nature of the autonomous individual self. > > Many people's texts & titles associate self & will with illusory. It's > real enough, (as real as anything in this world), just not quite what > it appears to be. > > Ian > > On Wed, Aug 17, 2011 at 10:19 AM, MarshaV <[email protected]> wrote: >> >> Hi Ian, >> >> Yes, but Ms. Albahari's investigation is whether the 'sense of self' does, >> in fact, reflect a real 'self'. A far more important investigation consider >> that RMP rejects an autonomous self. >> >> >> >> "The MOQ, like the Buddhists and the Determinists (odd bedfellows) says this >> “autonomous individual” is an illusion." >> (RMP, Copleston) >> >> >> >> Marsha >> >> >> >> >> On Aug 17, 2011, at 4:05 AM, Ian Glendinning wrote: >> >>> Thanks Marsha, >>> >>> So even an analytical buddhist agrees that "one must" ... attribute >>> free-will to self. >>> >>> Ian >>> >>> On Wed, Aug 17, 2011 at 8:59 AM, MarshaV <[email protected]> wrote: >>>> >>>> 3.2.2 Role: Agent of actions and thinker of thoughts (autonomy) >>>> >>>> "The sense of boundedness is also brought out through considerations >>>> pertaining to 'the self's' causal efficacy. For most people take >>>> themselves to be autonomous agents in virtue of their assumed causal >>>> powers, thus relating directly to the 'role-occupiers' _thinker of >>>> thoughts_, _initiator of actions_. These roles point to common modes of >>>> assumed self-identity. How, more precisely, do we identify as such >>>> thinkers and agents? One way, already mentioned, is through 'this-ness': >>>> the felt value attached to the idea that _I, this particular self_, as >>>> opposed to some other self, am the agent of certain actions. Another way >>>> we construe ourselves to be thinking agents is through the feeling that >>>> our deliberate actions are not the result of impersonal factors but, >>>> rather, of special causal powers pertaining to free-will. --- _our_ >>>> free-will. We feel, in other words, that our choices are not blindly >>>> determined, but that with any deliberate action, we could have chosen to >>>> do otherwise. The feeling that one is able to exert unique causal powers >>>> on the world through one's own thoughts and actions add weight to the >>>> feeling of _being_ a separate, autonomous entity. Identifying as a (free) >>>> thinker and agent would thus plausibly evoke a sense of boundary between >>>> our 'free' selves and the world with which we interact (including other >>>> free agents). >>>> >>>> "But the feelings of freedom do not seem to stop there. Like >>>> 'this-ness', the belief in one's free-will seems to endow those free >>>> thoughts and actions with value. One takes particular pride or shame not >>>> only in the apparent fact that _this_, as opposed _that_ kind of action. >>>> It is through this feeling of freedom that one feel's responsible for >>>> one's actions. In the extensive literature of free-will, it has been >>>> noted that anyone who _truly_ believed there was no real choice in the >>>> matter --- that our every action was determined from birth --- would not >>>> fully experience the emotions of pride, shame, guilt, praise or blame, to >>>> name but a few. It seems that for these emotions to be properly felt, one >>>> must, at _some_ level, buy into the assumption that it is possible to have >>>> chosen differently. We do not usually attribute heartfelt praise or blame >>>> to behaviours we perceive as mechanistic or random (if we do, then it >>>> tends to be through unconsciously anthropomorphising in >>>> animate objects such as stalling cars and red traffic lights!). The >>>> emotional investment in the outcome of one's actions serves to intensify >>>> the sense of boundary between self-as-agent and other (or self-as-thinker >>>> and other). The associated roles, 'thinker of thoughts' and 'initiator >>>> of actions' thus depict distinct and repetitive _modes_ in which we, as >>>> subjects, identify with things (in the capacity of these roles), >>>> underscoring the sense of boundary between self and other. And the >>>> associated sense of boundedness is best evidenced through the value we >>>> attach to being, it would seem, a free author of our actions. >>>> >>>> "The reflections developed in this discussion on both 'this-ness' and >>>> 'autonomy' (introduced by Baron) help to illuminate, from two different >>>> angles, the sense of ontological uniqueness that we have. The sense of >>>> being a uniquely separate _thing_, whether as something special, or as >>>> something autonomous, is strong evidence for our reflexive ascription of >>>> boundedness to the self we assume we are. We can also note its connection >>>> with the long-running debate on free-will, and with the fact that many >>>> philosophers, such as Kant and Frankfurt, have chosen to identify the most >>>> central aspect of our 'selves' with 'the will'." >>>> >>>> (Albahari, Miri, 'Analytical Buddhism: The Two-tiered Illusion of >>>> Self ', pp.96-97) >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> ___ >>>> >>>> >>>> Moq_Discuss mailing list >>>> Listinfo, Unsubscribing etc. >>>> http://lists.moqtalk.org/listinfo.cgi/moq_discuss-moqtalk.org >>>> Archives: >>>> http://lists.moqtalk.org/pipermail/moq_discuss-moqtalk.org/ >>>> http://moq.org/md/archives.html >>>> >>> Moq_Discuss mailing list >>> Listinfo, Unsubscribing etc. >>> http://lists.moqtalk.org/listinfo.cgi/moq_discuss-moqtalk.org >>> Archives: >>> http://lists.moqtalk.org/pipermail/moq_discuss-moqtalk.org/ >>> http://moq.org/md/archives.html >> >> >> >> ___ >> >> >> Moq_Discuss mailing list >> Listinfo, Unsubscribing etc. >> http://lists.moqtalk.org/listinfo.cgi/moq_discuss-moqtalk.org >> Archives: >> http://lists.moqtalk.org/pipermail/moq_discuss-moqtalk.org/ >> http://moq.org/md/archives.html >> > Moq_Discuss mailing list > Listinfo, Unsubscribing etc. > http://lists.moqtalk.org/listinfo.cgi/moq_discuss-moqtalk.org > Archives: > http://lists.moqtalk.org/pipermail/moq_discuss-moqtalk.org/ > http://moq.org/md/archives.html ___ Moq_Discuss mailing list Listinfo, Unsubscribing etc. http://lists.moqtalk.org/listinfo.cgi/moq_discuss-moqtalk.org Archives: http://lists.moqtalk.org/pipermail/moq_discuss-moqtalk.org/ http://moq.org/md/archives.html
