Copleston:
Bradley does not disagree, any more than Hegel did, with the view that the end 
of morality is the realization of a good will. 

RMP:
The term “will” is translated by the MOQ as “attraction to Quality.” 

Copleston:
This doesn’t sound like the common meaning of the word because in the common 
meaning will is a property of an autonomous self-realizing individual.  

RMP:
The MOQ, like the Buddhists and the Determinists (odd bedfellows) says this 
“autonomous individual” is an illusion.  

Copleston:
His point is that content must be given to this idea. And to do this we must 
understand that the good will is the universal will, 

RMP:
If Bradley had stopped here the MOQ would agree. 

Copleston:
the will of a social organism. 

RMP:
But he didn’t stop there and the MOQ strongly disagrees that the universal will 
is the will of the social organism. 

Copleston:
For this means that one's duties are specified by one's membership of the 
social organism, and that 'to be moral, I must will my station and its duties'. 
 

RMP:
Hitler couldn’t have agreed more.








On Aug 17, 2011, at 5:19 AM, MarshaV wrote:

> 
> Hi Ian,  
> 
> Yes, but Ms. Albahari's investigation is whether the 'sense of self' does, in 
> fact, reflect a real 'self'.  A far more important investigation consider 
> that RMP rejects an autonomous self.    
> 
> 
> 
> "The MOQ, like the Buddhists and the Determinists (odd bedfellows) says this 
> “autonomous individual” is an illusion."
>       (RMP, Copleston) 
> 
> 
> 
> Marsha  
> 
> 
> 
> 
> On Aug 17, 2011, at 4:05 AM, Ian Glendinning wrote:
> 
>> Thanks Marsha,
>> 
>> So even an analytical buddhist agrees that "one must" ... attribute
>> free-will to self.
>> 
>> Ian
>> 
>> On Wed, Aug 17, 2011 at 8:59 AM, MarshaV <[email protected]> wrote:
>>> 
>>> 3.2.2  Role: Agent of actions and thinker of thoughts (autonomy)
>>> 
>>>  "The sense of boundedness is also brought out through considerations 
>>> pertaining to 'the self's' causal efficacy.  For most people take 
>>> themselves to be autonomous agents in virtue of their assumed causal 
>>> powers, thus relating directly to the 'role-occupiers'  _thinker of 
>>> thoughts_,  _initiator of actions_.  These roles point to common modes of 
>>> assumed self-identity.  How, more precisely, do we identify as such 
>>> thinkers and agents?  One way, already mentioned, is through 'this-ness': 
>>> the felt value attached to the idea that _I, this particular self_, as 
>>> opposed to some other self, am the agent of certain actions.  Another way 
>>> we construe ourselves to be thinking agents is through the feeling that our 
>>> deliberate actions are not the result of impersonal factors but, rather, of 
>>> special causal powers pertaining to free-will.  ---  _our_ free-will.  We 
>>> feel, in other words, that our choices are not blindly determined, but that 
>>> with any deliberate action, we could have chosen to
>>> do otherwise.  The feeling that one is able to exert unique causal powers 
>>> on the world through one's own thoughts and actions add weight to the 
>>> feeling of _being_ a separate, autonomous entity.  Identifying as a (free) 
>>> thinker and agent would thus plausibly evoke a sense of boundary between 
>>> our 'free' selves and the world with which we interact (including other 
>>> free agents).
>>> 
>>>  "But the feelings of freedom do not seem to stop there.  Like 'this-ness', 
>>> the belief in one's free-will seems to endow those free thoughts and 
>>> actions with value.  One takes particular pride or shame not only in the 
>>> apparent fact that _this_, as opposed _that_ kind of action.  It is through 
>>> this feeling of freedom that one feel's responsible for one's actions.  In 
>>> the extensive literature of free-will, it has been noted that anyone who 
>>> _truly_ believed there was no real choice in the matter --- that our every 
>>> action was determined from birth --- would not fully experience the 
>>> emotions of pride, shame, guilt, praise or blame, to name but a few.  It 
>>> seems that for these emotions to be properly felt, one must, at _some_ 
>>> level, buy into the assumption that it is possible to have chosen 
>>> differently.  We do not usually attribute heartfelt praise or blame to 
>>> behaviours we perceive as mechanistic or random (if we do, then it tends to 
>>> be through unconsciously anthropomorphising in
>>> animate objects such as stalling cars and red traffic lights!).  The 
>>> emotional investment in the outcome of one's actions serves to intensify 
>>> the sense of boundary between self-as-agent and other (or self-as-thinker 
>>> and other).   The associated roles, 'thinker of thoughts' and 'initiator of 
>>> actions' thus depict distinct and repetitive _modes_ in which we, as 
>>> subjects, identify with things (in the capacity of these roles), 
>>> underscoring the sense of boundary between self and other.  And the 
>>> associated sense of boundedness is best evidenced through the value we 
>>> attach to being, it would seem, a free author of our actions.
>>> 
>>>  "The reflections developed in this discussion on both 'this-ness' and 
>>> 'autonomy' (introduced by Baron) help to illuminate, from two different 
>>> angles, the sense of ontological uniqueness that we have.  The sense of 
>>> being a uniquely separate _thing_, whether as something special, or as 
>>> something autonomous, is strong evidence for our reflexive ascription of 
>>> boundedness to the self we assume we are.  We can also note its connection 
>>> with the long-running debate on free-will, and with the fact that many 
>>> philosophers, such as Kant and Frankfurt, have chosen to identify the most 
>>> central aspect of our 'selves' with 'the will'."
>>> 
>>>       (Albahari, Miri, 'Analytical Buddhism: The Two-tiered Illusion of 
>>> Self ', pp.96-97)
>>> 
>>> 
>>> 
>>> 
>>> 
>>> 
>>> 
>>> 
>>> 
>>> 
>>> ___
>>> 
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