Marsha, I don't call that rejection, but a warning as to the illusory nature of the autonomous individual self.
Many people's texts & titles associate self & will with illusory. It's real enough, (as real as anything in this world), just not quite what it appears to be. Ian On Wed, Aug 17, 2011 at 10:19 AM, MarshaV <[email protected]> wrote: > > Hi Ian, > > Yes, but Ms. Albahari's investigation is whether the 'sense of self' does, in > fact, reflect a real 'self'. A far more important investigation consider > that RMP rejects an autonomous self. > > > > "The MOQ, like the Buddhists and the Determinists (odd bedfellows) says this > “autonomous individual” is an illusion." > (RMP, Copleston) > > > > Marsha > > > > > On Aug 17, 2011, at 4:05 AM, Ian Glendinning wrote: > >> Thanks Marsha, >> >> So even an analytical buddhist agrees that "one must" ... attribute >> free-will to self. >> >> Ian >> >> On Wed, Aug 17, 2011 at 8:59 AM, MarshaV <[email protected]> wrote: >>> >>> 3.2.2 Role: Agent of actions and thinker of thoughts (autonomy) >>> >>> "The sense of boundedness is also brought out through considerations >>> pertaining to 'the self's' causal efficacy. For most people take >>> themselves to be autonomous agents in virtue of their assumed causal >>> powers, thus relating directly to the 'role-occupiers' _thinker of >>> thoughts_, _initiator of actions_. These roles point to common modes of >>> assumed self-identity. How, more precisely, do we identify as such >>> thinkers and agents? One way, already mentioned, is through 'this-ness': >>> the felt value attached to the idea that _I, this particular self_, as >>> opposed to some other self, am the agent of certain actions. Another way >>> we construe ourselves to be thinking agents is through the feeling that our >>> deliberate actions are not the result of impersonal factors but, rather, of >>> special causal powers pertaining to free-will. --- _our_ free-will. We >>> feel, in other words, that our choices are not blindly determined, but that >>> with any deliberate action, we could have chosen to >>> do otherwise. The feeling that one is able to exert unique causal powers >>> on the world through one's own thoughts and actions add weight to the >>> feeling of _being_ a separate, autonomous entity. Identifying as a (free) >>> thinker and agent would thus plausibly evoke a sense of boundary between >>> our 'free' selves and the world with which we interact (including other >>> free agents). >>> >>> "But the feelings of freedom do not seem to stop there. Like >>> 'this-ness', the belief in one's free-will seems to endow those free >>> thoughts and actions with value. One takes particular pride or shame not >>> only in the apparent fact that _this_, as opposed _that_ kind of action. >>> It is through this feeling of freedom that one feel's responsible for one's >>> actions. In the extensive literature of free-will, it has been noted that >>> anyone who _truly_ believed there was no real choice in the matter --- that >>> our every action was determined from birth --- would not fully experience >>> the emotions of pride, shame, guilt, praise or blame, to name but a few. >>> It seems that for these emotions to be properly felt, one must, at _some_ >>> level, buy into the assumption that it is possible to have chosen >>> differently. We do not usually attribute heartfelt praise or blame to >>> behaviours we perceive as mechanistic or random (if we do, then it tends to >>> be through unconsciously anthropomorphising in >>> animate objects such as stalling cars and red traffic lights!). The >>> emotional investment in the outcome of one's actions serves to intensify >>> the sense of boundary between self-as-agent and other (or self-as-thinker >>> and other). The associated roles, 'thinker of thoughts' and 'initiator of >>> actions' thus depict distinct and repetitive _modes_ in which we, as >>> subjects, identify with things (in the capacity of these roles), >>> underscoring the sense of boundary between self and other. And the >>> associated sense of boundedness is best evidenced through the value we >>> attach to being, it would seem, a free author of our actions. >>> >>> "The reflections developed in this discussion on both 'this-ness' and >>> 'autonomy' (introduced by Baron) help to illuminate, from two different >>> angles, the sense of ontological uniqueness that we have. The sense of >>> being a uniquely separate _thing_, whether as something special, or as >>> something autonomous, is strong evidence for our reflexive ascription of >>> boundedness to the self we assume we are. We can also note its connection >>> with the long-running debate on free-will, and with the fact that many >>> philosophers, such as Kant and Frankfurt, have chosen to identify the most >>> central aspect of our 'selves' with 'the will'." >>> >>> (Albahari, Miri, 'Analytical Buddhism: The Two-tiered Illusion of >>> Self ', pp.96-97) >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> ___ >>> >>> >>> Moq_Discuss mailing list >>> Listinfo, Unsubscribing etc. >>> http://lists.moqtalk.org/listinfo.cgi/moq_discuss-moqtalk.org >>> Archives: >>> http://lists.moqtalk.org/pipermail/moq_discuss-moqtalk.org/ >>> http://moq.org/md/archives.html >>> >> Moq_Discuss mailing list >> Listinfo, Unsubscribing etc. >> http://lists.moqtalk.org/listinfo.cgi/moq_discuss-moqtalk.org >> Archives: >> http://lists.moqtalk.org/pipermail/moq_discuss-moqtalk.org/ >> http://moq.org/md/archives.html > > > > ___ > > > Moq_Discuss mailing list > Listinfo, Unsubscribing etc. > http://lists.moqtalk.org/listinfo.cgi/moq_discuss-moqtalk.org > Archives: > http://lists.moqtalk.org/pipermail/moq_discuss-moqtalk.org/ > http://moq.org/md/archives.html > Moq_Discuss mailing list Listinfo, Unsubscribing etc. http://lists.moqtalk.org/listinfo.cgi/moq_discuss-moqtalk.org Archives: http://lists.moqtalk.org/pipermail/moq_discuss-moqtalk.org/ http://moq.org/md/archives.html
