Marsha, I'm not, I don't, I do, I agree already. Ian
On Wed, Aug 17, 2011 at 11:34 AM, MarshaV <[email protected]> wrote: > > > Ian, > > And I think I've said before if you want to play within the conventional > (static) reality, that is your choice. One can justify debating the number > of angels that can dance on a pin. The real changes will come when one,,,??? > > > > Copleston: > Now it is certain that it is only through action that a man can realize > himself, in the sense of actualizing his potentialities and developing his > personality towards the ideal state of harmonious integration of his powers. > > RMP: > Zen argues that it is through stillness, not action, that a man can realize > himself, in the sense of actualizing his potentialities and developing his > personality towards the ideal state of harmonious integration of his powers. > > Copleston: > And it is also obvious that every human act, in the proper sense of the term, > is motivated. It is performed in view of some immediate end or goal. > > RMP: > Quality > > Copleston: > But it is arguable that a man's motives are determined by his existing > character, in conjunction with other circumstances, and that character is > itself the result of empirical causes. > > RMP: > static quality. > > Copleston: > In this case are not a man's actions determined in such a way that what he > will be depends on what he is, what he is depending in turn on circumstances > other than his free choice? True, circumstances vary; but the ways in which > men react to varying circumstances seem to be determined. > > RMP: > statically > > Copleston: > And if all a man's acts are determined, is there any room for an ethical > theory which sets up a certain ideal of human personality as that which we > ought to strive to realize through our actions? > > RMP: > Yes, Dynamic Quality. > > Copleston: > Green is quite prepared to concede to the determinists a good deal of the > ground on which they base their case. But at the same time he tries to take > the sting out of these concessions. > > RMP: > The MOQ needs to concede nothing. > > > > > > On Aug 17, 2011, at 6:20 AM, Ian Glendinning wrote: > >> Marsha, I don't call that rejection, but a warning as to the illusory >> nature of the autonomous individual self. >> >> Many people's texts & titles associate self & will with illusory. It's >> real enough, (as real as anything in this world), just not quite what >> it appears to be. >> >> Ian >> >> On Wed, Aug 17, 2011 at 10:19 AM, MarshaV <[email protected]> wrote: >>> >>> Hi Ian, >>> >>> Yes, but Ms. Albahari's investigation is whether the 'sense of self' does, >>> in fact, reflect a real 'self'. A far more important investigation >>> consider that RMP rejects an autonomous self. >>> >>> >>> >>> "The MOQ, like the Buddhists and the Determinists (odd bedfellows) says >>> this “autonomous individual” is an illusion." >>> (RMP, Copleston) >>> >>> >>> >>> Marsha >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> On Aug 17, 2011, at 4:05 AM, Ian Glendinning wrote: >>> >>>> Thanks Marsha, >>>> >>>> So even an analytical buddhist agrees that "one must" ... attribute >>>> free-will to self. >>>> >>>> Ian >>>> >>>> On Wed, Aug 17, 2011 at 8:59 AM, MarshaV <[email protected]> wrote: >>>>> >>>>> 3.2.2 Role: Agent of actions and thinker of thoughts (autonomy) >>>>> >>>>> "The sense of boundedness is also brought out through considerations >>>>> pertaining to 'the self's' causal efficacy. For most people take >>>>> themselves to be autonomous agents in virtue of their assumed causal >>>>> powers, thus relating directly to the 'role-occupiers' _thinker of >>>>> thoughts_, _initiator of actions_. These roles point to common modes of >>>>> assumed self-identity. How, more precisely, do we identify as such >>>>> thinkers and agents? One way, already mentioned, is through 'this-ness': >>>>> the felt value attached to the idea that _I, this particular self_, as >>>>> opposed to some other self, am the agent of certain actions. Another way >>>>> we construe ourselves to be thinking agents is through the feeling that >>>>> our deliberate actions are not the result of impersonal factors but, >>>>> rather, of special causal powers pertaining to free-will. --- _our_ >>>>> free-will. We feel, in other words, that our choices are not blindly >>>>> determined, but that with any deliberate action, we could have chosen to >>>>> do otherwise. The feeling that one is able to exert unique causal >>>>> powers on the world through one's own thoughts and actions add weight to >>>>> the feeling of _being_ a separate, autonomous entity. Identifying as a >>>>> (free) thinker and agent would thus plausibly evoke a sense of boundary >>>>> between our 'free' selves and the world with which we interact (including >>>>> other free agents). >>>>> >>>>> "But the feelings of freedom do not seem to stop there. Like >>>>> 'this-ness', the belief in one's free-will seems to endow those free >>>>> thoughts and actions with value. One takes particular pride or shame not >>>>> only in the apparent fact that _this_, as opposed _that_ kind of action. >>>>> It is through this feeling of freedom that one feel's responsible for >>>>> one's actions. In the extensive literature of free-will, it has been >>>>> noted that anyone who _truly_ believed there was no real choice in the >>>>> matter --- that our every action was determined from birth --- would not >>>>> fully experience the emotions of pride, shame, guilt, praise or blame, to >>>>> name but a few. It seems that for these emotions to be properly felt, >>>>> one must, at _some_ level, buy into the assumption that it is possible to >>>>> have chosen differently. We do not usually attribute heartfelt praise or >>>>> blame to behaviours we perceive as mechanistic or random (if we do, then >>>>> it tends to be through unconsciously anthropomorphising in >>>>> animate objects such as stalling cars and red traffic lights!). The >>>>> emotional investment in the outcome of one's actions serves to intensify >>>>> the sense of boundary between self-as-agent and other (or self-as-thinker >>>>> and other). The associated roles, 'thinker of thoughts' and 'initiator >>>>> of actions' thus depict distinct and repetitive _modes_ in which we, as >>>>> subjects, identify with things (in the capacity of these roles), >>>>> underscoring the sense of boundary between self and other. And the >>>>> associated sense of boundedness is best evidenced through the value we >>>>> attach to being, it would seem, a free author of our actions. >>>>> >>>>> "The reflections developed in this discussion on both 'this-ness' and >>>>> 'autonomy' (introduced by Baron) help to illuminate, from two different >>>>> angles, the sense of ontological uniqueness that we have. The sense of >>>>> being a uniquely separate _thing_, whether as something special, or as >>>>> something autonomous, is strong evidence for our reflexive ascription of >>>>> boundedness to the self we assume we are. We can also note its >>>>> connection with the long-running debate on free-will, and with the fact >>>>> that many philosophers, such as Kant and Frankfurt, have chosen to >>>>> identify the most central aspect of our 'selves' with 'the will'." >>>>> >>>>> (Albahari, Miri, 'Analytical Buddhism: The Two-tiered Illusion of >>>>> Self ', pp.96-97) >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> ___ >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> Moq_Discuss mailing list >>>>> Listinfo, Unsubscribing etc. >>>>> http://lists.moqtalk.org/listinfo.cgi/moq_discuss-moqtalk.org >>>>> Archives: >>>>> http://lists.moqtalk.org/pipermail/moq_discuss-moqtalk.org/ >>>>> http://moq.org/md/archives.html >>>>> >>>> Moq_Discuss mailing list >>>> Listinfo, Unsubscribing etc. >>>> http://lists.moqtalk.org/listinfo.cgi/moq_discuss-moqtalk.org >>>> Archives: >>>> http://lists.moqtalk.org/pipermail/moq_discuss-moqtalk.org/ >>>> http://moq.org/md/archives.html >>> >>> >>> >>> ___ >>> >>> >>> Moq_Discuss mailing list >>> Listinfo, Unsubscribing etc. >>> http://lists.moqtalk.org/listinfo.cgi/moq_discuss-moqtalk.org >>> Archives: >>> http://lists.moqtalk.org/pipermail/moq_discuss-moqtalk.org/ >>> http://moq.org/md/archives.html >>> >> Moq_Discuss mailing list >> Listinfo, Unsubscribing etc. >> http://lists.moqtalk.org/listinfo.cgi/moq_discuss-moqtalk.org >> Archives: >> http://lists.moqtalk.org/pipermail/moq_discuss-moqtalk.org/ >> http://moq.org/md/archives.html > > > > ___ > > > Moq_Discuss mailing list > Listinfo, Unsubscribing etc. > http://lists.moqtalk.org/listinfo.cgi/moq_discuss-moqtalk.org > Archives: > http://lists.moqtalk.org/pipermail/moq_discuss-moqtalk.org/ > http://moq.org/md/archives.html > Moq_Discuss mailing list Listinfo, Unsubscribing etc. http://lists.moqtalk.org/listinfo.cgi/moq_discuss-moqtalk.org Archives: http://lists.moqtalk.org/pipermail/moq_discuss-moqtalk.org/ http://moq.org/md/archives.html
