On Aug 17, 2011, at 3:41 PM, Arlo Bensinger wrote: > [Marsha] > RMP has called an autonomous self is an illusion.. > > [Arlo] > Right, Marsha, he qualified by "autonomous", right? What he is saying is that > there are no existential existants, there are only patterns of value. This > includes the "self", just as it includes objects. I think you could reword > this, and Pirsig would agree, "the autonomous rock is an illusion". > > What is the "illusion" here is the primacy of subjects and objects, no? > > What sense does it make to say, within a MOQ, that one pattern of value is an > "illusion"? What would this even mean? If all patterns are patterns of value, > how can one be an "illusion" and another be "real"? What I am saying is that > "real" and "illusion" only mean anything from within the S/O context.
Marsha: RMP does, in fact, state that it is an illusion. I find no need to reword it. Perhaps he thought the self's illusory nature needed to be stressed. > [Marsha] > And in Lila's Child he states that the MoQ "denies any existence of a “self” > that is independent of inorganic, biological, social or intellectual > patterns. There is no “self” that contains these patterns." > > [Arlo] > Right, well this is just restating his hierarchy; everything is a pattern of > value (of or within these four levels) except DQ. So there is no "self" that > is apart from that. Right. So the "self" is a pattern of value. That was what > I said in my first reply. > > And, just as the human body (a biological pattern) is not independent of the > carbon atoms (inorganic patterns) from which it forms, the "self" pattern > also is not independent of the levels from which it forms. Marsha: Okay. > [Marsha] > At least that is how I understand it. I'm not sure how far apart are our > views. > > [Arlo] > I guess where they diverge is over the idea of "illusion", no? While I agree > the "autonomous self" is an "illusion", I think the "self" pattern of value > is neither real nor illusory but experientially valuable, and as such I ask > instead when/how such concepts are pragmatically useful and in what context. Marsha: Okay. I consider that RMP has stated that static quality represents all that can be conceptualized. I am interested in the mind, and it's relationship with a 'sense of self'. > [Arlo] > This is, I argue, just like asking if "Cartesian" coordinates are an > "illusion" and "Polar" coordinates "real". Ask, instead, which one provides > real empirical value in the context its being drawn upon. Marsha: I, too, consider first-hand experience important. > [Arlo] > I think I used this example before, but here it is again. Asking whether or > not my motorcycle is "real" in some existential sense, or just an illusion > (in contrast to being an existential existant), is to stay stuck in the world > of SOM. What I ask is how the stability of that pattern of value improves my > empirical activity. This was the point, I believe, Pirsig made about the > atomic bombs. What good does it do to say that the bombs that exploded over > Hiroshima and Nagasaki were "illusions"? Marsha: For me, my automobile, the story of Hiroshima and Nagasaki are static patterns of value. Also, I believe the remarks that RMP made about Hiroshima and Nagasaki were made in ZMM, where static patterns of value had not yet been developed. ___ Moq_Discuss mailing list Listinfo, Unsubscribing etc. http://lists.moqtalk.org/listinfo.cgi/moq_discuss-moqtalk.org Archives: http://lists.moqtalk.org/pipermail/moq_discuss-moqtalk.org/ http://moq.org/md/archives.html
